2023: Where is Japan headed under Kishida?
2023: Where is
Japan headed
under Kishida?
20 January 2023
In 2022, geopolitical tensions in the region put a spotlight on Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio. After eight years of leadership by Abe Shinzo (and a year by Suga Yoshihide), external observers wondered whether Japan was going to remain on a similar political course or whether Kishida would set the groundwork to implement his own (different) policies for Japan.
As we move further into 2023, 9DASHLINE invites a select group of experts to assess how the Kishida administration’s policies on domestic, international, economic, and security issues will differ from the Abe administration.
MORE OF THE SAME
DR JAMES D. BROWN — PROFESSOR, TEMPLE UNIVERSITY’S JAPAN CAMPUS
The tragic nature of Abe Shinzo’s assassination in July 2022 obscures the fact that he was not a popular prime minister by the time he stepped down in September 2020. A Kyodo poll just one month earlier had found the Abe administration’s approval rating to be just 36 per cent.
Many Japanese felt that Abe’s trademark stimulatory economic policy of Abenomics had only brought benefits to the rich. There was also opposition to Abe’s efforts to expand the role of Japan’s military. Moreover, Japan’s longest serving prime minister looked increasingly out of touch with the public and was tainted by several nepotism and political funding scandals.
It is therefore no surprise that, after taking office in October 2021, Kishida Fumio promised a ‘new era’. He presented himself as a good listener and carried around a notebook in which to jot down voters’ comments. The free-market emphasis of Abenomics was also set to be replaced by ‘new capitalism’, with greater emphasis on redistribution. Many also expected the dovish Kishida to slow Japan’s evolution into a more capable security actor.
However, one year on, it is evident that Kishida represents more continuity than change. Most notably, ‘new capitalism’ remains an empty slogan and Japan has continued the massive monetary stimulus that was central to Abenomics.
Security reforms pioneered under Abe have also accelerated, with Japan now committed to taking defence spending to 2 per cent of the GDP by 2027. A decision is also impending on Japan’s acquisition of strike missiles.
Kishida also looks just as out of touch with the public as Abe was. He misjudged the public mood in approving a lavish state funeral for his former boss. He has also shown a tin ear by continuing to defend tarnished cabinet ministers long after it was clear they would need to resign. Kishida even has his own nepotism scandal, having appointed his son as his executive secretary.
Overall, far from heralding a new era, Kishida represents more of the same. Even Kishida’s approval rating mirrors Abe’s before he resigned. At the end of November, a Kyodo poll gave Kishida’s cabinet an approval rating of just 33.1 per cent.
A COOL-HEADED LEADER FOR UNEASY TIMES
DR EVA PEJSOVA — JAPAN CHAIR, CENTRE FOR SECURITY, DIPLOMACY AND STRATEGY, BRUSSELS SCHOOL OF GOVERNANCE
When Kishida Fumio was appointed prime minister in October 2021, many expected ‘less of the same’ at best: a continuation in Abe’s footsteps, with less charisma and a more dovish approach to foreign and security affairs. The assessment of his first year in office clearly proves the sceptics wrong.
Japan’s strong condemnation of Russia’s war of aggression, active support to Ukraine, outspoken criticism of China’s expansionism and human rights abuses, as well as boosting security ties with US allies in the region, attest to the determination to push the country’s leadership in upholding the rules-based international order to the next level. The commitment to strengthening deterrence and response capabilities, doubling the defence budget, and nuclear non-proliferation, further demonstrate that Japan’s growing security clout has only gained momentum.
While these developments may have more to do with the geopolitical shocks that marked Kishida’s first year in office than the leader himself, one needs to applaud his resilience in navigating the hostile security environment, domestic challenges, and party politics. Indeed, the war in Ukraine and China’s growing aggressiveness vis-à-vis Taiwan have increased the sense of insecurity, boosting the public support for a stronger security and defence posture. A more hawkish tone has also been needed to maintain unity within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. Engaging China will be a key test for the Kishida government — it will need to balance between its attachment to the US and Japan’s own economic interests, which heavily depend on the Chinese market.
However, the greatest challenges lie at home. Scandals related to the Unification Church investigations, the highest inflation of the past 40 years, and the resignation of three cabinet members in November 2022 have plunged Kishida’s approval rating below the critical 30 per cent in recent opinion polls.
Considering the major milestones ahead, including the newly released National Security Strategy, the G7 presidency, and the UN Security Council non-permanent seat as of 2023, Tokyo has much to gain in keeping the current steady course and leadership in power. If Abe propelled Japan among the trendsetters in global affairs, Kishida’s pragmatic stewardship may well ensure it remains on that trajectory in the long run.
CHALLENGES ABOUND
DR ELLI-KATHARINA POHLKAMP — VISITING FELLOW, ASIA PROGRAMME, EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
Theoretically, Kishida Fumio has enough time to make his mark on Japanese politics because he is expected to rule for three ‘golden years’ until the next election scheduled for late fall 2025. But things have not gone according to plan. Practically, he is finding himself on the political defensive, struggling with a new low support rate for his cabinet and his leadership skills, and his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is weighed down by scandals. Kishida must now demonstrate strong leadership by delivering concrete results to secure his position.
Since his efforts to distinguish his economic approach from ‘Abenomics’ with his own ‘New Capitalism’ strategy have not proven successful in turning his vision into a coherent economic plan yet, Kishida has the biggest chance to repair his image with foreign and security policy — a field he feels very comfortable in.
Geopolitical circumstances such as the war in Ukraine and its global implications, as well as the rising threats from China and North Korea, have forced Kishida out of his dovish comfort zone and helped introduce new paths for the country that otherwise would not have been possible in a comparable speed due to resistance within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the public.
Although former Prime Minister Abe introduced a transformation in Tokyo’s defence and security policy, Kishida could now put his own distinctive stamp on Japan’s future direction. With the release and future implementation of the new National Security Strategy and related security documents, together with the decision to finally raise defence spending to 2 per cent, Kishida accomplishes a path long introduced, and now has the chance to show that Japan is willing to keep pace, have the capacity to engage, and actively boost its defence resilience.
Furthermore, Japan’s G7 presidency in 2023 will be another crucial opportunity for Kishida to promote his own political agenda and represent Japan as a responsible partner to protect the international rules-based order.
Perhaps the most difficult political area for Kishida to prove his skills will be to balance the relationship with China and his positioning of Japan in the Sino-US rivalry not only in the military area but particularly in the field of technological competition and trade weaponisation.
CONTINUITY OVER CHANGE IN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY
DR STEPHEN NAGY — SENIOR ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, INTERNATIONAL CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY, TOKYO
The Kishida Fumio administration’s policies on domestic, international, economic, and security issues represent continuity over change. Under former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, we saw Japan move away from the Yoshida Doctrine to the so-called Abe Doctrine in foreign policy based on a proactive contribution to peace through a three-pronged foreign policy.
The first part is Tokyo’s investment in the US-Japan alliance while diversifying security partners through Reciprocal Access Agreements and General Information Agreements and multilateral trade, such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). Second is engagement in the region and with partners in the region through the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision (FOIP). Third is proactively articulating Japan’s priorities and concerns, such as the late Abe’s clear statement that the fate of Taiwan is tied to Japan’s security. Each part contributes to inculcating stability and security into the Indo-Pacific region’s rules-based order, the management of sea lanes of communication, and supply chains that are existentially critical to Japan’s national security.
At the domestic level, ‘new capitalism’ is still being conceptualised, with the Kishida administration attempting to foster start-up culture in Japan, enhance the labour participation rate of women, and digitise the economy so that it can increase productivity and efficiency. Much needed labour, gender equality and diversity, migration, and legal reforms to foster a more dynamic labour market continue to move at an incremental pace that needs to be accelerated. Kishida continues to be wedded to the quantitative easing policies associated with Abenomics and efforts to strengthen corporate governance.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s increasingly assertive foreign policy have only re-enforced the core strategic imperatives of the Abe Doctrine to accelerate domestic reform to make Japan more resilient, sustainable, and insulated from geopolitics. Overall, plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose!
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform. Image credit: Wikimedia.