Shift in Philippine pivot to China hinges on next polls

11 August 2021

In late March, the Philippine government’s National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea, an agency that had tried to stay under the radar the last five years of the Duterte administration, sounded the alarm on the swarming of more than 200 Chinese vessels believed to be part of a maritime militia on Whitsun (Julian Felipe) Reef, near the Philippines.

This was followed by publicised military and coast guard patrols in the West Philippine Sea, the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea, never before seen under the leadership of President Rodrigo Duterte. Since taking office in 2016 Duterte has been widely criticised for his refusal to be assertive against China’s incursions in Philippine waters.

The Duterte administration had every reason to panic. The incursion had threatened to become his Scarborough Shoal moment, reminiscent of China’s takeover of a Philippine traditional fishing ground after a months-long standoff in 2012 under then President Benigno Aquino III. China’s continued presence at Whitsun Reef would have been an unsettling legacy for his administration and further opened the doors for critics here and abroad to assail his pandering to China.

The way things are going, we can expect Duterte to ramp up nationalist rhetoric over the next few months to gather voter support for his chosen successor. We have seen this game before.

The Philippines’ pushback on Whitsun Reef drew support from the international community, with the likes of the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and Japan condemning China’s escalation of tensions in the South China Sea. Most of the Chinese vessels eventually left the reef, but only to scatter across the Philippines’ EEZ. As other nations that oppose the undermining of the rules-based international order chimed in, the Philippines, for the first time under the Duterte administration, raised the prospect of seeking help from the United States as deterrence against China’s latest incursion.

Duterte pushback could be for optics

With the brazenness of Chinese incursions and other acts of aggression in the West Philippine Sea in the last five years — Chinese vessels swarming near Thitu (Pag-asa) Island and a Chinese trawler ramming a Filipino fishing boat near Reed (Recto) Bank — it is but logical to view the seemingly sudden strong position of the Duterte administration with suspicion. After all, they had exerted so much effort to play down the incidents all these years. It drove many policy observers into wondering if the Philippines had toughened its stance on the West Philippine Sea.

However, a closer look suggests that the ostensibly tough approach displayed on Whitsun Reef could only be for optics. In one of Duterte’s public addresses in May, just a few months after the Whitsun Reef intrusion, the President called the 2016 arbitral ruling that rejected China’s nine-dash line claim in the South China Sea a worthless piece of paper meant to be thrown in the trash bin — the very same words that China used to dismiss the ruling when it first came out. Duterte also issued a gag order on his defence and foreign ministers, who have been praised for talking tough on Chinese intrusion, on the West Philippine Sea issue.

The Philippine government appears to remain defensive when it is not in control of the narrative and whenever it could potentially face a public backlash. In early July, the government was livid in denying a BBC documentary on Chinese ships blocking Filipino fishermen from fishing at Scarborough (Panatag) Shoal, five years after a United Nations-backed court South China Sea ruling. The fishermen’s accounts were dismissed by Duterte’s spokesperson, Harry Roque, the Philippine Coast Guard and the mayor of Masinloc, a town in Zambales province just hours away from Scarborough.

In Duterte’s final State of the Nation Address on 26 July, he reiterated a part of his speech at the United Nations General Assembly in 2020, saying that “the Arbitral award is part of international law and beyond compromise and beyond the reach of the passing governments to dilute, to diminish or abandon”. Yet ironically in the same address, he belittled the ruling. “What will I do with a document that does not bind China because they were never a part of that arbitration? There was really no arbitration at all because it was only the Philippines side who was heard?”.

As the election draws near, Duterte might have started clearing out potential issues that could ruin the chances of his chosen successor. Just recently, Duterte reversed his unpopular decision to terminate the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with the United States, after a meeting with US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin Jr. The agreement is deemed critical especially at a time when US presence in the region is seen as a deterrent to China. The anti-American Duterte said he changed his mind because of the United States’ COVID-19 vaccine donations. He even went so far as to say that the Philippines and US shared a “common geopolitical outlook in Southeast Asia”.

Even Delfin Lorenzana, the Philippine National Defence Secretary, was sceptical that Duterte would scrap the VFA at all; "He suspended the effectivity of the termination twice. And we're facing an election in 10 months. And me, playing at the back of my mind, I thought it seemed that the President was not serious in terminating the VFA. Otherwise, he should have let the 180 days lapse and then it's over”.

Had Duterte tried to push through with the abrogation of the VFA, the far-reaching consequences would have haunted his legacy, affected his and his chosen successor’s current political standing, and probably created cracks in his relationship with the largely pro-American armed forces.

2022 on the horizon

With the May 2022 presidential elections just around the corner, Duterte’s recent actions on the West Philippine Sea indicate that he will cling to his policy of meek submission to China for the rest of his term. This is already evident in several of his statements proclaiming indebtedness to China for coronavirus vaccines and other economic aid, even if Beijing’s investment pledges have barely materialised.

Still, Duterte would not want it to appear that his administration is not taking action, either. He will take a tough stance even just for show, but he will try to stay within China’s good graces and avoid shaking up the overall bilateral relations.

Recent polls have shown that some Filipinos found the government’s efforts lacking when it came to defending the West Philippine Sea. The opposition is also banking on Duterte’s unpopular foreign policy to attack him and use it to their advantage. The way things are going, we can expect Duterte to ramp up nationalist rhetoric over the next few months to gather voter support for his chosen successor. We have seen this game before. When he campaigned in 2016, Duterte vowed to be tough on China on the West Philippine Sea, only to later claim that he had just been joking.

His favoured successor, whoever that may be, will likely continue the apparent acquiescence to China over the West Philippine Sea. But there is hope. Filipinos have the power to change the tide in the Philippines’ fight for the West Philippine Sea. All they have to do is keep in mind what Duterte put the Philippines through in the West Philippine Sea the last five years and decide from there if they would no longer have any of it.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Frances Mangosing is a national security reporter for Inquirer.net in Manila. Image credit: Wikimedia.