What Kim Jong-un’s diplomacy tells us about Sino-NK relations

12 January 2022

The Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea (DPRK) has long suffered from its place in history and geography, subject to the support and interests of great powers around the Korean Peninsula. Despite political, military, and economic disadvantages, Pyongyang has leveraged a savvy diplomatic tactic of playing great powers off one another to its own gain. Kim Jong-un’s grandfather, founder Kim Il-sung, was especially adept at playing the Soviet Union and China against each other to extract economic, military, technical, and humanitarian aid. In short, North Korean leaders have a remarkable ability to both depend on others for their material existence, while also keeping stronger players guessing at their capabilities and intentions.

Since assuming leadership in 2011 following the death of his father, Kim Jong-un has shifted the country into new policy directions by going it alone without consulting his powerful neighbour and ally China. These actions reflect his yearning to carve out space for geopolitical autonomy from great powers even while assuming China will still have its back when its political, security or economic situation becomes dire. The Beijing-Pyongyang relationship drips with trappings of the 20th century Cold War. Based on the 1961 Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty, the Chinese — along with their Soviet comrades — pledged the DPRK defensive aid and later economic and technical assistance as the United States built up its presence in South Korea and Japan.

Although ideological ties underpin the Sino-DPRK relationship to only a limited extent today, North Korea will not stray from Beijing because its bigger socialist brother provides a strong shield and sword should the cold Korean War turn hot. Moreover, China also serves as the biggest political ally on the global stage and the economic lifeblood for the isolated, autarkic country. For its part, Beijing’s strategic interest in this special relationship rests on fears of Korean Peninsular instability and US intentions for Northeast Asia.

Starting the decade with cooled relations

When Kim Jong-un came into power in 2011, relations between Pyongyang and China — idiomatically referred to as “close as lips and teeth” — began to peel apart. Kim, an untested leader only 28 years old at the time, turned all attention inward to consolidate power and eliminate rivals for power or outside influence, including Beijing. His political manoeuvring included reshuffling or purging officials with close ties to China or those who advocated greater cooperation with Beijing, including, infamously, his uncle Jang Song-taek, who operated several businesses with Chinese investors. In a 2013 address to the Korean Workers’ Party, Kim Jong-un introduced his byungjin (“dual-track”) policy that elevated nuclear weapons development in line with economic development as the state’s supreme goal. Indeed, Kim fulfilled these claims with four nuclear weapons tests between 2013 and 2017 and the country now possesses an estimated weapons stockpile of 25 to 50 warheads. Moreover, Kim’s military has made significant progress on its missile programs, including 2019 test launches of short-range solid-fuel missiles (the KN-23 and KN-25) and steady testing of long-range missiles (notably the Hwasong series) with the potential to reach US strategic assets in the Pacific and potentially the US mainland.

Looking forward to when the pandemic winds down, China will likely test the appetite in Pyongyang for bilateral and even multilateral meetings on denuclearisation and sanctions relief, especially at the working level.

Kim Jong-un’s successful demonstration of nuclear weapons development and significant progress on the ICBM program has resounding security implications for China. Certainly, the fact that their neighbour now has a nuclear stockpile makes the Chinese military uneasy. But North Korea’s steady progress combined with provocative rhetoric (“We will strike a merciless blow at the heart of the US with our powerful nuclear hammer, honed and hardened over time”) only instigates further buildup of US and ROK assets south of the DMZ, such as the introduction of the THAAD missile defence system that drove a rift between Beijing and Seoul. More recently, South Korean politicians and the public have been debating the development of their own nuclear capability, an unlikely but previously fringe debate only supported in small, hardline circles in Seoul. An arms race on the Korean Peninsula would not only increase inter-Korean risk but also create uncertainties in the US-ROK alliance disruptive to the balance of power in Northeast Asia.

Kim’s economic policy decisions have also rubbed Beijing the wrong way. Beijing has long urged North Korea to make economic reforms in line with China’s, such as returning autonomy and choice to local officials and opening Special Economic Zones. Kim has indeed made some policy changes to combat North Korea’s anaemic economy. For example, early in his tenure, he instituted the Socialist Corporate Responsible Management System (Sahoejuui gieob chaegim gwallije), which gave firm managers greater discretion over the over tools, strategies, and resources to conduct each business. While the state maintains ultimate control over overarching business activities and outputs, the new system has meant managers’ success depends on firm-level outputs rather than state-derived valuation. These changes bear some similarities to those in Deng Xiaoping’s household responsibility system that catalysed marketisation and commercialisation in rural economies. However, China’s reforms required political reform in addition to economic reform. Pyongyang leadership has dragged its feet on liberalisation for fear of losing control of the economy and politics at both the macro- and micro- levels.

UN Security Council, US Treasury, and EU Council sanctions make it hard for any business to deal with North Korean individuals and entities. China historically has baulked at UNSC resolutions on economic sanctions against North Korea on the grounds that sanctions risk destabilising the perennially frail economy. Beijing helps the North Korean economy stay afloat in the face of increasing international sanctions: the overall trade volume between China and North Korea rose from less than half of its total trade in 2008 to over 80 per cent of all trade per annum since 2011.

Frustrated with Kim Jong-un’s bellicosity and refusal to engage meaningfully according to Beijing’s wishes, China has joined the international community’s efforts and sought to take Pyongyang to task by joining the international community in increasing the economic screws, a key part of the Sino-DPRK relationship. In 2017, China joined the US in seeking stricter UN sanctions at the UNSC. After long turning a blind eye to Chinese firms’ trade with North Korea, Beijing put unprecedented pressure on banks, shipping companies, trading companies, and ports to adhere to the UN and US resolutions. China’s Big Four banks stopped providing financial services to new North Korean clients that year, reportedly motivated by the Chinese Central Bank’s direction. As Zhu Feng, Nanjing University professor and prominent foreign policy advisor in China told the New Yorker in 2017, “Beijing’s patience is running out”, and “The Kim regime has done absolutely nothing that is good for China’s national interest”.

Kim Jong-un’s 2018-2019 diplomatic campaign

On 25 March 2018, Kim Jong-un took his first steps outside of North Korea since assuming office. In the following two years, Kim Jong-un embarked on a dozen leader-level summits. He met Xi Jinping five times, Donald Trump three times, Moon Jae-in four times, and Vladimir Putin once. The diplomatic campaign not only refreshed the DPRK’s engagement with the world. Kim’s diplomatic corps embarked on serious efforts at the working level toward denuclearisation and sanctions relief. Kim also sought a new tack toward improving inter-Korean relations, most notably through the Comprehensive Military Agreement that laid out a robust framework for confidence-building measures and improved lines of communication.

Kim held some strong cards at the diplomatic table as a de facto nuclear weapons state with a successful third leadership transition. Kim Jong-un secretly travelled by train to Beijing in March 2018 for his first international summit. While international observers anticipated a US summit with bated breath, Kim’s visit with Xi served both practical and symbolic purposes. Practically, it placated a Beijing slighted by years of bluster and snubs and provided direct communication to get advice from the big brother. Symbolically, it reminded not only Beijing but also Washington that Pyongyang had considerable backing from China. These two factors were important before entering denuclearisation negotiations with the United States. In fact, denuclearisation dominated their agenda, with both countries reaffirming a commitment to working toward denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.

Looking forward to revived relations

Since 2020, the COVID crisis has dealt a hearty blow to any further diplomatic engagement. North Korea was the first country to shut down its borders. The move ignited a “mass exodus” of diplomats living in Pyongyang, further increasing Kim Jong-un’s diplomatic isolation. The staff at the Russian Embassy — one of the largest in Pyongyang — cited “unprecedented total restrictions” on individuals as well as shortages of medicines and health infrastructure. However it is important to remember that COVID was not the cause of North Korea’s diplomatic retreat, but a supporting factor. Even though Kim Jong-un’s last summit occurred a few months before the COVID outbreak, we have ample evidence that he had little interest in pursuing diplomacy that didn’t get what he wanted — specifically sanctions relief. Kim Jong-un felt burned by the unproductive conversations in Hanoi with Trump and his team and did not want to waste additional political capital to embark on another diplomatic campaign centred around denuclearisation. As such, Kim is unlikely to return to the 2018-2019 level of diplomatic intensity.

At the same time, Kim’s focus on meeting with Xi has created space for revived — though not “reset” — Sino-DPRK diplomatic relations. China has backed North Korea’s calls for sanctions relief as the country’s economy has tanked in the face of coping with the global pandemic. 2020 proved very difficult for North Korea economically, with its steepest decline in GDP (4.5 per cent) since the 1997 Great Famine that eviscerated the country’s economy and caused massive starvation and outward migration. Korea’s international trade plummeted in face of the self-imposed closure beginning in April 2021. China’s exports to North Korea fell an outstanding 81 per cent from 2019 to 2020, and its imports from North Korea fell 78 per cent. As the supplier of 95 per cent of merchandise into North Korea, Beijing likely fears that North Korea will not be able to sustain its economy much longer without outside help.

Additionally, China worries that these risks could spur adverse US action. In Beijing’s view, Pyongyang’s direct dealings with Washington could produce two equally unsettling outcomes. First, Beijing worries that failed denuclearisation talks could set off another nuclear crisis. In this worst-case scenario, according to Beijing, North Korea’s nuclear threat might instigate forceful US intervention. The current US military strategy focuses on cooperating with South Korea and other allies to refine deterrent capabilities. US officials and experts emphasise to Beijing that renewed fighting on the Korean Peninsula would be disastrous for everyone. However, Beijing continues to take note of earlier US analyses of collapse scenarios, regime instability, and nuclear adventurism. Without complete and irreversible denuclearisation, the United States could drag Beijing’s ally into serious conflict; produce political instability, humanitarian crisis, and mass migration; and ultimately test North Korea’s willingness to use its “treasured sword”, as it calls its nuclear capabilities.

Beijing also fears a second potential outcome: that US-DPRK bilateral denuclearisation talks could produce an entire Korean Peninsula tilted toward Washington if North Korea has access to new economic and potentially political partners. The issue compounds if a peace treaty and unification are part of the agenda. In his New Year’s Day address on 3 January, South Korean President Moon Jae-in pledged to pursue a formal end-of-war declaration to fulfil his promise of positive relations with the North. North Korea did not directly respond to Moon’s calls for renewed engagement, and on 5 January conducted a ballistic missile test off the eastern coast, which many experts interpret as Kim Jong-un’s reticence to move forward with any peace agreement. Moreover, Moon — whose term ends in April — will find it difficult to garner political will at home amid a contentious election.

Looking forward to when the pandemic winds down, China will likely test the appetite in Pyongyang for bilateral and even multilateral meetings on denuclearisation and sanctions relief, especially at the working level. The idea of revising a four-party framework for dialogue has been gaining traction again in both Beijing and Washington and would serve the interests of both great powers as well as both Koreas to maintain open channels among all sides. The talks could also produce mutually beneficial changes in the economic situation in North Korea, particularly in shaping acceptable channels of trade that do not support the nuclear program. The key obstacle would be assuring Kim Jong-un he would not be burned as he felt after the inter-Korean and US-DPRK summits, especially Hanoi. To that end, both China and the United States should work on providing concrete assistance, perhaps even through a trilateral endeavour with Seoul, especially in the non-security domains such as agriculture and reforestation. These efforts would serve to mitigate Beijing’s worst fears of economic implosion and an adventurist Pyongyang.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Darcie Draudt is a Postdoctoral Fellow with the George Washington University Institute for Korean Studies (GWIKS) at the Elliott School of International Affairs in Washington, DC. She holds a PhD in Political Science from Johns Hopkins University. Image credit: Flickr/Roman Harak.