The Korean Peninsula: Lessons from Russia's aggression against Ukraine

22 August 2022

The range of outcomes stemming from Russia’s aggression against Ukraine raises implications for the situation on the Korean Peninsula. Russia’s violation of international law, its threats to use nuclear weapons, and the deepening great power competition between the US and its allies and Russia and China, bring a number of lessons for South Korea and North Korea. The Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine has been met with different reactions around the world — as is well illustrated by the reactions of the two Korean states.

Despite its initially “slow-motion response”, South Korea (ROK) eventually strongly condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Considering the invasion a violation of the UN Charter, the ROK joined the international economic sanctions against Russia. On the other hand, North Korea was one of only five countries that voted against the UN General Assembly’s resolution that condemned Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Additionally, Pyongyang reinforced its support for Moscow by recognising the Russian-backed breakaway entities in eastern Ukraine as independent states in July this year.

North Korea’s tightening ties with China and Russia and its nuclear ambitions

North Korea (DPRK) has taken advantage of the war in Europe to tighten its ties with China and Russia. The growing US-Russia and US-China tensions have conformed to Kim Jong-un’s diagnosis that the world has entered a new ‘Cold War’. Before the invasion, North Korea described the concentration of Russian troops around Ukraine earlier this year as a “justified response” to US and NATO activity in the region. The invasion of Ukraine was presented as being a result of NATO’s expansion, of destabilising actions by the US around the world, and of a failure to take into account Russia’s “legitimate” security concerns.

North Korea’s use of rhetoric similar to China’s was not surprising given Pyongyang’s close and deepened relations with Beijing. Under conditions of intensified great power competition, Kim Jong-un has opted for further rapprochement with China, which is essential to the survival of his regime. This choice was understandable, but not ideal, as North Korea does not fully trust the authorities in Beijing and realises the costs that come with increased dependence on China.

The different reactions of South Korea and North Korea to the Russian invasion, the deepening Chinese-Russian cooperation, and US efforts to strengthen alliances, may perpetuate tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

North Korea’s support for Russia is not only due to both countries’ hostility toward the US but is also due to Russia’s stance towards easing the international sanctions on North Korea. Increased tensions between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing will further undermine the effectiveness of sanctions imposed on the DPRK. In return for its support, North Korea may presume that Russia will veto any UN Security Council resolutions concerning North Korea. Moreover, the fact that North Korea and Russia are subject to sanctions could encourage both countries to cooperate in circumventing and avoiding them. Recognising two Russian-backed breakaway states in eastern Ukraine could pave the way for sanctions evasion, as North Korea has probably selected workers to be sent to the pro-Russian republics in Donbas. This would violate a 2017 UN Security Council resolution that required all countries to repatriate every North Korean overseas worker by December 2019 to stop them earning foreign currency for the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.

Drawing parallels between Ukraine’s experience with nuclear weapons and North Korea’s current situation is misleading, as Kyiv has never had operational control over any nuclear weapons. However, Russian aggression has reinforced North Korea’s belief that nuclear weapons are the only way to ensure a country’s survival. Given that Biden has stated unequivocally that he will not send any troops to Ukraine, Pyongyang has confirmed its belief that nuclear capabilities are a useful tool in its policy towards the US. Moreover, the war in Ukraine can only reinforce North Korea’s suspicion of multilateral agreements, which it believes are ineffective and broken by the signatories themselves sooner or later anyway.

Strengthening the US-ROK alliance and developing South Korea’s defence capabilities

Given South Korea’s aspiration to become one of the leading democracies worldwide, Seoul highlighted its respect for international law by joining the build-up of pressure on Russia. Its stance on Russia’s aggression has shown that South Korea, despite its default cautiousness, will eventually adjust to the policy of its American ally and like-minded partners to preserve the rules-based international order. The war in Ukraine has also been a stimulus for the South Korean arms industry, which offers its products to the countries of NATO’s eastern flank (confirmed by massive arms deals with Poland). However, before the Russian invasion, South Korea indicated that it had concerns about potential costs to domestic business, caused by increased energy prices and supply chain difficulties. Seoul’s hesitant response in the first days of the war reflected its reluctance to confront the great powers, especially when this comes with economic costs.

In addition, for years South Korea treated Russia as a political partner, participating in the Six-Party Talks and the dialogue on plans to build trans-Korean rail and energy connections. When deciding to support Ukraine, Seoul was certainly aware of the inevitable deterioration of relations with Russia, which placed South Korea on its unfriendly countries list, and the increasing prospects of fostering further cooperation between China, Russia, and North Korea. Lessons from Ukraine have shown that nuclear weapons can embolden a country to use military force, as other states will be deterred from counterattacking. The possibility that the DPRK would carry out a campaign to change its borders with South Korea seems unthinkable, given South Korea’s conventional advantage vis-à-vis North Korea and the US allied commitment. Observing the US support for its NATO allies, South Korea can be certain that its alliance with the US and the presence of American troops on its soil effectively increase its security.

However, the war in Ukraine has also shown the need to strengthen South Korea’s defence capabilities. Bearing in mind the situation in Ukraine and the ongoing development of the North Korean nuclear weapons programme, some South Korean experts have even argued that South Korea should seek to resituate US tactical nuclear weapons on the South’s soil and negotiate a nuclear sharing agreement with the US. In general, the expert debate and public support for developing South Korea’s own nuclear capability may increase after Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

Challenging times for the Korean Peninsula

In sum, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is a crisis that could solidify division on the Korean Peninsula. The different reactions of South Korea and North Korea to the Russian invasion, the deepening Chinese-Russian cooperation, and US efforts to strengthen alliances, may perpetuate tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Second, the war in Ukraine may be a wake-up call for South Korea that its position of strategic ambiguity between competing great powers is increasingly untenable. The challenges and threats related to China and Russia’s policies, as well as the development of North Korea’s nuclear and missile weapons programme, may prompt South Korea to deepen its alliance with the US and with other like-minded partners such as NATO.

Third, in the face of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the arms race on the Korean Peninsula will only accelerate as both Korean states continue to develop advanced systems for self-defence. For North Korea, the war in Ukraine is further proof of the rationale behind the development of nuclear weapons. For South Korea, it has shown the necessity of ensuring the US commitment to its security and strengthening its defence capabilities to effectively deter a potential attack by the North. Fourth, the war in Europe may additionally hamper the talks on North Korea’s denuclearisation. The DPRK will not be interested in negotiating with the US as it has bet on tightening its ties with China and Russia to weaken US influence in the region. Sino-Russian support in the UN Security Council may additionally induce North Korea to conduct missile, and possibly even nuclear weapons, tests, which it has been signalling since January 2021.

The Russian aggression against Ukraine has already influenced the dynamic on the Korean Peninsula, reflecting the growing interdependence of security situations in Europe and Asia. With a more unstable security environment, preventing further Korean crises will require learning the right lessons from conflicts that occur even thousands of kilometres away from the Korean Peninsula.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Dr Oskar Pietrewicz is a Senior Analyst in the Asia-Pacific Programme at the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM). His research focuses on security issues in Northeast Asia with a special focus on the Korean Peninsula. Image credit: Flickr/UNC - CFC - USFK.