Canada and the Philippines: A fast-rising security partnership reshaping Ottawa's Indo-Pacific posture
Canada and the Philippines: A fast-rising security partnership reshaping Ottawa's Indo-Pacific posture
WRITTEN BY JONATHAN BERKSHIRE MILLER
18 November 2025
Canada's Indo-Pacific ambitions have long struggled against their own gravitational pull. For decades, Ottawa's engagement in the region drifted between diplomatic aspiration and operational hesitation, rarely settling into a sustained posture that matched its rhetoric. Yet the ground is shifting. Among Canada's regional relationships, one stands out not only for its pace but for its strategic clarity: the Philippines. What began as a cautious alignment has grown into the fastest-growing security partnership Canada has anywhere in the Indo-Pacific — a shift with implications well beyond the bilateral relationship itself.
This evolution reflects a deeper strategic change underway in Ottawa. Rather than scattering its attention across the region, Canada has begun anchoring its Indo-Pacific presence where it can add meaningful weight and where its values-driven approach aligns with concrete strategic needs. The Philippines fits this calculus almost perfectly. It sits at the centre of the maritime contest shaping the region's future; it faces daily coercive pressure that tests norms Canada considers existential to its own national interests; and it is seeking partners who bring reliability, clarity, and political steadiness. For Canada, the Philippines is no longer just a Southeast Asian partner — it is the place where Ottawa's Indo-Pacific strategy is finally taking recognisable form.
New momentum bolsters ties
The Status of Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) signed this November marked the inflection point. It is more than a legal mechanism of access; it has transformed how officials in the two capitals think about the relationship. Canadian naval and air planners view the Philippines now as a country where operations can be sustained, not just conducted. Philippine defence officials increasingly treat Canada as a partner with a predictable role, rather than an occasional presence. It is the kind of agreement which builds habits, and in security relationships, habits matter.
For the first time in years, Ottawa is treating the Indo-Pacific not as a region of opportunities to sample but as a theatre in which it must choose where to invest.
Canada's motivations are not abstract. Ottawa's national security community is increasingly grappling with the reality that events in the South China Sea carry direct consequences for Canadian prosperity and global stability. The Philippines is where that reality is most visible. Each confrontation at Second Thomas Shoal or off the coast of Palawan sends ripples through debates in Ottawa about deterrence, maritime governance, and the credibility of alliances. The Philippines has become a living test case of whether the rules-based maritime order — a phrase long central to Canadian foreign policy — retains meaning in an era of grey-zone pressure and creeping revisionism.
The alignment also works because Canada brings specific strengths that the Philippines finds useful. These are not framed around grand strategy or heavy military assets, but around enabling tools: domain awareness, cyber resilience, maritime coordination, and crisis response. Canada’s provision of dark-vessel detection capacity building, in particular, has been a success story in helping improve the Philippines maritime domain awareness. They are areas in which Canada has experience, credibility, and political freedom of action. In a region increasingly shaped by hybrid coercion, these capabilities matter as much as frigates or fighters. They help Manila navigate the space between confrontation and conflict. They give Canada a role that is both distinctive and complementary to larger allies.
One of the most consequential-and most quietly discussed-developments now emerging is the possibility of a rotational Canadian presence in the Philippines. Rather than the basing arrangements of old, this would be fluid, seasonal, and adaptable: periodic naval deployments, air force detachments for surveillance or exercises, training teams cycling through on a regular basis. The model echoes current regional practice: sustained presence without permanent footprint, deterrence without escalation. Canada can be present enough to matter without commitments that exceed its capacity.
Looking beyond the bilateral
This maturing partnership opens doors beyond the bilateral frame. The Philippines sits at the crossroads of emerging Indo-Pacific minilateralism, from the US–Japan–Australia–Philippines “Squad” alignment to various trilateral security dialogues. Canada is not positioning itself to join these arrangements as a formal member, but Manila offers a natural avenue to participate in selected areas of cooperation. Because Canada is already a trusted partner of the United States, Japan, and Australia, its growing relationship with the Philippines complements — rather than complicates — the emerging strategic geometry of the region. Philippine officials increasingly see Canada as an actor capable of reinforcing burden-sharing without altering the internal dynamics of existing groupings. For Ottawa, this is an opportunity to integrate into Indo-Pacific security structures in ways that align with its capabilities and diplomatic temperament.
At the same time, close alignment with the Philippines forces Canada to confront strategic choices it has often avoided. A more visible Canadian presence in the region will inevitably draw critique from actors who prefer to keep external powers at the margins. It will also require Ottawa to maintain political focus and funding over multiple years — a challenge for a system in which global priorities shift quickly. And Manila, for its part, must balance a growing roster of partners amid fluctuating domestic political pressures.
The road forward
None of these constraints undermines the trajectory of the partnership, but they shape the environment in which it must mature. What distinguishes this partnership from Canada's other regional security engagements is its momentum. The relationship is not being driven by institutional agreements or by symbolic gestures alone. It is moving forward because both sides see the strategic environment moving faster than legacy policies can keep up.
In Ottawa, this is beginning a much-needed recalibration of how Canada conceives its Indo-Pacific role. The Philippines is proving to be a place where Canada can be operational, not just declaratory — a place where Ottawa is welcomed not because of its size, but because of its reliability and clarity. It is also fast becoming a platform through which Canada can connect its own Indo-Pacific Strategy to the region's emerging security architecture.
In many ways, the Canada-Philippines relationship is taking on all the characteristics of the kind of Indo-Pacific partnership that Canada has long aspired to yet seldom realised: one rooted in shared democratic instinct and supported by practical cooperation, oriented toward building resilience in those gray zones between crisis and conflict. It opens an opportunity for Canada to transition from episodic engagement to strategic presence and from rhetoric to reality. It also provides Manila with one more partner at a moment when geopolitical pressure is reshaping its strategic outlook. In the end, the significance of the partnership lies less in the agreements signed or exercises conducted than in what it signals about Canada's evolving posture.
For the first time in years, Ottawa is treating the Indo-Pacific not as a region of opportunities to sample but as a theatre in which it must choose where to invest. The Philippines has emerged as the clearest expression of that choice-a relationship which is remaking Canada's strategic identity in the Indo-Pacific and positioning both countries to play a more active role in the contested maritime order now taking shape.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent those of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Jonathan Berkshire Miller is principal of Pendulum Geopolitical Advisory, and a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, based in Ottawa. Image credit: US Navy/Wikimedia Commons.