Charting the future: US elections and the evolving US-Japan alliance

17 April 2024

The US is Japan’s most important global ally and significantly influences Japan's national security and economy. However, this influence brings increased risk for Japan in the event of changes within the American political system and its policies. Japan is concerned and therefore feels pressure to strengthen the alliance system built with the Biden administration. It seeks to promote the implementation of newly introduced strategies to make them more binding and prevent a major change in course should Donald Trump win the election.

Under President Biden and Prime Minister Kishida, the US-Japan alliance has seen a period of significant strengthening and strategic alignment, particularly in the face of shared challenges in the Indo-Pacific region. In other words, “The Biden administration has positioned the US-Japan alliance at the centre of its Indo-Pacific strategy”.

Never before has there been such a convergence of ideas, approaches, and capabilities as during the Biden-Kishida administrations. They try to address global challenges both bilaterally and multilaterally through the G7, G20, and the Quad, as well as trilaterally with South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia. For both countries, strong alliances with like-minded partners are key to their strategies. This is in particular true when it comes to challenges linked to China. Japan has been the United States’ most willing ally in the Indo-Pacific to explicitly criticise Chinese behaviour, naming China as Japan’s biggest strategic challenge in its National Security Strategy released at the end of 2022.

Japan joined the coalition to support Ukraine and revised its three strategic security documents (the National Security Strategy NSS, the National Defense Strategy NDS, and the Defense Buildup Program), which include USD 285 billion in defence spending over five years starting in 2023, and set a goal of increasing annual defence spending to 2 per cent of GDP by 2027. This move has been commended by President Biden and is seen as a bolster to security across the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, under Kishida's leadership, Japan has not only expanded its traditional economic relationships but also signed several security cooperation agreements with countries such as Australia, Germany, the UAE, and the US to strengthen and expand its network of like-minded partners in multiple areas. Most importantly, during its successful G7 presidency in 2023, Kishida strongly promoted the discussion around economic security and adopted the first-ever economic security promotion law.

With these approaches, Prime Minister Kishida is sending a powerful signal that Japan is an Indo-Pacific security ally upon which the US can rely. Additionally, it is trying to fulfil the requests of several past US administrations to play a more proactive role on the global stage.

Japan worries about the upcoming US election

The forthcoming US presidential election has various implications for Japan and the US-Japan alliance. When communicating with representatives from the Japanese administration, one typically receives an official response indicating that Japan seeks strong and positive relations with the United States, regardless of who becomes the next US president. However, upon closer examination of the Japanese domestic political landscape, there are several indications that people are worried about the upcoming elections.

The Biden administration prefers cooperative approaches with allies, while President Trump prioritised unilateral approaches and personal relationships over longstanding US alliances during his previous administration. Tokyo is concerned that it may not be able to rely on a stable alliance between the two countries, despite its efforts under Kishida to position itself as indispensable to the US in the Indo-Pacific. These concerns are primarily centred on the potential escalation of pressure on Japan and South Korea to bear the cost of stationing US troops, which could be heightened by frequent threats of withdrawal.

While the late Prime Minister Abe was successful in establishing a positive personal relationship with President Trump, it cannot be assumed that the same would apply to Prime Minister Kishida. Additionally, Trump's perception of Japan as an essential ally for the US remains unclear. This makes it even more important for Tokyo to continue stabilising the trilaterals and its numerous alliances with partners beyond the US.

In Japan’s business sector, the speculative phrase “moshi tora”, meaning “if Trump” has become widespread, indicating various industrial scenarios developed in the Japanese business sector for the possibility of a Trump presidency.

Concerning China, while there have been several instances of alignment between the strategies of the Biden and Kishida administrations, such as Japan's participation in limiting the export of advanced semiconductor equipment to China, disparities remain. In particular, these concerns further economic security measures against China, where Japan expects a much stronger stance under a Trump administration. Japan is in a quandary, as forging closer ties with the US to enhance its competitive position vis-à-vis China risks exacerbating Beijing's leverage over Japan's dependencies on China. If Sino-Japanese relations soured, Beijing could resort to retaliatory actions that could significantly impact Japan, with the possibility for such measures to become more frequent amid escalating strategic competition between the US and China.

Japan's latest Diplomatic Bluebook 2024 signals a desire to promote a “mutually beneficial strategic relationship and build a constructive and stable bilateral relationship” with China. This could lead to increased scrutiny of Japanese businesses investing in critical US technologies and their potential connections with China. Furthermore, Tokyo is committed to maintaining the language and message agreed upon by the G7 to counter China. It is concerned that Trump’s potential return to power may result in a different language or economic approach. Additionally, Tokyo is greatly concerned about a potential change in course regarding support for Taiwan in the event of a conflict.

In Japan’s business sector, the speculative phrase “moshi tora”, meaning “if Trump” has become widespread, indicating various industrial scenarios developed in the Japanese business sector for the possibility of a Trump presidency. Japan is the fifth-largest US trading partner for exports (USD 120 billion in 2022) and imports (USD 188 billion in 2022). Also, Japan is the largest source of FDI in the US with more than USD 700 billion in 2022. In their second “economic 2+2” meeting in November 2023, the US and Japan agreed on continued coordination of shared priorities and efforts to make their economies more competitive and resilient.

Tokyo revitalises and expands its connections in the US

During the historic Summit on 10 April, Prime Minister Kishida and President Biden reaffirmed the significance of bilateral relations and reinforced collaborative approaches by raising the alliance to an unprecedented “higher and different level”. In their joint leaders’ statement, they agreed to further synchronise their strategies and introduced an immense upgrade of their defence ties by agreeing on 70 different pacts on defence cooperation, “the largest set of substantial, significant deliverables” so far. Additionally, Kishida toured regional cities in the US to “highlight achievements by local Japanese companies through their investments”. This is particularly important amid the current uncertainty surrounding Nippon Steel’s proposed purchase of US Steel, as President Biden’s stance remains unclear and Donald Trump has already expressed an intention to block the deal. This deal exemplifies the delicate balance required in relations between even the closest of allies. While underlining the importance of the US-Japan alliance, it also signals distrust due to domestic pressures and interests.

The Japanese Foreign Ministry has fully mobilised the Japanese Embassy in Washington DC and reactivated personal connections and lobbying efforts to navigate the current American political landscape. Despite increasing Japan’s government-related lobbying expenditure in the US by 13.4 per cent compared to last year, Japan has made efforts to engage with members of a potential Trump administration. This includes dispatching senior ruling-party figure Taro Aso to try to meet with Trump himself and engaging with Trump-aligned think tanks and former US officials. However, ironically, Tokyo’s good relations with the Biden administration may complicate the relationship-building efforts with Trump’s team in the future.

Nevertheless, the future of the US-Japan alliance is not solely determined by the next US president, it also depends on the survival of the Kishida premiership. Party president elections are scheduled for this fall, but numerous political scandals have muddied the waters for Prime Minister Kishida. Japan’s decade-long relative political stability, which has provided a good foundation for closer Japan-US strategic alignment, may now be at risk, since the support for the Kishida cabinet has surged to 67 per cent. Domestic upheavals do not automatically imply a severe shift in Japan’s foreign policy direction or in its relations with the US. Rather, the low trust of Japanese public opinion in its government may limit the tenure of Japan’s prime minister and prevent continuity in Japan’s politics and relationship-building with international counterparts. This, in turn, could potentially backfire on Japan’s position as a key ally for the US in the Indo-Pacific.

The US-Japan alliance has demonstrated remarkable resilience. It survived the first Trump administration and emerged stronger under Biden. As Japan must prepare to navigate the uncertainties of the upcoming US elections, its leaders will continue to work for stability, even if the unpredictable winds of American politics blow once more. However, the prospect of a second Trump administration is already exerting pressure on Japan to bolster the resilience of its system of alliances and encourage the implementation or even institutionalisation of approaches introduced to make them more binding and prevent ‘unwinding’.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Dr Elli-Katharina Pohlkamp is the Director of the Agora Strategy Institute and a Visiting Fellow at the Asia Programme of the European Council on Foreign Relations. Image credit: Wikimedia/首相官邸