The patriot's paradox: Thailand's withdrawal from MOU 44, cheap nationalism, and elite interests

WRITTEN BY WILLIAM J. JONES AND DR THANACHATE WISAIJORN

6 April 2026

Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul’s recent election victory could spell trouble for Thailand-Cambodia relations. His electoral success and subsequent policy statement proposing Thailand’s withdrawal from the 2001 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU 44) — a framework for bilateral negotiations over disputed maritime areas between Thailand and Cambodia — represent a deep contradiction for Thailand: the use of cheap nationalism may advance elite interests at the expense of Thai national interests.

Cambodia and Thailand share a long land and sea border, much of which is disputed. The maritime dispute dates back to 1972, when Cambodian Prime Minister Lon Nol issued two presidential decrees using the Thai island of Koh Kut as the reference point for Cambodia’s territorial claims in the Gulf of Thailand. This Overlapping Claims Area (OCA) comprises some 27,000 square kilometres of maritime territory. On the one hand, it is estimated to contain natural gas reserves of around 311 billion cubic metres, as well as sizeable oil reserves. On the other hand, questions of territory inevitably fall within the bounds of sovereignty — one of the most sensitive issues for Southeast Asian countries. The future viability of MOU 44 has now come into question, re-intensifying territorial tensions between the two countries.

Filling the void: MOU 44

Signed by Cambodia and Thailand in June 2001, MOU 44 reflected two primary points of interest. First, it marked a triumph of diplomacy between the two Southeast Asian countries. As the second in a pair of boundary agreements — following MOU 43 (2000), which focused on land borders — MOU 44 addressed maritime territory and provided a framework for bilateral negotiations. At the time, neither country had yet become a signatory of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), leaving no prior framework for conflict resolution. Together, the twin MOUs represented a ‘golden age’ of cooperation between the two countries, when mutually beneficial outcomes were the primary philosophy guiding their relations.

Second, MOU 44 reflects a careful balancing of internal national interests from the Thai perspective. The core of the MOU is found in Article 2. The Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs, led by then-Foreign Minister Surakiart Sathirathai, crafted the agreement to establish a legal linkage between the extraction of hydrocarbon resources and the “mutually acceptable delimitation of the territorial sea, continental shelf and exclusive economic zone” in the OCA. It links long-term national interests in resolving a territorial dispute with more immediate corporate and political interests in exploiting hydrocarbon resources.

Ultimately, the current trajectory presents two distinct interpretations: it may be viewed cynically as a method to advance corporate and elite interests by using cheap nationalism, or pragmatically as a necessary step to access valuable economic resources blocked by territorial disputes.

Thai politicians have therefore been forced to weigh short-term monetary gains against the sensitive question of sovereignty, which demands significant political capital. In effect, MOU 44 requires territorial disputes to be settled conclusively before oil and gas can be extracted. For Thai political and economic elites to ‘unlock’ oil and gas worth billions of dollars, they would need to solve the sovereignty conundrum and demonstrate political courage. This would entail expending large amounts of political capital to strike a territorial compromise with Cambodia that could prove unpopular with the Thai public.

MOU 44 was largely unproblematic as it filled the void created by the lack of a framework for conflict resolution. However, its fragility has been exposed with rising nationalism on both sides of the border. Recent developments have shown that virulent nationalisms began to take priority over rational negotiation based on mutual understanding and cooperation.

Rupture of relations: setting the stage for withdrawal

Border tensions simmered between Thailand and Cambodia following the short conflicts of 2008-2011, but were contained to the area around the Ta Muen Thom temple complex and eased by a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ in 2011. However, tensions flared again in February 2025, when Cambodian villagers accompanied by military officials entered the Ta Muen Thom temple complex and sang the Cambodian national anthem and other patriotic songs. Tensions reached a peak when former Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen released a secretly recorded phone conversation between himself and then-Thai Prime Minister Paethongtarn Shinawatra in June 2025.

The recording, which depicted Shinawatra in a subservient role — addressing Hun Sen as ‘uncle’ and offering to fulfil his demands to resolve the conflict — appeared to compromise Thai national interests. Her admission of an adversarial relationship with the Thai military also undermined her government’s standing domestically. The release of the tape led to her removal as prime minister and the subsequent collapse of the Pheu Thai government. More importantly, the tape triggered two rounds of open conflict in July and December 2025, poisoning bilateral relations and sparking ultranationalism in both countries.

With the collapse of the Pheu Thai government, Anutin was elected to lead a transitional caretaker government, before securing a full mandate in the February 2026 general election. During the election campaign, Anutin and his Bhumjaithai Party used nationalism as a primary plank in their strategy, taking a hard line on Cambodia by vowing not to open the border, supporting the military, and raising the possibility of cancelling both MOUs through referendum votes. Anutin initially attempted to use withdrawal from MOU 43 as a political tool, but he and Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow later backed off after recognising that withdrawal would be detrimental for Thai interests. This sovereignty-first strategy nevertheless paid off handsomely, with the once mid-sized party emerging as the frontrunner and set to form the core of a new coalition government. Within a week of his election victory, Anutin bolstered this rhetoric by announcing his government’s intent to withdraw from MOU 44.

The primary difference between the two MOUs lies in the progress made under MOU 43. To date, both countries have jointly agreed on 45 of 73 boundary markers from the colonial period that form the unofficial land border. Meanwhile, the maritime boundary under MOU 44 has made no progress to date. The substantial progress in Thailand’s national interest under MOU 43 explains why both the prime minister and foreign minister pivoted on their withdrawal stance. By contrast, MOU 44 withdrawal presents a low-cost alternative to satisfy cheap nationalist appeal.

Withdrawing from MOU 44: winners and losers

By withdrawing from MOU 44, a future Thai government would be able to negotiate joint development — read exploitation — of hydrocarbon resources without having to confront the territorial trap associated with sovereignty. This access to natural resources would provide an important source of wealth and energy security for both countries. To this end, Cambodia has long indicated its willingness to establish a joint development area focused on oil and gas exploration in the OCA — similar to the Malaysia-Thailand Joint Development Area — which aligns with Thailand’s ambitions.

Thai politicians have sought the delinking of territory from natural resources for many years and could now be realised with the support of nationalist Thai voters who, in prioritising sovereignty, may inadvertently have voted against their national interests and instead enabled the pursuit of narrow elite interests. This presents the ‘patriot’s paradox’: if the future Anutin government pursues this path of short-term nationalist wins, it risks sacrificing the national interest of settling the maritime border dispute.

While Cambodia has historically wanted a joint development area that would free it of the constraints of MOU 44, Phnom Penh has rejected Thailand’s recent bid for unilateral withdrawal, framing it as a politically motivated violation of international law. Thailand’s unilateral action could therefore also provide Phnom Penh with a diplomatic cudgel to bolster its narrative of victimhood at the hands of a belligerent government in Bangkok. However, even if Thailand withdraws from MOU 44 within a year, it will still be locked into negotiations through UNCLOS. Cambodia recently ratified UNCLOS, and Thailand is already a state party, meaning both countries are bound by Articles 73, 81, and 83, which prohibit unilateral drilling and require states to seek an equitable delimitation of maritime boundaries.

Ultimately, the current trajectory presents two distinct interpretations: it may be viewed cynically as a method to advance corporate and elite interests by using cheap nationalism, or pragmatically as a necessary step to access valuable economic resources blocked by territorial disputes. While the Anutin government may not proceed with a hydrocarbon deal immediately, as the issue is still politically radioactive, future Thai governments will undoubtedly seek to ‘unlock’ these substantial resources. With the demise of MOU 44, Thai voters will have delivered to Thai politicians the very thing elites have wanted for years: profits from oil and gas without using political capital and dealing with territorial complexities.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writers and do not necessarily represent those of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biographies

William J. Jones is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at Mahidol University International College. His research and publications are focused on regional and international security, human rights, and regionalism in Southeast Asia.

Dr Thanachate Wisaijorn is a Thai scholar of International Relations specialising in Thai–Lao relations, border studies, and the politics of the Mekong subregion. His research and publications are focused on geopolitics, border studies, and International Relations. Image credit: Flickr/The White House.