Convergence without cooperation: Why US–India maritime cooperation isn’t ready for a crisis

WRITTEN BY DR. SAHAR KHAN AND ANUTTAMA BANERJI

11 May 2026

The United States and India increasingly describe their maritime partnership as a cornerstone of stability in the Indo-Pacific. Over the past decade, the relationship has deepened through a series of foundational agreements, such as the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), Transforming the Relationship Utilizing Strategic Technology (TRUST), and India-US Defense Acceleration Ecosystem (INDUS-X), which together provide the legal and technical scaffolding for cooperation. Combined with high-profile joint exercises like Malabar, the trajectory appears clear: two maritime powers are managing a contested Indo-Pacific order.

The Iran war, however, has revealed a sobering reality: despite institutional convergence, the US and India are not yet capable of operating together in a real-world contingency. Due to the ongoing blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, India has deployed naval assets to protect merchant shipping and conduct humanitarian operations, but coordination with US forces remains limited. From New Delhi’s perspective, the Iran war may serve as a referendum on US military decision-making and its broader strategic costs. Incidents such as the sinking of the Iranian vessel IRIS Dena in the Indian Ocean — an area India considers central to its sphere of operations — further erode trust between the US and India.

Exercises without integration: political constraints and logistical challenges

Joint exercises remain the most visible manifestation of US–India maritime cooperation. Malabar has evolved into a sophisticated, multi-domain exercise encompassing anti-submarine warfare, carrier operations, and networked surveillance, while Exercise Tiger Triumph reflects growing ambition in joint and combined operations. As the Iran conflict spills into the Indian Ocean, both navies are responding to the same disruptions — securing sea lines of communication, monitoring escalation, and escorting vessels — but largely in parallel rather than as an integrated force.

The issue is not the absence of interaction but the absence of integration. This gap has long existed. Even in earlier instances, such as Operation Sagittarius in 2002, when the Indian Navy escorted US supply vessels through the Malacca Straits to support US operations in Afghanistan, cooperation remained episodic and ad hoc. Today’s environment is far more complex: congested sea lanes, blurred distinctions between civilian and military targets, and persistent escalation risks. The Iran war offers a preview of future contingencies — whether in the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, or Indian Ocean itself — where real-time coordination will be essential. Without it, the partnership risks remaining strategically symbolic but operationally thin.

A central weakness in the partnership is the absence of shared operational experience. Unlike US treaty allies, India has not participated in high-intensity contingencies alongside US forces. This limits trust, slows decision-making, and increases the risk of misalignment.

Interoperability is often framed as a technical challenge, but in the US–India context it is primarily political. Agreements such as Communications, Compatibility, and Security Agreement (COMCASA) enable secure communications and data-sharing systems like Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS), theoretically allowing both sides to operate on shared networks. Yet the Iran war has shown that technical compatibility does not guarantee operational coordination. India remains cautious about fully integrating into US-led frameworks, a hesitation that reflects its longstanding commitment to strategic autonomy and concerns about entrapment in conflicts where it has limited stakes. New Delhi has also sought to balance its relationships with Washington, Tehran, and Gulf partners, while avoiding the perception of alignment in a US-led conflict. It also wishes to see alignment within US combatant commands in their outlook toward the Indian Ocean Region.

For its part, the US has not fully resolved India’s place within its security architecture. The designation of “Major Defence Partner” accommodates Indian sensitivities around strategic autonomy but leaves ambiguity in crisis scenarios. This ambiguity shapes the extent of operational access and intelligence-sharing Washington is willing to provide. The result is a ceiling on interoperability that becomes most visible in wartime. Systems may be compatible, but their use is constrained by political caution. The Iran war underscores that interoperability depends as much on aligned intent as on integrated technology.

LEMOA is often cited as a breakthrough, enabling reciprocal logistical access. In theory, it allows US and Indian forces to extend operational reach across the Indo-Pacific. India has deliberately framed LEMOA as a logistical arrangement rather than anything close to a basing agreement, emphasizing that India has the right to refuse a US proposal for joint military exercises and access to Indian logistical facilities. LEMOA’s emphasis on reciprocity allows India to preserve its strategic autonomy and avoid the optics of alliance behaviour. The Iran war highlights the limitations of this reciprocity.

Viable paths of cooperation: maritime domain awareness, operational habits, and industrial links

If there is a functional core to US–India maritime cooperation, it is maritime domain awareness (MDA). Both countries recognise that the ability to track and understand activity across the Indian Ocean is critical to shaping the regional security environment. Shared MDA — enabled through maritime situational awareness and technology-sharing — offers a practical confidence-building pathway. The Iran war reinforces the importance of this domain. Disruptions to shipping, rerouting of vessels, and the presence of multiple naval actors have created an unprecedented demand for real-time maritime visibility. India’s investments in coastal radar networks, information fusion centres such as the Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR), and commercial satellite data platforms like SeaVision and HawkEye 360 complement US global surveillance capabilities.

Yet, MDA remains underutilised. Information is shared but not fully integrated, and fusion centres function more as coordination hubs than operational nodes. Even during an active conflict, shared awareness has not consistently translated into coordinated action. While IFC-IOR has demonstrated value in non-traditional scenarios such as piracy — most notably during the MV Ruen incident — it has not been fully tested in state-based maritime crises. This gap is particularly concerning as Chinese naval activity expands into the Indian Ocean, including submarine deployments and dual-use research vessels. Monitoring these movements — especially through chokepoints such as the Ombai-Wetar Strait — requires sustained, coordinated surveillance.

MDA offers the most politically viable pathway for deepening cooperation. It is less escalatory than joint combat operations and more immediately actionable than defence industrial integration. The challenge is moving from passive information sharing to active coordination.

A central weakness in the partnership is the absence of shared operational experience. Unlike US treaty allies, India has not participated in high-intensity contingencies alongside US forces. This limits trust, slows decision-making, and increases the risk of misalignment. The solution lies in building operational habits through practice. Joint responses to non-traditional challenges — piracy, illegal fishing, humanitarian assistance, and grey-zone coercion — can serve as testing grounds for coordination. And while the US and India have coordinated on these issues, they have not yet developed shared expectations and routines, indicating that existing agreements are underutilised. The Iran war further underscores the cost of not having these habits in place.

Defence industrial cooperation is often presented as the next frontier of US–India relations. India seeks co-production and technology transfer, consistent with its goal of becoming aatmanirbhar (self-reliant) in defence manufacturing. Initiatives such as the renamed TRUST aim to facilitate this shift, but structural barriers — including export controls, intellectual property concerns, and regulatory mismatches — have constrained collaboration. The absence of a Reciprocal Defense Procurement agreement further complicates supply chain integration. While there is a clear strategic rationale for deeper cooperation, both sides need to make adjustments. The US must move beyond a transactional model of arms sales, while India must streamline procurement processes and navigate regulatory frameworks such as the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR), Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), and Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS). Successful examples of co-production — such as India–Japan collaboration on the Uniform Complex Radio Antenna (UNICORN) mast and Mogami-class frigate — demonstrate what is possible. Replicating such models in the US–India context will depend on sustained trust and political commitment.

From symbolic alignment to real effectiveness

The US–India maritime partnership has achieved significant institutional progress, but institutional density does not equal operational effectiveness. The Iran war highlights the central challenge: translating alignment into coordinated action. Closing this gap will require prioritising implementation over expansion. This includes operationalising interoperability, clarifying logistical arrangements, leveraging MDA for real-time coordination, and advancing industrial cooperation. While the US and India do not need a formal alliance, they do need to move beyond the assumption that convergence alone is sufficient. In an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific, effectiveness — not alignment — will determine whether the partnership shapes regional outcomes or remains reactive to them.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writers and do not necessarily represent those of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biographies

Anuttama Banerji is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Aerospace and Strategic Studies, New Delhi. Previously, she was a Research Associate at the National Maritime Foundation, also in New Delhi. She graduated with a Master’s in International Relations from London School of Economics in 2018. Her research focuses on water and maritime security as well as South Asian geopolitics.

Dr. Sahar Khan is a 2026 Nonresident Fellow at the Institute of Global Affairs and co-host of a new podcast called “Beyond the Lines of Control” which focuses on South Asian regional security. Previously, she was the Deputy Director and Senior Fellow of the Stimson Center’s South Asia Program, Research Fellow in Defense and Foreign Policy at the Cato Institute, and managing editor of Inkstick Media.

Image credit: US Pacific Fleet.