India-China border tensions: assessing New Delhi’s response
India-China border tensions: assessing New Delhi’s response
WRITTEN BY TANVI KULKARNI
11 August 2020
The border standoff between India and China in Ladakh, which began on May 5 this year, represents the ‘most serious’ escalation of hostilities between the two countries since the 1980s. In July, New Delhi and Beijing opened negotiations at the highest diplomatic level, between their Special Representatives, seeking a resolution to the current impasse. However, even after the deaths of Chinese and Indian soldiers in June, China continues to impose itself militarily upon the disputed Line of Actual Control (LAC). India now faces a serious challenge in managing border tensions that could develop into a further crisis. In considering New Delhi’s response so far to Beijing’s assertiveness, there are three discerning features.
A textbook start
The first phase of the standoff followed a somewhat predictable pattern with India’s response in the initial phase of the crisis customary to previous episodes. The Indian Army confirmed the Chinese incursions and the clashes between the Indian and Chinese troops at Pangong Tso on 5-6 May and at Naku La (in Sikkim) on 9 May. During these clashes, soldiers from both sides were injured but no fatalities were incurred. The situation was brought ‘under control’ after local commanders’ conducted a parley.
Since May, New Delhi has tried to delicately balance the diplomatic-military standoff on the LAC with the broader economic relationship with China. It has neither summoned the Chinese envoy over the transgressions nor explicitly demanded a status-quo ante.
For the Indian Army, Chinese incursions are not new, nor are such clashes unfamiliar; in recent years there have been several border confrontations with the Chinese, in Chumar (2011), Depsang (2013), Chumar again in 2014, in Bhutan at the Doklam tri-boundary (2017) with the most recent being at Demchok 2018.
In each of these cases, efforts were first made to resolve the dispute at the local commanders’ level through the Border Personnel Meetings (flag meetings) at designated places. Both sides have followed this protocol vis-à-vis local issues related to patrols and minor incursions. In the case of escalation, formal discussions have been raised at higher military-to-military levels. A resolution has usually involved a return to status quo ante and restoration of norms followed on the LAC. Given these expected patterns, even as fresh reports of tensions in the Galwan Valley emerged a week after the initial confrontation in Pangong Tso, the Indian Army Chief General Naravane termed the clashes as “a routine happening”.
By the second half of May, however, the standoff appeared to escalate as both sides increased troop strength at multiple locations on the LAC in the Western sector, calling in infantry and even armoured reinforcements. The Doklam standoff in 2017 had demonstrated that such eyeball-to-eyeball confrontations could take weeks, even months, to resolve without firing a shot. Top military officers on both sides – India’s XIV Corps Commander Lt Gen Harinder Singh and Chinese PLA Commander of South Xinjiang Military District, Maj Gen Lin Liu – attempted a ‘limited disengagement and de-escalation’ plan to resolve the dispute that could no longer be addressed at the local commanders’ level. However, on the intervening night of 15/16 June, a violent scuffle broke out between Indian and Chinese troops in the Galwan Valley resulting in the aforementioned deaths of 20 Indian soldiers and an undeclared number of Chinese soldiers. These deaths were the first on the India-China frontier since 1975 and provoked outrage in both countries, but especially in India.
Multiple audience problem
The loss of multiple Indian and Chinese lives in the Galwan Valley became a critical turning point in the standoff. As the Indian leadership attempted to manage an unexpected crisis that threatened the Modi government’s legitimacy, it faced a classic multiple audience problem. In an attempt to reassure the domestic audience of his Government’s resolve (to protect India’s territorial integrity) and of his strongman image, Prime Minister Modi seemed to insinuate that ‘nobody’ had intruded into Indian territory, at an all-political party meeting later and in a televised speech on 19 June. Chinese officials picked up on this statement to deny their culpability and to further assert their claim on the Galwan Valley. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) was left to subsequently issue clarifications about the PM’s statement and also refute Chinese claims on the entirety of the Galwan Valley.
In its response, New Delhi attempted to balance between escalation and restraint. It gave the Indian army greater tactical authority to respond to Chinese provocations through a significant change to the rules of engagement on the LAC. The post-Galwan phase of the standoff was rife with nebulous information, internal contradictions, and speculative reporting. In the absence of formal briefings from either the Indian armed forces (as in the case of Balakot airstrikes) or the MEA (besides the weekly press briefings), public discourse in India about the standoff was being primarily shaped through the television media debates with little credible information.
To appease the predictable yet visible public anger at China, the Indian Government also banned the use of 59 Chinese software applications. This cross-domain escalation was moderated through formal diplomatic outreach toward China. Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar spoke with the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi on 17 June. Military-to-military talks resumed shortly thereafter.
The LAC is different from the LoC
Both China and Pakistan have presented revisionist border claims on the LAC and LoC (Line of Control), respectively, with India. Both borders are un-demarcated and characterised by extremely harsh terrains, high levels of militarization, and occasional confrontations. However, India has traditionally shown greater military and diplomatic restraint during escalating border tensions with China than with Pakistan. Barring the obvious difference in the military power of China and Pakistan, another reason is the difference in the sheer volume of hostile activity on each border.
The ceasefire violations on the LoC far outnumber the transgressions on the LAC every year, causing a greater loss of life and property. Moreover, within India, the border dispute with Pakistan is a more emotive and politically sensitive issue than the one with China. Consequently, New Delhi has explored a wider range of responses during escalating border tensions with Pakistan: political (adverse official statements, political engagement), diplomatic (summoning the envoy, cancellation of visits/meetings, National Security Advisor-level talks), military (tit-for-tat retaliation, commander-level meetings, high alerts, cancellation of border talks, even nuclear signalling) and economic (suspension of cross-LoC trade). These response options have seldom been used vis-à-vis escalation of border disputes with China
Since May, New Delhi has tried to delicately balance the diplomatic-military standoff on the LAC with the broader economic relationship with China. It has neither summoned the Chinese envoy over the transgressions nor explicitly demanded a status-quo ante. Upon China’s insistence, talks were opened at the highest diplomatic level, between the Special Representatives of the two countries – Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and Chinese Foreign Minister and State Councillor Wang Yi – even as the military commanders continued to speak on the ground and the talks with the MEA appeared to hit a stalemate. Previously, bilateral political engagements like official visits played a decisive role in resolving standoffs with China (such was the case in 2013, 2014, and 2017). However, this time, Defence Minister, Rajnath Singh’s visit to Moscow, alongside his Chinese counterpart, did not yield such a result.
In conclusion
New Delhi’s response to the border standoff with China this summer can be understood through three discernible features. First, although it followed a predictable pattern of conflict that prompted a text-book response mechanism at the beginning, the Galwan valley incident brought a dramatic twist to conflict. Second, Prime Minister Modi’s attempts to indicate resolve and address domestic outrage at the Chinese incursions unwittingly communicated messages that were used by Beijing to press its claims on Indian territory. Finally, New Delhi’s restraint vis-à-vis China concerning border tensions is a result of fewer incentives to explore a wider range of responses.
Unlike previous China-India border standoffs, the older formula of military restraint and prompt resolution has seemed unworkable. New Delhi appears to be far more willing to endure a long haul of this crisis. The question, which is yet to be answered, is whether Beijing will be a willing partner in a strategy prone to risks of further escalation.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Tanvi Kulkarni teaches Defence and Strategic Studies at the Savitribai Phule Pune University. She’s a Visiting Fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi. Tanvi is due to earn a PhD in Diplomacy and Disarmament Studies from the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Image credit: Guilhem Vellut/Flickr.