'Deterrence and stern diplomacy': where do we go from here?
“Deterrence and stern diplomacy”: where do we go from here?
WRITTEN BY EDWARD HOWELL
14 June 2021
The culmination of the long-awaited US-North Korea Policy Review was no real surprise. True to his pre-election campaign pledges, Biden did not advocate for any high-level engagement — not least presidential-level summitry, as per his predecessor — on the part of Washington towards Pyongyang. The North Korea Policy Review reiterated time-old axioms about the US’ approach towards its age-old adversary: a “calibrated, practical approach” to the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, characterised by “diplomacy and stern deterrence”.
While the White House has insisted that such an approach will comprise neither a "grand bargain nor will it rely on strategic patience", transforming such an ambiguous claim into empirical realities is no easy task. Biden’s emphasis on preserving Washington’s alliance with Seoul, as he recommits the US to South Korea both economically and politically, stands in stark contrast to the claims of his predecessor, who notoriously dismissed annual US-ROK defensive military exercises as a “waste of money”, threatened to withdraw the US forces from South Korea owing to reasons of cost, and accused US allies, not least South Korea and Japan, of “free-riding” off the security umbrella. These latter words, perhaps, were music to Kim Jong-un’s ears. Nevertheless, the failure of any concrete deal between Washington and Pyongyang, and subsequent stagnation in relations, has been one large step back in terms of progress, whether on the lofty goal of ‘denuclearisation’ or greater trust-building between the two sides. Indeed, earlier this year, North Korea notably rebuffed any attempts by the Biden administration to commence back-channel dialogue, a telling signal from Pyongyang that the regime will only talk when it feels it wants to do so.
Yet, of course, it is not all about Washington and Pyongyang. The efforts of South Korean President, Moon Jae-in, to pursue economic and political engagement with its northern counterpart, have borne little fruit. Despite Moon reiterating his support for the Biden administration’s policy, we must situate inter-Korean relations within the broader US-DPRK framework. Diplomacy and stern deterrence, while simultaneously supporting “inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation” — is this too good to be true?
Biden’s approach to North Korea: strategic patience 2.0?
Biden knows all too well that although ‘strategic patience’ towards the DPRK was the hallmark strategy of the second Obama administration, it was hardly a success. At its core, ‘strategic patience’ revolved around the idea that for any progress on denuclearisation and concessions from the international community, Pyongyang would have to make the first move. Without this first move, minimal dialogue would take place: according to this approach, not only would the international community need to be patient in waiting for North Korea to take the first step towards nuclear concessions, but so too would North Korea, for receiving any political or economic benefits from the international community.
Growing tensions in Sino-US relations vis-à-vis Taiwan and the treatment of Uyghur minorities in Xinjiang only underscore the Biden administration’s policy of maintaining stability over the possible unintended consequences of any attempt to reach out to Kim Jong-un.
It would, however, be too harsh to dismiss the strategy as a failure: Washington’s ties with Pyongyang were operating under severe constraints, including a then-highly conservative administration in Seoul, under Lee Myung-bak, who almost immediately reversed the Sunshine Policy instigated by Kim Dae-jung, and continued by Roh Moo-hyun. At the same time, one outcome of ‘strategic patience’ was a growing impatience on the part of the US and its allies. North Korea conducted four nuclear tests from 2009-2016, despite a marked increase in multilateral sanctions on the regime following its first nuclear test in October 2006. Indeed, the regime claimed — despite international scepticism — to have conducted its first hydrogen bomb test in January 2016.
Fast forward to 2021, and we will have to wait and see if Biden’s stance of deterrence and diplomacy is a repeat of ‘strategic patience’. Although at present, diplomacy seems to be contingent on whether North Korea shows a commitment towards denuclearisation, the veteran diplomats that constitute the Biden administration, specifically vis-à-vis its North Korea policy, may catalyse a more creative approach. Following the testing of short-range missile launches in March 2021, Biden highlighted how “if they [the DPRK] choose to escalate, we will respond accordingly”, but kept the door open for dialogue, arguing how he was “prepared for some form of diplomacy, but it has to be conditioned upon the end result of denuclearisation”. Yet, what might “some form” of diplomacy entail? Recent history informs us how working-level talks with the DPRK can quickly collapse — as was seen in the case of the Stockholm Talks in October 2019 — if North Korea does not feel its interests are being accommodated.
South Korea: time is running out
At the Moon-Biden summit in Washington, the South Korean leader praised his US counterpart for “express[ing] his support for the inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation”. Rhetoric aside, the ambition with which Moon Jae-in sought to pursue his policy of economic and political reconciliation has dissipated, due to growing fissures in the US-DPRK relationship. With the exit of the Trump administration, Moon’s attempt at pursuing a more independent policy towards the North, in a last-minute effort at salvaging his policy ambitions, has borne little fruit.
Despite the promise of inter-Korean economic cooperation and political reconciliation put forth in the ambiguous wording of the Panmunjom Declaration of April 2018, cooperation has steadily declined from the halcyon days of summitry both between the two Koreas, and, of course, the US and DPRK. Who can forget when the inter-Korean liaison office, a de facto embassy at Kaesong, established in line with the Declaration, was demolished by North Korea in June 2020 after activist groups from the South sent anti-DPRK leaflets across the DMZ? What is more, the South Korean government’s controversial subsequent decision to ban send such leaflets to the North has not only provoked outrage amongst activist groups in the South but, at its core, has failed to improve inter-Korean relations. North Korean provocations towards its Southern counterpart, both rhetorical and in the form of short-range missile tests, have not subsided. With activist groups in Seoul continuing to send such items, Pyongyang claimed to its citizens that such leaflets may form “a possible route of transmission” of coronavirus.
Back to the status quo?
Despite proclaiming the importance of denuclearisation, the Biden administration’s approach towards North Korea seems more accurately premised around reducing the threat from a nuclear-armed North rather than taking bold steps towards the lofty goal of compelling Pyongyang to make tangible nuclear concessions (whether through sanctions or engagement). Terse present relations between Washington and Beijing only complicate matters further, with Beijing keen to preserve stability on the Korean Peninsula, while simultaneously continuing its support for Pyongyang’s denuclearisation.
With increasing evidence of rising Sino-North Korean trade, following North Korea’s covid-induced closure of the Sino-DPRK border in January 2020, Beijing wishes both to maintain its precarious and somewhat begrudging relationship with Pyongyang. Growing tensions in Sino-US relations vis-à-vis Taiwan and the treatment of Uyghur minorities in Xinjiang only underscore the Biden administration’s policy of maintaining stability over the possible unintended consequences of any attempt to reach out to Kim Jong-un. The Biden administration recently appointed veteran diplomat Sung Kim as the Special Representative for North Korea Policy and has instigated plans to appoint a US Special Envoy on North Korean Human Rights Issues in the near future, a position that remained vacant during the Trump era.
Yet again, the international community seeks to address the problem of a nuclear North Korea, and the threats to regional and international stability posed by a regime that shows little intention of complying with international norms. The North Korea problem, however, does not stop with its nuclear weapons. As the Biden administration’s experienced team of veteran diplomats and negotiators seek to resolve all aspects of the North Korea issue, pertaining both to its nuclear programme and its human rights violations, we can safely say that once more, Pyongyang is proving a challenge for the international community.
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Author biography
Edward Howell is a Stipendiary Lecturer in Politics at New College, University of Oxford. His research expertise is focused on the Korean Peninsula and the international relations of East Asia. Image credit: Wikipedia.