Techno-nationalism: A key driver behind China’s geostrategic ambitions

14 September 2022

Nationalism today interacts in complex ways with advanced information and communication systems, frequently resulting in unexpected outcomes. Such digital nationalism has become a central feature of political discourse and decision-making in China, at times powerfully shaping the state's policy efforts. The role of advanced information and communication technologies in such processes is of relevance here. How do interactions in complex sociotechnical systems give rise to nationalism?

For digital nationalism to flourish in any country, there are certain criteria that should essentially be met: 1) endorsing overall state-driven nationalistic sentiments 2) the existence of business endeavours which monetise nationalistic sentiments 3) netizens who exploit these sentiments by engaging their audience in provocative communication patterns 4) the development of AI technology that curates information and content, and promotes activities based upon the behaviour of netizens. As per observations thus far, the PRC has met all four of these criteria with tremendous force, and even the Chinese internet system has therefore become an intriguing object of study, covering aspects of technology-society relations and their potential manipulation or alteration to fit into the country’s national power ambitions.

The PRC elites believe in the necessity (and their ability) to "create a healthy network environment" through "network public opinion guidance”. China's leadership is unapologetic about the importance of "rallying support for achieving the Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the nation". The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) legitimises itself and its actions through media management, and it promotes its carefully crafted "pragmatic nationalism" as a largely standardised set of semantic and aesthetic resources for citizens to make sense of politics. There are numerous examples of this long-standing relationship between state-led efforts and digitised popular sentiments.

Chinese internet and netizens as conduits for nationalism

In the aftermath of the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake, when the Chinese government planned to accept Japanese government relief efforts, online users intervened and stopped the much-needed aid, citing the history of Japan’s imperial invasion of China. In 2012, online reactions to Sino-Japanese territorial disputes spilled into large-scale protests, whereby Chinese citizens who had bought Japanese cars or run Japanese restaurants were targeted. These incidents have had a sort of policy-shaping effect on the Chinese military strategy concerning Japan. Scholars in Chinese studies are divided over the question of how the popular nationalism that circles through China's digital networks relates to state policy. Some assert that popular sentiments do not affect political decision-making in China, arguing that the authoritarian political system and its strongman leaders are impervious to public opinion. Others make the case that Chinese officials are cleverly and successfully using the PRC's expansive propaganda and censorship system to increasingly steer the public mindset.

Thousands of people from around the world have already clustered in China to fill positions related to technological research, raising the nation’s status as a top destination for high-end activities and adding to the growing national pride.

Within authoritarian regimes, it is quite common to make use of the digital sphere to enhance the domestic concentration of power. Recently, as COVID-19 became a nationalist rallying point for the Chinese authorities, the country’s netizens allegedly attacked those who criticised the PRC's handling of the pandemic. In today's education and propaganda policies, the CCP emphasises the nation’s tumultuous history of strife and conflict in order to provide context for its more recent successes in improving the welfare of Chinese citizens and elevating the PRC to Great Power status. The PRC’s media policies have pushed digital technologies and platforms to the point where these pervasive services have become an essential part of China's digital infrastructure. As a result of techno-nationalist governance efforts to create a largely autonomous and sovereign PRC internet, and to foster interactions between enterprises, state actors, and private internet users, Chinese nationalism has further materialised.

Techno-nationalism and self-reliance, the elimination of Chinese insecurities

Since their country's defeat in the first Opium War in the mid-19th century, China's political and social elites have long argued that stagnant scientific and technological advancement was a major reason for why their nation lagged behind the West. In particular, to reduce reliance on imports, pursue an export-based policy, capitalise on global value chains, and move the nation beyond its status as ‘the world's factory’, technological developments became linked to national security and economic growth. The intensity with which the PRC has started to pursue its technological goals have unquestionably perturbed powerful elites across the planet; under former US President Donald Trump, America initiated a campaign against Chinese tech firms, particularly Huawei and ZTE, which comprised of limiting their access to US-controlled semiconductors and other crucial US-controlled technologies. Under current President Joe Biden, that campaign has continued, and if more Chinese companies are added to the purported ‘Entity List’, they will suffer a similar fate.

The actions of the US are essentially akin to a wake-up call for the PRC’s leadership. The CCP believes that it must become technologically independent so as not to be subject to the whims of the US and her allies. Xi Jinping’s arrival at the helm was accompanied by the goal of national rejuvenation, mainly through technological self-reliance. The Made in China 2025 Initiative, released in 2015, aims to slowly eliminate dependence on other nations for raw materials by creating more R&D favouring infrastructures. The CCP also plans on boosting China’s own semiconductor industry in order to eliminate its growing insecurity with regard to Taiwan. For example, The Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), which Zhang Rujing created, has a significant impact on China's aspirations to achieve self-reliance in this area. Beijing emphasises the narrative that Zhang, who is largely regarded as the ‘father of the Chinese semiconductor’, moved his production infrastructure from Taiwan to the mainland in order to realise his ‘patriotic’ dream of setting up first-rate chip manufacturing facilities in China instead.

Boosting competition

Other drivers of techno-nationalism include local government plans to receive credit for expected GDP growth, technological R&D-led job creation, innovation, and encouraging venture capitalists to bring potential ‘unicorns’ to their areas. Thousands of people from around the world have already clustered in China to fill positions related to technological research, raising the nation’s status as a top destination for high-end activities and adding to the growing national pride. The Chinese central government has also taken extensive measures to control and curtail tech giants over the past couple of years in the name of antitrust, social equity, and data protection.

The regulatory crackdown has targeted consumer-facing internet-platform companies, including the renowned Alibaba. These companies do not operate in any of the cutting-edge areas, such as biotech, quantum computing, artificial intelligence, and semiconductors — areas in which China hopes to match and eventually surpass the US. Curbing their growth will boost competition in other sectors, giving a chance for smaller and medium-sized companies to flourish. It may also free up resources, which could be redirected to extend leading-edge technological frontiers, ultimately enhancing the already rising wave of digital nationalism in the country as well.

Technological progress has been an integral component of national security and economic success. China’s launch of programs link the Made in China 2025, China Manufacturing 2025, and China Standards 2035 are proof that development in this field is used as an instrument to generate vast nationalistic sentiments among the Chinese people — an endeavour that has been quite successful as of the present moment.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Dibakar De is a research scholar in the field of International Relations working on the topic of ‘Nation-Branding and Public Diplomacy in Foreign Policy: Comparative study of US and China since 2012’. He is currently pursuing his Doctoral Degree from Amity Institute of International Studies, Amity University Uttar Pradesh under the guidance of Dr Monish Tourangbam. Image credit: Unsplash/Tim Jamieson.