The Russian military build-up on Japan’s northern frontier

24 January 2022

Russia’s progressive strengthening of its military capabilities on the Kuril chain does not qualify as one of the primary security threats to Japan, yet it is still a headache for Tokyo. It is also a reminder of the futility of Japanese hopes for the return of the four disputed islands.

The eyes of Japanese security experts are understandably directed towards the southwest, where tensions have been rising over Taiwan and the Senkaku Islands. However, Japan must also remain watchful in the north, where Russia has been steadily deploying new military capabilities on the Kuril Islands. These islands were occupied by Soviet forces at the end of World War II, but continue to be claimed by Japan as its Northern Territories.

Russia’s growing military presence

Russia has long maintained a military presence on the disputed islands, yet, during the last decade, there has been a marked increase. This followed then-president Dmitrii Medvedev’s announcement in February 2011 that modernising Russian forces on the Kurils should be a priority. Subsequent steps have included the deployment in 2016 of the Bal and Bastion anti-ship missile systems to Kunashir and Iturup, which are the largest of the disputed islands. In December 2021, the Russian military announced that it had installed further Bastion missiles on Matua, an island in the central Kurils where Russia is building a military base. In January this year, it was confirmed that several T80BVs, Russia’s main battle tank, had also been deployed to the Kurils.

Tokyo has little option but to stand firm, enhance cooperation with democratic partners, especially the United States, and demonstrate that Japan, while not acting aggressively, is closely monitoring Russian activities in its vicinity and is fully capable of defending its waters and airspace.

Russia has also enhanced its control of the skies. In February 2018, the Russian prime minister signed a directive officially making the new civilian airport on Iturup dual use with the military. Later that year, three SU-35 fighter jets were spotted on the island. Additionally, in December 2020, Russia’s Ministry of Defence announced the deployment of the S300V4 anti-aircraft system to the Southern Kurils. Living conditions for the Russian military have also markedly improved, including through the completion of new housing blocks, as well as kindergartens and leisure facilities. At present, approximately 3,500 Russian military personnel are stationed on the Southern Kurils. These are deployed with Russia’s 18th Machine Gun-Artillery Division, which is headquartered on Iturup.

Not surprisingly, the reinforcement of Russia’s military presence on the islands has been accompanied by an increase in the frequency and scale of military drills. To take just the most recent examples, on 8 January, Russia’s Eastern Military District revealed that it had conducted test firing of the S300V4 system on the Southern Kurils. Two days later, it announced further drills, this time involving 1000 troops, armoured vehicles, and grenade launchers. During 40 per cent of the exercise, Russian personnel trained in masks to protect themselves from poison gas.

Japan’s calm response

This build-up of Russian forces is occurring extremely close to the Japanese main islands. It is only around 20 km from Kunashir to Hokkaidō. This proximity was demonstrated in August 2021 when a Russian asylum seeker swam across from Kunashir using only a wetsuit and snorkel. The distance is even less, not even 4 km, if measured from Russian-controlled Signal’nyi, one of the uninhabited Habomai Islets. Japan’s Ministry of Defence certainly does have specific concerns. These include Russia’s deployment of the Bastion system on Iturup. Although this is primarily an anti-ship system, it is judged capable of firing the Zircon hypersonic cruise missile, which Russia is currently developing.

Since Bastion’s range is 300 km, the system could theoretically attack land-based targets in parts of Hokkaidō. Similarly, from its position on Kunashir, the S300V4, with a range of 400 km, could theoretically shoot down Japanese aircraft from above almost all of Hokkaidō. Given this situation, it might be assumed that Tokyo views Russia’s growing military presence on the Kurils as one of the leading threats to Japan’s security.

That this is not the case owes something to the fact that Japan’s security planners have their hands full in dealing with China and North Korea. However, it is also due to a recognition that Russia’s military build-up is not primarily directed against Japan. During the Cold War, Japan’s strategy was focused on defending against a Soviet invasion of Hokkaidō, yet this is no longer considered a genuine threat, not least because the Russian military in the Far East lacks the capability for such a large-scale amphibious assault. Indeed, Japan’s Self-Defence Forces are sufficiently relaxed on this point to have engaged since 2010 in a steady reorientation of Japanese defence assets away from the north and towards the southwest.

Rather than preparing to attack Japan, the purpose of Russia’s military build-up on the Kurils is to cement control over the Sea of Okhotsk. By having the ability to guard access to this sea, Russia can use it as a bastion from which to operate its nuclear-armed submarines. Furthermore, the Kuril chain is close to the shipping lane connecting East Asia with the Northern Sea Route, which Moscow hopes will become a major trade route as the Arctic becomes increasingly ice-free. Lastly, it is widely recognised that some of the new military capabilities on the Kurils are simply compensating for the chronic underinvestment that occurred during the 1990s and early 2000s and that Russia’s military presence in the Far East remains below its Cold War peak.

However, while Russia’s military activities on the Kurils are not comparable to the threat posed by China to the Senkaku Islands, it is still a problem that Japan could well do without. For a start, the requirement to monitor Russian military activities puts further strain on Japan’s overstretched Self-Defence Forces (SDF). For instance, over the past five years, Russian military aircraft have annually provoked around 360 scrambles by Japanese SDF jets.

Additionally, even if the Russian military build-up is not primarily directed against Japan, Moscow can still use its forces on the Kurils as leverage. Specifically, Moscow can make clear that actions by Tokyo that it dislikes, such as Japan’s adhesion to further Western sanctions or agreement to host additional US military assets, will be met by an intensification of military drills or the positioning of supplementary armaments on the Kurils. A more provocative option would be for Russia to invite China to join military drills on the islands, something that would cause panic in Tokyo about Moscow and Beijing joining forces against Japan.

Beijing has historically supported Japan’s claim to the disputed islands, but Chinese officials have recently shown signs of leaning towards Russia’s position by calling on Japan to respect the results of World War II in the context of the Kuril Island dispute. The unprecedented joint circuit of the Japanese archipelago that Russian and Chinese naval ships completed in October 2021 further elevated Japan’s concerns. Finally, the growing presence of the Russian forces on the Kurils is frustrating for Tokyo because it clearly demonstrates the hopelessness of Japan’s ambitions to secure the return of the four disputed islands. It was always a tall order for Tokyo to regain the larger islands of Iturup and Kunashir. Now, however, given Russia’s increased military investments, the prospect of the return of these islands seems even more fantastical.

Standing firm

In seeking to address this issue, one option would be for Tokyo to take a conciliatory approach in the hope that Russia will limit its confrontational behaviour and restrict deployments on the islands. Yet this was tried with no success by Abe Shinzō, who served as prime minister from 2012 to 2020. Indeed, it was precisely during Abe’s efforts to build a relationship of personal trust with President Putin that many of these deployments occurred. Most strikingly, Moscow announced the installation of the Bal and Bastion missile systems shortly before Abe welcomed President Putin to his hometown in Yamaguchi in December 2016.

As such, Tokyo has little option but to stand firm, enhance cooperation with democratic partners, especially the United States, and demonstrate that Japan, while not acting aggressively, is closely monitoring Russian activities in its vicinity and is fully capable of defending its waters and airspace. This means that, while the southwest is undoubtedly the main priority, Japan must also ensure that it has sufficient resources to uphold the security of its northern frontier.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

James D.J Brown is an associate professor of Political Science at Temple University, Japan Campus. His most recent book (co-edited with Guibourg Delamotte and Robert Dujarric) is The Abe Legacy: How Japan Has Been Shaped by Abe Shinzō (Lexington, 2021). Image credit: Wikipedia.