Player or pawn? The geopolitics of the Nuclear Suppliers Group

10 November 2023

The plenary meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) 2023 ended inconclusively on the question of India’s and Pakistan’s bids for membership in the club, repeating the outcome of the 2022 plenary meeting. The NSG member states have struggled to devise a consensual criterion towards the membership bids of non-NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) states — such as India and Pakistan — since 2016.

Formed in 1974, the NSG is a multilateral export control system and a consortium of nuclear-supplier nations that aims to stop nuclear proliferation by limiting the export of goods that can be used to make nuclear weapons. Arriving at a definitive decision concerning India’s and Pakistan's applications within a consensus-oriented body like the NSG faces multifaceted challenges as the group has become another arena for geopolitical competition. Far from a resolution for the membership bids of India and Pakistan, Chairman Benno Laggner of Switzerland announced on 23 June that he plans to extend the deliberations during an "unofficial gathering" scheduled for November. The struggle to devise criteria for these membership bids challenges the NSG’s credibility. It also highlights that the NSG has become a battleground for geopolitical competition, jeopardising its effectiveness in the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Evolving geopolitics and the NSG

In the changing geopolitical and strategic environments, the US refers to China as its “major competitor” and positions India as a “major defender” against China in US National Security and Defense Strategy documents (NSS and NDS). Consequently, the US is taking a one-sided approach favouring India’s membership in the NSG. Recently, in the Indo-US joint statement of 2023, the US declared its support for India's membership bid while completely ignoring Pakistan’s bid. This creates serious ramifications for South Asian strategic stability and puts Pakistan in a difficult position.

Whether the NSG can impartially assess India’s and Pakistan’s bids for membership is a litmus test for the group’s credibility.

This state-specific approach goes back to 2008 when the US assisted India by lobbying for an exemption from the NSG’s restrictions on nuclear trade with states that don’t allow international inspections of all their nuclear facilities and are non-signatories of the NPT. The US advocated for the NSG's waiver on India’s behalf, despite concerns from other NSG members, to enhance its strategic ties with the country. Washington was also motivated by additional considerations, including the potential for increased nuclear commerce with New Delhi. While the US provided an exemption to India for its own strategic interests in the region, Pakistan was left ignored despite its excellent IAEA track record of nuclear safety and security. Pakistan showed its clear resistance to the US’ exemptive approach towards India in Geneva in 2016 and argued that membership in the NSG should be criteria-based and not country-specific. Pakistan maintains its demand for transparent and uniform criteria for non-NPT countries to this day.

The INFCIRC/66, an Indian safeguards model predating the NPT, is still used for non-NPT states' safeguards. This model allows flexibility in moving nuclear materials between safeguarded and unsafeguarded facilities. While this flexibility suits states with multiple civilian facilities, it doesn't align with India's goal of separating civilian and military facilities. India considers unsafeguarded facilities as "strategic", implying potential military use. Therefore, the 2009 agreement permitting material transfer between safeguarded and unsafeguarded facilities is inappropriate in India's context. Further, the exemption granted to India undermines Article I & II of the NPT by allowing a state that is not recognised as a nuclear-armed state under the NPT to engage in civilian nuclear trade, potentially blurring the distinction between nuclear-armed and non-nuclear-armed states. The US’ exceptional behaviour towards one state over the other undermines the NSG’s non-discriminatory stature. With India rethinking its no-first-use policy, any discriminatory behaviour in favour of India might well be perceived by New Delhi as supporting a pro-nuclear proliferation policy — at the cost of Pakistan’s sovereignty and regional nuclear stability.

China has suggested a consensual approach in the matter of NSG membership for non-NPT states. It vetoed a proposal for any exemption for India in the 2016 meeting and endorsed admission with a “criteria-based approach” for every entry into NSG, especially of non-NPT states. China prefers addressing technical, political, and legal aspects of admission before progressing to the next phase of formulating concrete non-discriminatory criteria for non-NPT states. Beijing also supports a two-step approach, where NSG members must first establish the criteria for admitting non-NPT states to the NSG before discussing individual cases. However, although NSG members have been discussing many criteria, they have struggled to reach a consensus. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s and India’s bids for membership remain on the waiting list.

Whereas India wants the NSG to follow the so-called “merit-based approach”, Pakistan demands a criteria-based approach towards both states’ applications. A merit-based approach allows countries that may not fully meet all criteria but have made significant contributions to non-proliferation or taken substantial steps towards disarmament to be considered for participation or membership. Such an approach could be discriminatory because it allows for subjective evaluations of a country's contributions and actions, potentially leading to inconsistencies and favouritism in decision-making. Exceptional treatment towards either of the two nuclear states will have serious regional implications depending on the changing strategic environment. Admitting only one state to the NSG will allow that state to profit from better access to the nuclear market and potentially expand its nuclear arsenal. This would not only threaten strategic stability between India and Pakistan but also the regional balance of power in South Asia.

Challenges to NSG credibility undermine the global nuclear non-proliferation regime

Granting NSG membership to India through an exemption in the process while putting Pakistan on hold would contravene the group’s purpose. As per NSG guidelines, NPT membership is a prerequisite for joining the suppliers’ group. Both India and Pakistan are non-signatories of the NPT and should, therefore, be treated equally regarding NSG membership. A failure to do so would disrupt the existing balance of power in the region, potentially leading to regional instability.

The previous exemption from NSG requirements granted to India may have already diminished its motivation to contemplate NPT membership. Fully extending NSG membership to India would effectively eliminate any lingering leverage that could encourage India to participate in nuclear disarmament initiatives. At the same time, both India and Pakistan need NSG membership to fully achieve their civilian nuclear energy ambitions, which are important for their respective energy futures.

Whether the NSG can impartially assess India’s and Pakistan’s bids for membership is a litmus test for the group’s credibility. Failing to address the needs of non-NPT states objectively would undermine the NSG’s role in the broader nuclear non-proliferation regime and risk making the group dispensable in the evolving geopolitical structure. An open dialogue between the US and China could play a key role in moving forward towards building a consensus on the bids. An open dialogue will provide transparency for all to trust the credibility of the NSG, paving the way for members to collectively establish non-discriminatory admission criteria for non-NPT states in the future.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Syeda Saba Batool is a Researcher at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS) Islamabad. She is also the Board Chair at Emerging Voices Network (EVN), BASIC, London. She is pursuing her MPhil degree in International Relations from the School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid e Azam University, Islamabad. Image credit: Unsplash/Nicolas Hippert.