China-Maldives military agreement: an upgrade to the bilateral relationship

16 April 2024

Following the swearing-in ceremony of Mohamed Muizzu as the new President of the Republic of Maldives in November 2023, the relationship between the island nation and its neighbour India has begun to sour. At the same time, the Maldives has successfully found a new economic and security partner, the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

Over the past decade, China-Maldives relations have continued to grow closer, especially after the construction of the China-Maldives Friendship Bridge in 2018 under the Belt and Road Initiative. Since his inauguration, President Muizzu has forged stronger ties with China, leading to an upgrade of the bilateral partnership, including its military cooperation, as demonstrated by the signing of the new military agreement.

Through obtaining “the different forms of training required by the Maldives' military” and by granting “various non-lethal military equipment free of charge” as part of this new military pact, the PRC could harness a more significant military influence in the Indian Ocean, which is of particularly concern to India. This evolving China-Maldives relationship is altering regional dynamics in the Indian Ocean, exacerbating tensions with India, and amplifying China’s influence in the region and beyond.

A new military agreement between the PRC and Maldives

On 4 March, the Maldivian Minister of Defence, Mohamed Ghassan Maumoon, signed a new agreement with Major General Zhang Baoqun, Deputy Director of the Office for International Military Cooperation of the PRC, which entails the provision of free military assistance by the PRC to the island. Although little is known regarding the details of the agreement, it marks a significant shift in the bilateral relationship from a primarily economic to a security partnership.

The Maldives finds itself caught in a tug-of-war between India and China. However, Malé under Muizzu’s presidency has shown increasing openness towards China as it strives to navigate the balance between the two countries and maintain its own sovereignty.

The signing of the agreement signifies a growing closeness between the Maldives and PRC since Muizzu’s election as president. In November 2023, Beijing sent a special envoy to the swearing-in ceremony of the then President-elect. The last visit by a Chinese president to the island nation was Xi’s in 2014. Nevertheless, President Muizzu travelled to Beijing in January 2024, marking the 10th anniversary of Xi’s visit to the Maldives. As part of Muizzu’s state visit, both sides signed “an action plan to establish the China-Maldives comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership and multiple bilateral cooperation documents on Belt and Road cooperation, disaster management, economy and technology, and the blue and digital economies, green development, infrastructure, and people's livelihoods, among other fields”.

In late February 2024, shortly after Muizzu concluded his visit to China, the Chinese research vessel Xiang Yang Hong 3 successfully docked in Malé. However, the same vessel had previously attempted to make a resupply port call in Sri Lanka, which was denied as the Sri Lankan government, amid controversy, had declared a one-year moratorium on the docking of foreign research vessels. The decision followed discontent by India over the docking of similar research vessels at the Chinese-leased port of Hambantota in the past, such as the Yuan Wang 5 in August 2022 and Shi Yan 6 in October 2023 in Colombo.

This action stems from a growing recognition that Chinese port calls and research vessels can serve dual-use and military purposes, and is aimed at expanding Beijing’s influence at foreign ports and locations. Meanwhile, Beijing may interpret the willingness of foreign countries to host these port calls as an opportunity to strengthen bilateral relations and potentially expand security cooperation.

Currently, the Maldives finds itself caught in a tug-of-war between India and China. However, Malé under Muizzu’s presidency has shown increasing openness towards China as it strives to navigate the balance between the two countries and maintain its own sovereignty.

Maldives balancing between India and China

The Maldives has long partnered with India for security and economic assistance. In the past, India solidified this relationship by gifting a Dornier aircraft to the Maldives in August 2022 and a patrol vessel and landing craft in May 2023. However, with the election of Muizzu and the ‘India Out’ platform he campaigned for during his campaign, current Indian military personnel stationed in the island nation have been ordered to withdraw. By 10 May 2024, approximately 80 Indian troops operating these gifted assets are expected to leave the country.

Following the announcement of the new China-Maldives military agreement on 6 March, India declared the commissioning of a new naval base in Minicoy, an Indian island situated around 125 kilometres from the Maldives. The Indian government stated that this new naval base, INS Jatayu, “strengthens Indian Navy's foothold in the Lakshadweep island while extending capacity building, operational reach and sustenance in the region”.

As Indian military personnel are leaving the Maldives, India’s decision to establish a base in Minicoy carries significant implications. It not only aims to deter China’s growing influence in the Maldives and India’s proximity but also seeks to extend its power projection into the broader Indian Ocean region. Considering the recent announcement by China and the Maldives to explore plans for implementing China’s Global Security Initiative alongside other common goals, it is likely that India will keep a close eye on China’s activities in the Maldives.

Despite the Maldives forging a closer security partnership with China through the military pact, this has definitely not ended the India-Maldives bilateral relationship. President Muizzu recently tried to reassure the neighbouring country by calling India its ‘closest ally’ and expressed hope that “India will accommodate debt relief measures for the Maldives' in the repayment of the hefty loans taken from the country over consecutive governments.” Rather than completely alienating one country, Muizzu has begun to carefully rebalance and strategically assert the Maldives’ position in the India-China relations after his initial hardline approach.

Implications for China’s influence in the Indian Ocean

As the China-Maldives relationship strengthens, this development holds significant implications for China’s influence abroad, as well as regional dynamics in the Indian Ocean and Indo-Pacific.

In recent years, the PRC has embarked on a sustained campaign abroad to secure its maritime and military power outside its borders in the Indian Ocean and beyond, through investments in port projects and the establishment of military installations in locations such as Djibouti and the Cambodian Ream Naval Base.

Military cooperation with the Maldives could provide China with a sure means to expand its power and increase its access to the Indian Ocean.

However, since no official agreement has been released beyond Muizzu stating that this new pact would include training and equipment, the extent of access granted to the Chinese military through the new agreement remains unseen. Still, concerns have already been raised by the Maldivian Democratic Party Chairperson, Fayyaz Ismail, about potential Chinese military efforts in the island nation.

As India-China relations have long been rattled, the world’s two largest nations by population continue to compete for regional influence amid China’s growing power. The Maldives’ decision to partner with China militarily while removing Indian military presence from its islands may further upset India and lead to a more hostile perception of Beijing’s efforts to exert global influence. Although the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the agreement “does not target any third party and will not be disrupted by any third party”, Beijing’s claim appears doubtful in light of past discontent by India over China’s similar past behaviour in Sri Lanka.

In its pursuit of influence and power on the international stage, Beijing has increasingly sought partnerships and agreements with smaller nations and island countries. In the Indian Ocean, this is evident in the cases of the Maldives and Sri Lanka. These nations are often caught in the competition for new allies and partners while also delicately balancing relations with competing nations. Correspondingly, Beijing has competed with countries like the United States and Australia in the Indo-Pacific region to bolster partnerships and security agreements. A recent example of success against Beijing’s widening influence has been AUKUS, which facilitates trilateral security cooperation in the forms on nuclear-powered submarines and beyond.

Amid a flurry of recent interactions between the two countries, the latest development in China-Maldives relations comes as no surprise. Moving forward, the Maldives will continue to strike a careful balance between India and other partners, including the PRC, to fulfil its interests. However, the future trajectory of this bilateral relationship will determine the extent of China’s growing military and maritime influence in the Indian Ocean. And accordingly, India is paying close attention to China’s activities in the Maldives, as should the rest of the world.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Lea Thome is the Schwarzman Fellow at the Wilson Center, affiliated with the Kissinger Institute on China and the United States. She holds a bachelor’s degree in political science and international relations with a minor in Chinese from the University of Rochester. She was named a Schwarzman Scholar, graduating with a master’s degree in global affairs from Tsinghua University. Originally hailing from Germany, she has dedicated her research to studying international security and US-China relations issues. Image credit: Presidency.mv (cropped).