Will India pivot towards the US after Galwan?

19 June 2020

The ongoing Galwan valley military confrontation between India and China is not an ordinary incident and sits high on the list of India-China conflicts since the same valley was a flashpoint in the 1962 war. The incident marked a new low in India-China ties as “both sides suffered casualties”; the Indian External Affairs Minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar has stated that this “unprecedented development will have a serious impact on the bilateral relationship”.

Internationally, this incident has placed the spotlight back on India-China ties ahead of the current global fight against COVID-19, indicating the prevalence of traditional security rivalry over the non-traditional security threats. The Galwan valley incursion presents as defiant Chinese behaviour in response to anti-China narratives fast emerging in the order of global fora led by the United States. On New Delhi’s part, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s statement against the backdrop of the Galwan incident that “India wants peace” but is capable of giving a “befitting reply” if provoked presents a strong note of India’s current strategic thinking vis-à-vis China. It is not very often that such a statement gets released officially from the Indian side, that too from the Prime Minister.

So, what does this signify for India’s strategic calculus vis-à-vis China?

Such a statement signals India’s testimony to resilience amid China’s growing military assertiveness. It reinforces India’s portent to face China without exhibiting an overt sense of edginess. Upholding national security and sovereignty as an integral ethos in Indian foreign policy, New Delhi has preferred a path of resolving disputes and differences through dialogues and mutual understanding.

For India, it is becoming increasingly clear that China’s ‘peaceful’ rise is coming to an end. While militarily both nations aim for a peaceful accord, the diplomatic ties between them should and must be changed.

Galwan however has brought to fore the question of whether New Delhi should deter China any further by forming a military alliance with its ‘Comprehensive Global Strategic’ partner, the United States. India’s embrace of a US-led worldview has seen significant growth lately with its endorsement of the US’s “Quad Plus” process. Washington too has shown India reciprocity in its foreign policy by calling for an expanded Group of 7 (G-7), with India as a member. The Galwan incident and China’s hostile strategic posturing could further strengthen this synergy. The US has stated that it is “closely monitoring” the situation in Galwan; and in May itself, President Trump offered to mediate between India and China as border tensions flared – an offer not fully endorsed by both Beijing and New Delhi.

India and the US have also emerged as Indo-Pacific partners; however, India’s ‘China connect’ policies have deterred the true potential of their defence and maritime security partnerships. India has presented itself as an anti-BRI nation rather than an anti-China one, hoping to balance its power-partner contention with Beijing. However, in the post-Galwan period, a strong case must be made for India to break away from its China pacification strategy. Appeasing China has largely been counter-productive, with the Communist Party expecting acquiescence from other nations without projecting the same in its own behaviours. Indian foreign policy outlook must show a militarized and securitized synergy post Galwan. Inclusion in international frameworks like the G-7, which the US is beginning to view in a non-conformist manner and welcoming India despite it not being an industrialized democracy, must be taken advantage of by Indian leaders.

The case for a strong maritime defence synergy between the US and India is an old one, but choosing to act on it now is a strategic necessity for New Delhi. Even as the COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted the global order, China has continued its provocative posturing in the Indo-Pacific. Enunciating President Xi’s strongman image and not showing signs of weakness in contested maritime domains, a carrier strike group of China’s People Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) passed near Okinawa in Japan through the Miyako Strait, only 330 kms north of Taiwan. This transit alerted Japan and further alarmed Taiwan which has already seen increased Chinese naval presence and air drills around its shores. Further, when the virus was at its peak within China itself in January, China had sent research ships to the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). In response to this Chinese aggressiveness, the US has for the first time in over three years simultaneously deployed three aircraft carriers in the Indo-Pacific waters.

For the last decade, India’s Indo-Pacific approach did not completely adhere to an “anti-China” chronicle that the United States was promoting in the region. For instance, India has shown not-so-keen an interest in its consideration to join the Blue-Dot-Network (BDN) that the US along with Japan and Australia has been trying to promote in Indo-Pacific, mostly as a balancing pledge to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. India’s deteriorating relations with China might encourage New Delhi to consider joining the BDN. To India, joining the BDN will confirm to an economic alliance exercise in a post-COVID period, as the economic fallout of this pandemic is going to exert a heavy toll on global trade, supply chain networks and on the prospects of infrastructure building.

Nonetheless, it is important to note that a case for stronger US-India military synergy should only be made on an equal footing from both sides. When engaging, the US must consider India’s growing global importance and retreat from its superpower centric approach. Furthermore, India’s Indo-Pacific outlook gives immense weight to the Indian Ocean and regions like the Bay of Bengal, Malacca Strait and the Arabian Sea; areas which the US seems to view as low priority. A balance on this front must be reached, with an India-US alliance providing a gateway for India into Asian nations and vice-versa. Understandably, India will now look at the India-China border disputes afresh: the Galwan incident has highlighted the growing irrelevance of multi-alignment and strategic autonomy.

In addition to the categorization of India as a Major Defence Partner (MDP) for the US and the signing of the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in 2016, the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) signed in 2018, the tri-service military exercise ‘Tiger Triumph’ and the defence technology transfer pacts concluded between the two nations in 2019, New Delhi will aim to have a confirmed military alliance treaty with Washington and counter China’s aggressive posturing in the Indo-Pacific. Taking a stronger position on Huawei and re-calibrating its 5G links with the US in order to strengthen military information technology growth can also serve as a major cooperation area. However, while the recent Chinese incursion in Galwan can serve as a strong push for India to move towards the US, such an India-US alliance should not be China-centric or China-limited, but a natural evolution of the growing synergy the two democratic, liberal and rules-based order espousing nations have developed.

US interests in India and Asia have been limited to ensuring a status-quo and Washington’s dominance in the Indo-Pacific region. If a stronger India-US alliance is to be structured, the implementation of an ‘America First’ principle can have no sway in the same. The ‘Comprehensive Strategic Global Partnership’ between the two nations needs concrete substance instead of strategies that are rhetorical. The time for both nations to take advantage of their domestic overtures and international standing have risen under the current order. In a post-Galwan order, an India that is no longer looking to appease China will have unparalleled potential to grow its own global and regional clout. In the post-COVID period, already fearing a ‘manufacturing exodus’ from within China, setbacks to its ambitious BRI project and facing increasing global scrutiny, China itself will not look to aggressively engage India, especially if New Delhi has an alliance partner in the US by its side.

For India, it is becoming increasingly clear that China’s ‘peaceful’ rise is coming to an end. While militarily both nations aim for a peaceful accord, the diplomatic ties between them will and should seek change. India’s ‘China Connect’, already showing weaknesses in structure and implementation during the COVID-19 pandemic, must slowly but surely be brought to a halt. Further, the inclusion of Australia in MALABAR, under consideration in the past due to multiple strategic choices mostly underpinned by the expectation of an adverse reaction from Beijing, must be propagated for without further ado. India’s strategic posturing and alignment with the Quad and ‘Quad Plus’ nations must also receive primary focus in the post-Galwan India-China era.

A stronger US-India military alliance can indeed give credence to the Chinese fear of the revived Quad emerging as an ‘Asian NATO’. Hence, a common alarm over increased Chinese aggressiveness in a post-COVID order can end up serving as the main factor behind a restructuring of the Quad framework as well as a bilateral China-containment alliance.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Jagannath P. Panda is a Research Fellow and Centre Coordinator for East Asia at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi, India. He is the Series Editor for Routledge Studies on Think Asia. Dr. Panda is an expert on ‘China and Indo-Pacific security’ with a prime focus on East Asia- China, Japan and Korean Peninsula. Image credit: Freddy Berlin/Flickr.

Pacific9DLJune 19, 2020India, South Asia, China, Quad