Walking a tightrope: Balancing research security concerns with a need for China competence

17 November 2023

Academic, business, and diplomatic exchange with China has become more cumbersome at a time when cross-regional understanding and cooperation is of utmost importance. Global challenges such as climate change, pandemic control, and artificial intelligence require global collaboration and solutions. Yet ideological differences, geopolitical tensions, competition in standard-setting, and fears of economic dependencies have contributed to a rising sense of unease surrounding scientific collaboration between European universities and Chinese partners.

The Xi administration’s increasingly authoritarian governance style, militant rhetoric, and global economic reach have stoked anxieties that exchange with China is only possible in areas deemed acceptable to the Chinese Communist Party. The war in Ukraine and China’s unwillingness to condemn Russian aggression, as well as internal repression in Hong Kong and Xinjiang, have further deteriorated the country’s image in liberal democracies. Talk of decoupling and de-risking, the securitisation of academia (particularly with reference to dual-use technologies and civil-military fusion), and worries over what a multipolar world will mean for global power relations have also played their part in generating narratives of otherness and suspicion that drive us apart when we should be working closer together to tackle planetary challenges.

The study of China (Sinology) has also been affected by these narratives, which cloud China’s image as a precarious, but fascinating and worthwhile destination of study. In the past couple of years, China scholars have been accused of naivety and self-censorship, but also outright bias and co-opting Party propaganda, and willingness to compromise scholarly integrity for access to the field. While accurate in the sense that foreigners are dependent on Chinese authorities for access, what these allegations fail to acknowledge is the tightrope China researchers must walk when trying to extract valuable insights on the one hand and making sure not to jeopardise their own and Chinese partners’ safety on the other.

If we believe our understanding of China to be lacking today, what would a further decline in professionals who speak Mandarin and understand Chinese culture mean for our relations with the People’s Republic in the future?

As other regional scholars investigating authoritarian political systems will attest, special rules of engagement apply in countries with repressive regimes. Similar to deciphering hidden meanings in Chinese policy documents or navigating the country’s opaque regulatory landscape, Sinologists are trained to evaluate where the Party draws red lines and what can be stated (both in written and oral form) without risking their own and Chinese interlocutors’ safety. Because these lines are constantly redrawn, what was deemed acceptable in the past may be judged to be sensitive today. Balancing demands for critical, brave, and investigative research at home with the very real concerns for safety and access in China is one of the trickiest skills China researchers must acquire.

The need for research security

Given China’s growing influence on our political, economic, and social welfare, demands for critical scholarship on the People’s Republic must be met by well-trained and experienced analysts capable of handling such challenges to research. Political developments in China require us to be vigilant, circumspect, and clear about whom we wish to cooperate with and what areas we deem acceptable (or even beneficial) for joint research. Similarly, frameworks need to be developed that clearly define fields and Chinese partners with whom we do not wish to collaborate for national security reasons. As in any collaboration (both domestic and international) an element of uncertainty with respect to risks and trust will remain; if our standard for cooperating were total certainty, we could not engage in joint research with any partners — Chinese or otherwise. Consequently, it is important that we sensitise individuals working with or in China to identify and anticipate risks, as well as develop standards for them to judge whether a collaboration’s opportunities outweigh the risks. In this regard, academic institutions and companies across Europe are exchanging views and best practices on how to balance risks, with the equally real opportunities of research with and on China.

In researching China, the country’s shift towards an even more authoritarian style of governance also places extra responsibilities on scholars. Academic freedom in the People’s Republic has become more restrictive since Xi Jinping’s ascension to power — not only for European researchers but also for our Chinese partners. Reflecting on how the researcher’s presence will change the nature and behaviour of an object under study is critical since the authoritarian setting adds a lever of pressure to respondents’ provision of data. Interview partners, for instance, naturally want to portray the best version of themselves, regardless of their political surroundings. In China, however, respondents are not only mindful of projecting a positive impression of themselves and the organisation they represent, but they are also constantly alive to the danger of providing sensitive information that may get them (and/or their families) into trouble.

*Graduation ceremony. School of Mechanical Engineering.* *Image credit: Unsplash/Wang Tianfang*.

In addition, during field research, it is no longer enough for scholars to observe, document, and analyse a subject or phenomenon under investigation. Rather, it has become critical to reflect on and disclose the circumstances that put researchers in a position to make said observations. The recent controversy over two eminent German Sinologists’ research trip to Xinjiang represents a case-in-point: while undoubtedly well-intentioned, the lack of clarity (possibly for editorial reasons) over the terms and conditions that allowed them to make their observations generated criticism and personal attacks. While Sinologists, like other academics, are open to balanced criticism and level-headed debate, accusations that question their scholarly integrity (or worse) cut deep and are in no way conducive to fostering engagement with China.

Therefore, in recognising risks in academic collaboration with China, developing measures that ensure research security, and sensitising scholars, we must also pay attention to the language we use, particularly towards individuals of Chinese origin. That is not to say that we should refrain from calling out perceived injustices in China, but we should do so based on evidence and with the future of collaboration with Chinese partners in mind. In case of severe transgressions, such as breaches of trust — where the benefits of collaboration no longer outweigh the costs — the option to pause or terminate a joint undertaking should be taken seriously. Once a decision to collaborate has been made, however, we should strive to foster trust and maximise output, for instance by making visiting scholars, business representatives, politicians, and students feel welcome.

This does not mean that we should abandon our safety precautions, but we should also not impose continuous monitoring or engage in racial profiling by suspecting individuals of espionage without concrete evidence. Given that Chinese research institutions today are at the forefront of global endeavours, we should stay humble and focus on what each system can contribute to achieving common goals. We must also recognise that Chinese organisations can, and do, set international standards and influence the direction of technological innovation. If we want to have a seat at the table in designing regulation, standards, and innovation, we may have to engage with organisations that we evaluate as risky in terms of research security in many fields.

Europe’s need for China competence

To make judgements on research security, but also business transactions and diplomatic relations with China, establishing a knowledge base on the country is of vital importance. Yet precisely at this critical moment, when European governments are calling for more China competence, student numbers in Sinology are declining. While the pandemic and developments in China certainly carry part of the blame, the image our politicians and media paint of the country does not help make China an attractive subject to study. In European primary and secondary schools, China is only gradually appearing on the curriculum, and teacher training programmes are badly needed to generate competencies at an earlier stage. In tertiary education, funding and permanent positions remain a perennial issue. For students, the job market in Europe is problematic — few job descriptions are tailored to the skills that Sinologists acquire during their time at university.

As a consequence, we are facing an allocation problem in supply and demand: too many Sinology students pursue careers that require little or no knowledge of the Chinese language and culture at a time when European demand for China competence could not be more urgent. In light of the global challenges we must face together, we need experts in business, politics, and academia who understand China, who can engage in fruitful exchange, but also evaluate and make informed judgements on the opportunities and risks of cooperation. While China’s authoritarian shift and repressive policies are partly responsible, we must also reflect on our own role in souring bilateral relations, specifically our insufficient grasp of the country’s history, political system, economy, culture, and language. By marginalising Chinese studies in our curricula, for instance, we contribute to difficulties in cross-cultural relations, where we expect China and its people to accommodate our poor grasp of the country’s language and customs. Studying Sinology helps us view our actions through China’s eyes, which can only be beneficial to finding compromise and building more trusting relations.

If we believe our understanding of China to be lacking today, what would a further decline in professionals who speak Mandarin and understand Chinese culture mean for our relations with the People’s Republic in the future? As in technology development, where observers worry that an overemphasis on security threatens innovation, there is a real danger that security concerns — as rational as they are in relations with an authoritarian country — are becoming an obstacle to our need for expertise on China. Similar to the challenges China researchers face in conducting responsible field research, the public discourse must also walk a tightrope, where necessary security measures are balanced against the equally necessary production of knowledge on China.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Dr Hannes Gohli is a post-doc researcher at the Julius-Maximilians-University Würzburg, whose research interests focus on the People’s Republic of China’s energy transition and cybergovernance. He is also the general manager of the university’s China Competence Centre. In this capacity, he collects cross-institutional knowledge on Chinese competence in Würzburg, assists researchers and staff in their collaborations with Chinese partners and organises China-related events. Image credit: Unsplash/Declan Sun.