8 March 2026

Debates over Donald Trump’s “America First” doctrine have raised questions about whether the United States is turning inward or simply redefining its global role. While recent strategy documents emphasise “restraint” and the avoidance of costly foreign entanglements, operations in Iran and Venezuela expose the limits of this posture.

In the Indo-Pacific, US strategy reaffirms the centrality of the region and the need for sustained deterrence, particularly in response to China’s growing influence. This apparent tension between restraint and engagement has placed renewed scrutiny on Washington’s expectations of its allies and partners.

Here, 9DASHLINE asks several experts to unpack this evolving strategy. Is the United States genuinely pursuing a more restrained posture in the Indo-Pacific, or is it recalibrating its presence by externalising the burdens of competition? What are the implications of this approach for alliance credibility, regional stability, and the future balance of power?

BURDEN-SHIFTING AND THE CREDIBILITY GAP

Dr Anisa Heritage

Senior Lecturer, Defence and International Affairs Department (Faculty for the Study of Leadership, Security and Warfare), Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, UK. Research Fellow, Global Europe Centre, University of Kent, UK.

The 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS) acknowledges the unsustainability of an overstretched US global posture, citing fiscal and military pressures alongside simultaneity and shifting international power dynamics. Accordingly, allies are expected to move towards greater self-reliance and take more forward-leaning postures in regional security. In Northeast Asia, Japan and South Korea are expected to increase defence spending and be more proactive in conventional defence.

Shifting the defensive burden onto regional allies aligns with Trump’s desire to reduce free-riding. However, NDS26 assumes heightened operational and political alignment between Washington and Tokyo in executing US deterrence strategy. This posture faces challenges in Northeast Asia. NDS26’s focus on deterrence by denial along the First Island Chain places Japan and Taiwan at the frontline of renewed great power competition, making Japan and concentrated US assets a primary target in confrontations with China. Further, NDS26’s focus on “strategic restraint” — where the use of force depends on US interests at a specific moment — generates dangerous ambiguity.

Clarity, not conditionality, in US Northeast Asian partnerships is essential. While a stronger denial posture towards China is welcomed by Japan and Taiwan, the transactional tone of alliances tied to defence spending creates unease. Uncertainty about US credibility is especially problematic when asking regional allies to accept greater geopolitical risk. Worse, still, is the conditionality. Would the US defend Japan if it judged Japanese defence investment insufficient?

Trump’s strategy is paradoxical. Deterrence requires a force posture and alliance contributions to protect the First Island Chain. However, demands for greater burden-sharing have not been coupled with assurances about the reliability of existing US commitments. Thus, regional partners like Japan and Australia are diversifying partnerships among themselves and with ASEAN and India, indicating less willingness to outsource strategic direction to Washington. While US influence will inevitably remain, its ability to shape regional outcomes and direct the agenda as it once did have weakened.

* The views and opinions expressed in this article are strictly those of the author, from open sources, and do not represent the views or policies of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, the UK Ministry of Defence, or the UK government.

MIXED SIGNALS ON US COMMITMENT TO THE INDO-PACIFIC

Chris Estep

Non-Resident Fellow, Foreign Policy Research Institute (Asia Program). Former National Security Communications Advisor to Vice President Kamala Harris. Former Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs.

Americans’ views about the Indo-Pacific defy simple characterisation as public support for more or less “restrained” US defence priorities in the region. Most want Washington to avoid armed conflict with Beijing, and most believe US partners should do more for their own security. At the same time, most still view US allies in the Indo-Pacific favourably, and most do not want China to dominate the region.

In its core strategic documents, the second Trump administration has sent similarly mixed signals. The 2025 National Security Strategy controversially ranked US objectives in the Western Hemisphere before US aims in the Indo-Pacific, even though the 2026 National Defense Strategy described the latter as “the world’s economic center of gravity”. US military operations in Venezuela in early January provided stark evidence about what this potential shift in the US government’s priorities could look like in practice, including the redeployment of several American warships previously slated for routine activities in the Indo-Pacific. Subsequent US military operations in Iran have further highlighted the administration’s willingness to devote enormous attention and resources toward regions beyond the Indo-Pacific. Against the backdrop of Beijing’s persistent pressure, uncertainty in regional capitals about the depth of Washington’s commitment and focus could drive longstanding US allies and partners to distance themselves from the US or even acquiesce to China’s demands.

Ultimately, the US government could still take concrete opportunities throughout 2026 to advance robust security objectives in the Indo-Pacific, including by supporting increased defence spending by regional players such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan; strengthening shared defence industrial capacity with many of these partners; and effectively resourcing the US military’s regional posture — and all against the backdrop of a potentially high tempo of face-to-face meetings between President Trump and President Xi. Taking these steps and more would help prove Washington’s practical commitment to safeguarding US and allied security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific.

* The views expressed in this article are his alone.

TRANSACTIONAL ALLIANCES AND THE EROSION OF TRUST

Emma Whitmyer

Policy Researcher (East Asia, Korean Peninsula, and US alliances in the region). Former Senior Program Officer, Asia Society Policy Institute. Former Junior Scholars Fellow, South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Seoul.

The 2025 release of the updated National Security Strategy by the Trump Administration calls on allies to do more for collective defence by investing more into capabilities and providing greater access to the United States, specifically addressing countries like South Korea, Japan, and Australia. Although the document claims that US alliances have been “rebuilt” since Trump’s first day back in office, developments in Venezuela, Greenland, and Iran, as well as the announcements to withdraw from international organisations demonstrate a growing willingness to walk away from established institutions and the rules-based international order.

This approach signals that the US is not fully committed to strengthening its alliances unless they are perceived as immediately beneficial. Instead of signalling restraint, this strategy shifts the burden of containment onto regional partners. As a result, this undermines US-backed principles and questions the credibility of future commitments.

For this administration, improving relations beyond commercial or transactional gains appears largely secondary. The long-term consequences will extend beyond a lack of confidence in the US as a reliable security partner, which is incredibly important to its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific. These consequences will likely include economic implications as well. A transactional approach to alliances imposes costs on partners, who must continually demonstrate their willingness to contribute more in order to sustain US support. Over time, this will cost the US as pressure encourages partners to seek alternative paths for economic cooperation.

FROM STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT TO EXTRACTIVE DISRUPTION

Alan Tidwell

Professor and Director (Center for Australian, New Zealand and Pacific Studies), Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington DC.

The shift in US foreign policy within the Indo-Pacific, characterised by the abandonment of development aid and a pivot toward transactionalism, represents a move from restraint to aggressive disruption. Current actions redefine the US as an extractive and coercive power that has replaced nuanced diplomacy with a coercive model. This is best exemplified by the December 2025 agreement with Palau, which exchanged a USD 7.5 million aid package for the acceptance of 75 third-country deportees. The later rejection of the deal by Palau’s legislature signals just how unpopular such moves are within the region. Simultaneously, the administration has utilised punitive tools, such as the 1 January 2026 "Expanded Travel and Immigration Ban" that suspended visas for Tonga under new "public charge" and non-cooperation rules.

Strategic engagement is now primarily extractive, as seen in the shift toward active support for deep-sea mining under Executive Order 14285. From bypassing the International Seabed Authority to fast-tracking domestic exploration, the US has prioritised commercial mineral recovery over regional environmental stability and international consensus. This is not a withdrawal of presence, but a liquidation of diplomatic capital for immediate domestic gain. The long-term consequences for US influence may be severe. The closure of USAID and the disappearance of "Climate Ready" funds signals US unreliability.

This, coupled with the abrupt recall of two career ambassadors in late 2025, has created a strategic vacuum, leaving the US "missing in action" while competitors like China are positioned to fill the diplomatic void. This behaviour also drives regional fragmentation by ignoring the deep-sea mining moratorium supported by Papua New Guinea and Fiji while backing mining-friendly states like Nauru. By prioritising short-term transactional wins, Washington has converted itself from a "partner of choice" into a disruptive actor.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writers and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Image credit: Flickr/The White House.

Restraint or recalibration? US strategy in the Indo-Pacific