The EU’s toughening stance on China: will it last?

9 July 2020

It is hard to imagine that 45 years after the establishment of diplomatic relations, the European Union and China truly consider each other strategic partners. After all, it is clear they have embraced the strategic dimension of their relationship in fundamentally different ways. They do not share the same social, cultural and economic outlooks, have different domestic abilities and divergent global aspirations. Given the depth of their differences and the intensity of the tensions resulting from therein, the strategic dimension of the partnership rings hollow.

There is no doubt the EU is aware and alert of the risk of ending up on the losing side of this relationship. In the words of European Council President Charles Michel at the last bilateral summit, the EU has to recognise the two sides do not share the same values, political systems or approach to multilateralism. For the relations to further develop, they must become more rules-based and reciprocal, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen added.

Bilateral relations and the challenges within

In reality, significant tensions lie at the heart of their bilateral relations, which the global health crisis originating in Wuhan, China, in late 2019 further amplified. In contravention with its commitments to gradually liberalise economically and politically, China remains largely closed to Europe. China’s “economic caste system” differentiates and favours state-owned over private enterprises and local over foreign, which has not ensured a level-playing field for European and domestic enterprises. Politically, the situation of fundamental freedoms under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party remains appalling, including the treatment of minorities in Xinjiang and Tibet, of human rights defenders, as well as the proposal of a national security law for Hong Kong, all in violation of China’s obligations under international conventions.

A realistic reflection on the EU’s approach to China is one that understands that rather than trying to change China, Europe must adjust and equip itself to face the new reality. It must increase the protection of its interests and values in bilateral relations

By contrast, during decades of intense bilateral exchange, Europe has remained open to China, on all fronts and has facilitated China’s integration into the international community guided by human rights, democracy and rule of law. But the lack of reciprocity — both economic and political — has led to an asymmetric relationship, which has not only benefited China at the expense of Europe, it has also made the EU vulnerable and exposed to Chinese influence. As China portrayed itself as a source of unlimited economic opportunities, Europe has been too naïve, EU leaders agree. Beyond Europe, China’s behaviour — increased repression at home and assertiveness abroad — undermines democracy around the world.

As tensions are deeply embedded in fundamental differences, and the reconciliation of differences seems unlikely in the near future, frictions will remain. The real question Europeans should be asking themselves is can the EU fix the glaring asymmetry and lack of reciprocity and ensure EU-China ties will be truly mutually beneficial?

Given the complexity of bilateral relations, there is no simple answer to this question. Objective assessments of Europe’s approach to China are not always easy to come by. Not without reason: perceptions of ‘the other’ are shaped by an increasingly antagonistic relationship, burdened by mismatched expectations and failed commitments, charged with strong emotions in a context where information is easily weaponised to undermine and manipulate. Disillusionment is present on both sides, but for different reasons. In addition, while the free flow of opinions accommodates a high diversity of views in Europe, in China open debate is under tight control.

The free flow of opinions and criticism are however not sufficient to contribute to Europe’s efforts to rebalance its China policy. Reflections inside Europe on how the EU can return to the original aspiration of EU-China relations, namely to seek cooperation for mutual benefit, must be guided by a realistic, constructive, pragmatic, forward-looking and, most importantly, balanced approach that encourages dialogue. Reflections must be rooted in a thorough understanding of, on one hand, what the EU can and cannot do, and on the other hand, of what the EU wants from China. First, however, a word on where the EU really stands with China is warranted. EU High Representative Josep Borrell described the current state of EU-China affairs as locked in a ‘battle of narratives’, with China aggressively claiming it is a responsible partner while at the same time attempting to discredit the EU.

The pandemic further undermines state of relations

In the context of US-China confrontation and with a ‘decoupling’ of their economies underway, the pandemic has aggravated things for all. For a while, it looked like China was ‘winning the battle’ of narratives. In April the EEAS toned down its criticism of Chinese disinformation about the virus following protests from Beijing. Soon after, the EU’s ambassador to China reportedly allowed Chinese censorship of an open letter signed by the EU’s 27 ambassadors to China, omitting a key reference to the fact that the virus originated in China. Yet, soon enough it appeared China was, in fact, losing face with its ‘face-mask diplomacy’.

Nevertheless, ‘bowing’ to Chinese influence contradicts the EU’s toughening stance on China as articulated in 2019 when Brussels labelled China a ‘systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance’. This assertiveness goes back to 2016 when the EU reassessed and reaffirmed the principles underlying the relationship. It declared relations needed to be one of reciprocal benefit in line with the rules-based international order, where the EU projects a ‘strong, clear and unified voice’, based on internal cooperation.

Yet, several years on, the situation has not improved. And as things stand, there is little hope of convergence towards openness. Calls for a ‘strategic response’ to Chinese activity, rather than just ad hoc reactions, have intensified for good reason. What happened for EU-China relations to deteriorate this much? How have trade ties thrived but in fact led to an evident asymmetry, and how was political dialogue established, but in reality, fail to ascertain trust? While the pandemic has deepened differences, underlying forces had already been at play. Decades of not adequately addressing the fundamental differences in political relations and economic ties have led to the consolidation of the asymmetry to China’s benefit and at Europe’s cost.

Reflections on how the EU could move forward from here together with China, rather than against it, are essential to ensuring that the current rules-based order with democratic governance, as embraced by Europe, remains in place, just as the United States is abandoning its role of maintaining the order. US President Donald Trump, with no support for alliances, no embrace of free trade, no concern over climate change and little support for democracy and human rights, seems to view the burdens of world leadership as outweighing the benefits.

Europe’s adjustment — a realistic assessment

A realistic assessment of the EU’s effort to adjust to a new reality with China is one that understands four important factors and their implications. One, the EU is not a state, but a sui generis entity of sovereign countries who decide by unanimity, hence the EU is structurally constrained. This challenges speaking and acting as one on China — what Brussels can and cannot do on China is a question of member states’ political will. Two, China will continue to tightly control its interaction with international norms, refusing to become the open society Europe would like it to be. Instead, Beijing will continue promoting its own model, threatening the democratic governance model. Three, it is, therefore, key to stress that Europe must uphold democratic multilateral cooperation, including strong transatlantic relations, to work out an affirmative strategy to address all efforts designed to discredit democracy.

This must include more effort from Europe to step up its responsibility for the defence of human rights, as it committed to do by upholding the promotion of human rights as a core part of its engagement with China. Finally, a realistic reflection on the EU’s approach to China is one that understands that rather than trying to change China, Europe must adjust and equip itself to face the new reality. It must increase the protection of its interests and values in bilateral relations, by cooperating with China where this is possible, but excluding cooperation where it creates dependence and poses a security threat.

In contrast with the EU’s structural constraints and 27 foreign policy positions, the centralised and authoritarian control in the hands of the Chinese Communist Party allows it to act with assertiveness and power, internally over its citizens and externally vis-à-vis its partners. Yet, notwithstanding Beijing’s inner fragmentation concerning the country’s domestic development and global role, with no accountability or transparency, this alternative model is undermining democracy. This is precisely where Europe’s strength, value and responsibility as a democracy lie, in upholding open markets and open societies in the face of an authoritarian advance. Europe must, therefore, strengthen internally to champion openness and transparency as a credible bastion of democracy, and avoid being caught between the US-China confrontation.

Credit should go where it is due

A constructive assessment of the EU’s approach to China is one that builds on this realistic approach and goes beyond acknowledging what ‘the EU’, as such, has not delivered on China. Instead, it builds on what the EU has delivered despite its fragmentation and the differences with China. Credit should go where it is due. The EU has toughened its overall stance on China by demanding reciprocity; it has introduced instruments to screen foreign investments and enforced antitrust measures to tackle unfair competition and security concerns from China, demanding that its regulatory system be respected; it has addressed the distortive effects caused by foreign subsidies with the aim of promoting the EU’s strategic autonomy. The EU has cooperated with China on a number of issues, for example, seeking to contribute to making Chinese citizens live more sustainable lives, environmental governance, regional development, sustainable urbanisation and development, water security and management, climate change and accelerating the transition to a greener global economy by supporting low-carbon urban development.

A pragmatic assessment would, therefore, propose to maintain initiatives that benefit the people of China and at the same time address global challenges, namely the eradication of poverty, climate change and sustainable development. Through such cooperation, the EU has translated talk into action. This approach is in itself forward-looking, seeking common interests where the EU can indeed project a strong, clear and unified voice. For the EU, neither seeking to change nor to isolate China is, therefore, the way forward, towards its readjustment to the new reality.

Finally, a balanced assessment of the EU’s approach to China understands that maintaining dialogue must be part of the way forward, as an essential element in an interdependent world, where China’s economy is too well integrated into global trade networks. But as China needs access to EU markets, Brussels must better leverage its economic power to protect its interests, and fix the asymmetry. New instruments, such as the screening mechanism, will be essential in sustaining the stronger EU language we have seen take shape.

The global health crisis knows no borders, nor does climate change. Advocating for Europe’s disengagement until China changes is therefore not the solution. Much value lies in reflections that contribute to Europe’s internal consolidation and stress the need to strengthen democratic alliances to withstand Chinese influence. The value of cooperation goes far beyond just benefiting Europe-China relations; it is a vital element for a more peaceful, cooperative and sustainable world.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Dr Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy is author of “Europe, China, and the Limits of Normative Power” (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), Affiliated Scholar at the Department of Political Science at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Consultant on China and Korean Peninsula at Human Rights Without Frontiers, former political advisor in the European Parliament (2008-2020). Image credit: European Commission.

East Asia9DLJuly 9, 2020China, European Union