The upper house elections and Japanese defence spending

11 July 2022

The assassination of former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo overshadowed the elections to the upper house of the Japanese parliament held this past Sunday. Abe was one of the most important Japanese prime ministers of the post-war era and, as the leader of the largest faction of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), remained a central figure in Japanese politics even after he stepped down in 2020. Abe’s passing could be a transformational event for Japanese politics, but how much it changes the political landscape will only become clear in the weeks and months to come. What is clear is that he left a deep imprint on Japanese foreign policy, pursuing a more proactive stance in global politics and a more robust defence policy. This imprint was also reflected in the upper house elections.

The election results brought few surprises. As expected, the LDP received the highest share of votes. Together with its coalition partner, Komeito, the LDP retains a comfortable majority in the upper house, in addition to its majority in the more powerful lower house. The main opposition party remains the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDP), followed by the Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin no Kai). With the latter in favour of revising the pacifist constitution to put the Japanese military on a more solid foundation, parties in support of revision have attained the required supermajority. However, constitutional revision remains challenging and is far from assured. In contrast, it is almost guaranteed that Japanese defence spending will increase in the coming years. What is less clear is how much the defence budget will increase, what the additional money will be spent on, and where the funding will come from.

High support for an increase in defence spending

In May, Prime Minister Kishida promised a “substantial increase in the defence budget” at a meeting with US President Joe Biden. In this, he has broad support among Japan’s political class. In a survey conducted before the election by NHK, Japan’s public broadcaster, 28 per cent of the candidates answered that the defence budget should be significantly increased and 38 per cent said that it should be increased to some extent, a result also reflected in an Asahi Shimbun poll. Members of the LDP clearly favoured this policy. But even among several opposition parties there was considerable support, though CDP candidates were more lukewarm towards an increase, with many favouring the current level of spending.

Over the coming months in Japan, discussions over the level of defence spending, what the money will be spent on, and where it will come from, will become more heated. The Japanese government will have to provide clearer answers and allow for some compromises to retain broad support among policymakers and keep the majority of the public on board.

The most important long-term factor in this embrace of higher defence spending is the rise of China. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has given it another jolt. As Baba Nobuyuki, co-leader of the Japan Innovation Party, exclaimed at an election event last month, “If we do not strengthen our security, if we do not increase our defence capabilities, innocent children and women will be indiscriminately massacred as in Ukraine”. Making use of rather less terrifying imagery, Prime Minister Kishida also warned at the recent NATO summit in Spain that “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow”. The idea that security needs to be achieved through strength is becoming more prominent. As Aso Taro, the outspoken — and gaffe-prone — vice president of the LDP and former prime minister, asserted in a stump speech last week, “What kind of child was being bullied during your childhood? The weak were bullied. The strong weren’t bullied. The same goes for countries”.

How much should defence spending be increased?

The war in Ukraine also seems to have increased support among the public for higher defence spending. However, this does not mean that the majority would support a significant increase. Asked in an Asahi Shimbun poll whether defence spending should be doubled in the next five years, only 39 per cent gave a positive response, while 42 per cent rejected this. A Kyodo News poll showed slightly different numbers, with 47.8 per cent in favour of an increase to 2 per cent or higher of GDP (doubling the current level of around 1 per cent of GDP), and 45.8 per cent against it.

The LDP has not provided a clear numerical target. Asked about it last month, Kishida avoided giving any precise numbers. However, an LDP policy package mentioned matching NATO spending, implying a 2 per cent target. With the public almost evenly split on this target, the LDP can expect significant headwinds. The Komeito, the LDP’s coalition partner, might also drag its feet. While the Komeito supports an increase, this does not mean that it is fully aligned with the LDP’s more ambitious targets. In a stump speech last week, Komeito leader Yamaguchi Natsuo expressed the worry that increasing military spending without adequate diplomacy to build trust among other countries could lead to an arms race.

Spending on what?

Next to the extent of the increase, a major question is on what the additional resources will be spent. As CDP leader Izumi Kenta stressed in an election speech, “The necessary defence capabilities need to be put in place, but without knowing the content, a doubling [of defence spending] is unacceptable”. One major point of contention is the ability to strike enemy bases, mentioned in the LDP’s election platform. As Sanae Takaichi, the policy chief of the LDP announced: “We will maintain the ability to counterattack against any armed assaults on Japan, including with the use of ballistic missiles, allowing us to deter and respond to such attacks in kind”. According to the aforementioned NHK survey, this policy is supported by majorities in the LDP and two opposition parties, the Japan Innovation Party and the Democratic Party for the People. However, unlike the defence budget increase, this policy has been outright rejected by the CDP. Moreover, for Komeito this appears to be a sensitive topic, with 63 per cent of candidates not responding at all to the survey question. In a poll in May, the Asahi Shimbun found that 44 per cent of the public favoured this policy, while 49 per cent were opposed to it.

How to pay for it?

The last major point of contention is funding. Some voices in the LDP, including the late Abe Shinzo, have suggested issuing government bonds. But Prime Minister Kishida himself has so far remained quiet on this topic. What is clear is that the government will have to strike a balance with other spending priorities. The leader of the Komeito has expressed his scepticism towards using government bonds and cautioned, “If the focus is only on defence, it will be difficult to gain the consent of the public”. Indeed, one factor to keep in mind is that in a recent poll only 15 per cent of the public selected foreign policy and security as the most important issue in this election, vastly outranked by the economy (43 per cent) and social security (33 per cent).

Increasing defence spending is the right policy in light of the regional security situation. The Japanese government has a great opportunity to achieve this, but it will face hurdles. Over the coming months, discussions over the level of defence spending, what the money will be spent on, and where it will come from, will become more heated. The government will have to provide clearer answers and allow for some compromises to retain broad support among policymakers and keep the majority of the public on board.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Felix Kuhn is Lecturer at the Beijing Foreign Studies University-Keele University Collaborative Programme on Diplomacy in Beijing. Image credit: Dvids/U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Natalie M. Byers.