What was behind the Jalalabad prison raid by the Islamic State?
What was behind the Jalalabad prison raid by Islamic State?
WRITTEN BY SAURAV SARKAR
10 August 2020
Residents of the city of Jalalabad, the capital of Afghanistan’s Nangarhar province, were startled by the sounds of gunfire and explosions on Sunday evening (2 August). While Afghans are no strangers to violence, people were looking forward to a quiet weekend after the Eid-al-Adha celebrations the previous day with the Afghan government and the Taliban having declared a three-day ceasefire. Therefore, the attack on the Jalalabad prison complex housing around 2,000 prisoners came as a complete surprise and led to a prolonged firefight that lasted well into Monday afternoon.
Over the more than 20 hours in which the attack took place, 29 people were killed which included prisoners, civilians, Afghan security forces and members of the attacking force. The Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) later claimed responsibility for the attack. Around 300 prisoners are believed to be unaccounted for as of writing, with many of them linked to ISKP.
This attack came at a critical time in Afghanistan with ongoing prisoner exchanges between the Afghan government and the Taliban, and with ISKP’s status at a low among jihadist groups in Afghanistan due to a string of recent losses and leadership arrests. ISKP has the potential to utilize the present political situation to its advantage by waging high-profile attacks across the country in an attempt to recruit more fighters and boost morale amongst its depleted membership. Until recently ISKP attacks in Afghanistan were limited to so-called soft targets, this attack on a hard government target in a major urban centre could signify a renewed offensive intent for the insurgent group.
ISKP inspired by tactics used in Iraq and Syria?
According to a United Nations (UN) report in July, the ISKP leadership ranks have been supplemented by foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) from Iraq and Syria such as Abu Said Mohammed al-Khorasani, Sheikh Abdul Tahrir, Abu Qutaibah and Abu Hajar al-Iraqi. The Islamic State (IS) in its early formative days in Iraq and Syria conducted a series of prison breaks freeing multiple Islamists in what came to be known as the “Breaking the Walls” campaign. The Jalalabad prison attack points towards the same tactics used by IS in Iraq and Syria being repeated in Afghanistan and being directed by experienced Syrian or Iraqi jihadists. Multiple FTFs were involved in the attack as only three of the eleven attackers were Afghans as per an ISKP media release.
The attackers were well-armed and equiped pointing towards careful preparation and a well-tested strategy. The tactics used by IS in Iraq and Syria appear to have been deployed with lethal effectiveness by ISKP in Afghanistan
As per IS media the attackers were divided into four teams. The raid began with the detonation of a suicide vehicle-borne with an improvised explosive device (IED) by one attacker at the gate and a three-man squad firing machine guns and rockets from a nearby building.
This was followed by five inghimasi (suicide) fighters entering the prison complex and freeing prisoners. In what seems like a diversionary tactic, a two-man “support unit” fired mortars from a long-range position towards the Jalalabad airbase that houses NATO forces. In a statement, an ISKP spokesperson compared the attack to the Abu Ghraib prison break in Iraq, itself a precursor event to the formation of the Islamic State in 2014.
Interestingly, Ansar-ul-Khilafah in Hind (a South Asian Islamic State-linked entity) in the July edition of its Voice of Hind (VoH) magazine mentioned jihadists currently imprisoned in the Middle East and South Asia and said that their release was a top priority for IS. It also mentioned that IS had previously carried out inghimasi operations to free their members from prisons in Syria and elsewhere. Inghimasiums are suicide attackers who carry small arms and explosive belts. Inghimasiuns fundamentally operate as ‘shock troops’, aiming to soften the defences of their targets for follow up attacks.
Given that three of the attackers involved in the prison raid were Indian (including the suicide bomber), along with one from Pakistan, the references to prison breaks and inghimasi operations seem to be significant. The attackers were well-armed and equipped pointing towards careful preparation and a well-tested strategy. The tactics used by IS in Iraq and Syria appear to have been deployed with lethal effectiveness by ISKP in Afghanistan as not only did the attackers gain access to the prison and free a large number of prisoners (71 of the escapees are reportedly from ISKP and 27 from the Taliban) but they were also able to pin down Afghan forces for almost 20 hours and also killed 13 civilians. Eleven attackers were confirmed killed by Afghan security forces but initial reports indicated there may well have been as many as 20 attackers (some may have escaped in the chaos along with the freed prisoners).
While this is not the first time that such a sophisticated prison break has happened in Afghanistan, the Taliban had done so previously multiple times, this is the first time that ISKP have been able to mount such a complex attack.
A resurgence of ISKP?
The Jalalabad prison raid does not just represent a major escalation of ISKP attacks against the Kabul government but also a major security and intelligence failure in that a large number of heavily armed attackers were able to infiltrate and execute an attack of this scale on a target that was not only fortified but also within a major Afghan city. The current ISKP leader who goes by the name of Dr Shabab al-Muhajir (as per IS sources) or Sheikh Matiullah Kamahwal (according to UN reporting) is known to be trying to boost his profile and motivate existing members by carrying out such high-profile and complex attacks. In a recently released statement, he reassured imprisoned ISKP members that the group would not “sit idle” while they remain jailed. ISKP seems to have bet a lot on this attack given the detailed description of the attack that followed on IS media. The fact that a majority of the attackers were FTFs is also telling as it indicates that outsiders form a large part of ISKP’s offensive capability.
Eastern Nangarhar province had been the traditional stronghold of ISKP since 2015 till it was routed from there by the US military, the Afghan government and Taliban forces around 2017-18. Most ISKP losses have occurred in Nangarhar and Jalalabad has been in ISKP crosshairs due to its proximity to Kabul and remote ISKP logistical bases in the east. Many captured/surrendered ISKP members could have been present at the prison in Jalalabad and may have given ISKP further motive to carry out the attack. Reports of the attackers executing Taliban prisoners during the attack could be revenge killings for the Taliban’s operations against ISKP. Also, the attackers could have taken advantage of the sense of security brought about by the Eid celebrations and ceasefire to mount their attack.
This attack could also improve its standing against the Taliban by giving the impression that it remains capable of freeing its members independently and inflict casualties against Afghan security forces while the Taliban has to negotiate with ‘foreign’ and ‘secular’ forces to get their members released from prison. This could further complicate the peace process as the Taliban could blame the Afghan government for not doing enough to protect its prisoners from ISKP and in turn portray the government as corrupt and incompetent.
This attack and recent deadly attacks in Kabul claimed/attributed to ISKP shows that despite recent losses of territory and fighters ISKP remains a major security threat if not a strategic one. By carrying out such attacks, ISKP wants to portray its resilience and maintain its relevance amongst jihadists in Afghanistan.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Saurav Sarkar is a Research Associate at the Center for Air Power Studies, Western Air Command, New Delhi, India. Previously, he was a Research Assistant at the Institute of Chinese Studies (ICS), New Delhi. Image credit: The US Army/Flickr.