China-Nepal territorial tensions: Lessons from history
China-Nepal territorial tensions: Lessons from history
WRITTEN BY SANJAY PULIPAKA AND MOHIT MUSADDI
16 November 2020
In recent weeks, Nepal’s border-problem with China has been the subject of intense discussion. With much focus this year on Nepal’s border with India, a serious development has emerged involving allegations regarding Chinese encroachments in the Humla district (located near the Lapcha Pass and Limi Valley) of Nepal where Beijing has reportedly constructed nine new buildings.
Nepal’s Foreign Ministry issued a press statement clarifying that the construction activity does not fall under the jurisdiction of the aforementioned Humla district. However, a former Minister for Tourism in the Federal Government has claimed (following a visit to the region) that there is indeed evidence of construction activity by Beijing on Nepalese soil. Moreover, a student wing of the Nepali Congress (NC) held protests in Dharchula last month against the reported encroachment, including voicing the slogan 'Back off China'. Although China and Nepal have a clear and delineated border, there has been occasional anxiety regarding the People Liberation Army’s intent and conduct along the frontier.
Persistent claims
A declassified US policy document from December 1959 reveals that concerns in Kathmandu about a possible Chinese infiltration across the western sector of the Sino-Nepalese border near Limi, is, in fact, nothing new. The same report also reveals that the Nepalese army believed that areas of Mustang (north of the Himalayan range) could also be under threat of Chinese infiltration. Eventually, the People’s Liberation Army did enter Mustang in the summer of 1960 and killed at least one soldier and captured Nepali villagers on the pretext that they were suppressing 'Tibetan rebels'.
Chinese scholars reportedly made a case for Tajikistan to 'return’ the Pamir region, which once ‘belonged to China’. This perhaps is a signal that Beijing is keen to develop greater control of territories adjoining the troubled provinces of Xinjiang and Tibet.
In the 1960s, Chinese forces had to contend with Tibetan insurgent groups operating out of Mustang. In response to the security challenge, China (reportedly) flirted with the idea of claiming parts of the Mustang region. To this day the area continues to attract Beijing’s attention. Edward Wong, writing for the New York Times in 2013, noted that Beijing has kept a close watch on Mustang “to stem the flows of disaffected Tibetans fleeing to Nepal” and military officials have been dispatched to Nepal to discuss the issue of “border security”. In 2017, a former Indian Foreign Secretary who was also Ambassador to Nepal observed that “the Chinese have encroached on and occupied a big chunk of Nepali territory in Mustang”. Even so, the Foreign Secretary’s observations were refuted by Nepali scholars who relied on the Nepal Department of Survey’s conclusions that no such encroachment had taken place.
Furthermore, there have been instances where China’s state media has erroneously depicted parts of Nepal as sitting within its borders. In May 2020, the Chinese state-owned broadcaster CGTN tweeted that Mount Everest is located in 'China’s Tibet Autonomous Region'. Following significant push back from Nepali civil society and politicians, CGTN posted a revised tweet stating the peek stood on the China-Nepal border.
This is not the first time Beijing has claimed Mount Everest. In 1960, a Chinese produced map included not only Mount Everest but also the entire Mahalangur range in the Himalayas (within 5 miles of the border). A subsequent border agreement mandated that Kathmandu would control the south side of the mountain while Beijing controlled the north. It should be noted that in 2016, China completed a paved road to Everest Base Camp on the north side of the mountain.
Count your fingers
Given decades of Chinese interest in Nepali territory and the asymmetric nature of the bilateral relationship, these repeated incidents are difficult to brush aside. Beijing’s ambitions are of course part of a larger strategy towards the Himalayan region, often referred to as the ‘five fingers of the Tibetan palm’. In the 1950s Mao Zedong argued that Xizang (Tibet) was China’s right palm and Beijing, therefore, had a responsibility to 'liberate' the five adjoining fingers. These included Nepal, Bhutan as well as India’s Ladakh, Sikkim, and the North-East Frontier Agency (today known as Arunachal Pradesh). It seems that this aspiration continues to inform the strategic thinking among Beijing's policymakers.
Ongoing border contestation along the India-China Line of Actual Control (LAC) has recently received considerable attention (especially within Nepal). China’s recent interest regarding Bhutan’s territory should also be noted in this context. Beijing’s sudden claim in relation to Bhutan’s Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary (SWS), with which it does not share a contiguous territorial border and which has not featured in 36 years of diplomatic talks could imply that Beijing, in the near future, may seek to adopt a similarly fluid approach to the other 'fingers’ of the Tibetan palm. Furthermore, in July, Chinese scholars reportedly made a case for Tajikistan to 'return’ the Pamir region, which once ‘belonged to China’. This perhaps is a signal that Beijing is keen to develop greater control of territories adjoining the troubled provinces of Xinjiang and Tibet.
The battle for history
Moreover, Chinese territorial claims are often preceded by historical reinterpretations. Nepal and Tibet had robust economic engagement before the Qin emperor’s army intervened in 1792, therefore, as has been the case in various other territorial contestations, China may seek to selectively interpret outcomes stemming from historical events. For example, several Chinese sources have defined the outcome of the Nepal-Tibet-China contestation of 1792 for Kathmandu as a loss of territory (Kerung and Kuti), recognition of Chinese suzerainty and acceptance of vassal status to the Chinese Emperor for which tribute was paid till 1911. On the other hand, Nepali history textbooks from 1975 have defined the outcome of the war in terms of a boundary settlement. Should China seek to claim territory through a creative interpretation of history, historians of Nepal may argue that owing to the prevalence of Nepal’s currency in Tibet, that Kathmandu is in a position to make similar claims. In fact, in 1959, Nepal’s Premier B.P. Koirala in noted, “historically, we [Nepal] had… suzerainty over Tibet… Tibet used to pay Nepal annual tributes in cash and kind".
Given Xi Jinping’s call to build an 'impregnable fortress' in Tibet, and China’s recent aggression and claims in Ladakh and Bhutan, persistent reports regarding Beijing’s activity on Nepal’s border now means closer scrutiny and regular monitoring is required. One should not dismiss the possibility of Nepal becoming the next target of China’s creeping territorial assertions. In order to counter any such action, Kathmandu should work towards a three-pronged approach. First, it must carefully monitor Chinese actions and statements. Second, it may wish to consider scaling up its strategic partnerships with larger like-minded powers and, finally, Kathmandu should be in a position to draw upon existing scholarship and present its historical records to contest any renewed Chinese territorial assertions.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Sanjay Pulipaka is a Senior Fellow at the Delhi Policy Group, India. He was a Pavate Fellow at the University of Cambridge and a former Fulbright Fellow in the United States.
Mohit Musaddi is a Research Associate at the Delhi Policy Group. He has a Masters in International Relations from the War Studies Department of King's College London. Image Credit: Flickr/Robert Nunn