Which way for the Belt and Road?
Which way for
the Belt and Road?
WRITTEN BY FRANCESCO GIOVANNI LIZZI
16 November 2023
The Third Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Forum for International Cooperation took place in Beijing on October 17-18, marking the tenth anniversary of the BRI, President Xi Jinping’s flagship infrastructure project. The forum highlighted how the future development of the BRI remains unclear. On the one hand, the optimistic tone and the heavy financial commitments that characterised Xi’s keynote speech signalled that the initiative is still up and running. On the other hand, it became apparent that the future of the BRI would be remarkably different from its past.
Future projects will be smaller in scale than previous mega-infrastructure endeavours, and no references have been made about how the BRI and other Chinese ventures, such as the comparatively new Global Development Initiative, will coexist. Overall, the forum offered insightful glimpses into the past and the immediate future, as well as future challenges for the Belt and Road.
Participants and premises
Taking stock of the international context surrounding the summit, it is apparent that the BRI has been confronted by a number of challenges. President Xi's keynote speech coincided with mounting scepticism, especially from Europe and North America, concerning the prospective viability of the initiative. These concerns stem from China's decelerating economic growth and the billions spent by China between 2008 and 2021 to bail out countries struggling under BRI debts. It is not only the economic but also the structural feasibility of the BRI which has been questioned by some BRI partner countries, citing construction flaws and corruption concerns.
President Xi also hinted at a progressively fragmented international arena characterised by “ideological confrontation, geopolitical rivalry and bloc politics”. His reference to the de-risking agenda implemented by Washington and Brussels was quite pronounced, and was somewhat paradoxically (given the recent examples of Chinese economic coercion) highlighted by the PRC’s leader: “What we stand against are unilateral sanctions, economic coercion and decoupling and supply chain disruption”.
Xi explicitly emphasised China's intention to continue financing robust infrastructure endeavours, with a particular focus on participating in the trans-Caspian international transportation corridor.
Perhaps illustrative of these developments, the recent BRI forum was attended by representatives from 140 countries and 30 international organisations, but only 23 heads of state (a decrease from the 37 present at the preceding forum in 2019). Among the most prominent world leaders in attendance were Russian President Vladimir Putin, Indonesian President Joko Widodo, Argentinian President Alberto Fernandez, and Thai Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin. Noteworthy as well was the presence of Haji Nooruddin Azizi, the Commerce Minister of the Afghan Taliban administration, which recently signalled its intention to join the BRI.
However, prominent figures from the European Union were conspicuously absent — particularly in comparison to the previous BRI summits. This further illustrates the scepticism that has increasingly pervaded the EU institutions since the BRI’s inception. The sole head of state from the bloc in attendance was Hungary's populist Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. According to some observers, the decreasing participation of state leaders is a compelling indication of waning enthusiasm for the BRI, a trend underscored by the diminished capacities of countries to assume additional debt and China’s aforementioned reduced inclination to extend loans.
Despite these challenges, President Xi portrayed a positive image of the BRI’s achievements. In his keynote, he emphasised the magnitude of the initiative and how the BRI has managed to “build a global network of connectivity” on an international level. Indeed, when taking into account the size of BRI projects from 2013 up to the present day, an estimate shows that BRI-related endeavours have exceeded the threshold of USD 1 trillion across the 148 countries involved. However, it is crucial to acknowledge that a number of undertakings in many BRI countries have failed to achieve their full potential.
Notable examples include various projects in Italy — the sole G7 member participating in the BRI but with an eye on leaving the initiative soon — and Kenya’s railway megaproject, which has witnessed environmental and procurement issues, as well as corruption. A recent report by Aid Data shows that suspensions and cancellations of BRI projects have accumulated over time. Indeed, by 2021, 94 infrastructure projects in 49 countries secured Chinese loan commitments worth USD 56 billion that were then suspended or cancelled.
Xi’s promises
Throughout his keynote speech, Xi placed notable emphasis on what he termed "small yet smart" projects, coupled with a heightened focus on environmentally sustainable development. He announced that China will carry out 1,000 small-scale livelihood assistance projects and enhance vocational education cooperation through the Luban Workshops. These Chinese-funded and directed vocational training programmes are scattered across 25 countries around the world. Furthermore, China will implement the Green Investment Principles for the Belt and Road and provide 100,000 training opportunities for partner countries by 2030.
Beijing also plans to hold the first Belt and Road Conference on Science and Technology Exchange. This underscores China's commitment to leveraging digital advancements as a cornerstone of its BRI framework. In this sense, one of the most notable announcements made at the forum was China’s launch of the Global Initiative for Artificial Intelligence Governance. This framework calls for ‘equal rights on development’ regardless of a country’s political system and was initiated a day after Washington broadened its restrictions on China’s access to chips.
These vows marked a difference from the grandiose infrastructure undertakings of previous years and the multiple overseas coal projects, which the Chinese leader banned in 2021. Nonetheless, Xi conveyed an unequivocal message regarding China's enduring dedication to the BRI. Indeed, to back up these projects, he reaffirmed China’s prior financial commitment to the Belt and Road, signalling a steadfast determination to propel this global infrastructure endeavour forward.
The headline allocation of RMB 780 billion (USD 106 billion) for the next five years mirrors the initial pledge made at the inaugural Belt and Road Forum in 2017. Financing will come from China's principal policy banks, namely the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China, in addition to USD 11 billion from the Silk Road Fund, an entity dedicated to investments in the context of BRI projects.
Finally, the forum shed light on a shift towards endorsing host country agency while keeping the “win-win cooperation” model intact. This was encapsulated in the passage "planning together, building together, and benefiting together" in Xi’s keynote, which represents an effort to counteract the narrative according to which BRI projects predominantly serve China's interests (e.g., by relying on debt trap diplomacy in total opposition to host countries’ interests).
What to expect from the ‘new BRI’?
The forum provided a blueprint for the recalibration of the Belt and Road Initiative while preserving a sense of continuity. The latter refers to the renewed commitment to “conventional” physical infrastructure projects primarily connecting East Asia and Europe. Xi explicitly emphasised China's intention to continue financing robust infrastructure endeavours, with a particular focus on participating in the trans-Caspian international transportation corridor.
This is of particular interest since support for the BRI has been waning in certain key partners such as Kazakhstan. Stressing China’s focus on the new corridor might therefore be seen as a commitment to revitalising the initiative in this particular region. Furthermore, the familiar refrain of win-win cooperation endures, presented as a “definite pathway to success in launching major initiatives that yield benefits for all parties involved” in Xi’s keynote speech.
President Xi's substantial economic commitment to upcoming green and digital BRI ventures also carries significant weight, and the shift towards more environmentally sustainable and digitally oriented projects marks a departure from the hard infrastructure ventures that previously characterised the BRI. This shows that, in a time when competitors to the BRI are multiplying, the initiative is not just about infrastructure but about China’s multi-faceted foreign policy, which can take many shapes.
In this sense, there are no indications as to how this altered trajectory aligns — or does not align — with other Chinese projects aimed at achieving a global governance system with Chinese features. China’s initiatives in recent years include the Global Development Initiative (GDI) of 2021, the Global Security Initiative of 2022 and the Global Civilisation Initiative of March 2023. Surprisingly, Xi’s keynote speech did not mention any of these projects. In particular, the absence of any reference to the GDI is noteworthy, since it prioritises realms encompassing education, sustainable energy, and poverty alleviation, all within the framework of collaboration with the United Nations.
Given the overlap of these issues and the new areas of investment envisioned at the BRI forum, it is somewhat bizarre that there was no direct mention in the keynote speech. The reason behind this decision may relate to Xi’s willingness to keep the initiatives separate for the moment while attempting to set a new direction for the BRI through smaller projects. According to some observers, these Chinese projects create an overarching umbrella for China’s international relations with a strong emphasis on win-win outcomes and a multipolar world order. However, what remains to be seen is how the three projects will combine since the Chinese President doubled down on the Belt and Road as the only “correct path forward”.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Francesco Giovanni Lizzi is a PhD candidate in Political and Social Science at the University of Bologna. His research focuses on Sino-Italian and Sino-German relations, especially on how the two EU countries have securitised their ties with China. Previously, he served as an intern at the Italian Embassy in Vietnam. Image credit: Casa Rosada/Wikimedia.