North Korea’s recent missile tests illustrate its nuclear tactics

30 June 2022

North Korea is advancing its nuclear weapons and missile programmes. Despite economic hardships and pandemic provisions, the regime in Pyongyang has made significant strides in developing a range of different missile systems. Its recent testing spree accounts primarily for technical rather than political purposes: North Korea appears eager to ‘diversify’ its nuclear forces to be able to defeat rival missile defence systems but several missile test events seem to be operational exercises purposed also to improve the capacity for multiple simultaneous launches. Both overarching purposes illustrate how the regime may employ its nuclear forces in conflict.

More than for show

Missile systems are the central pillar of North Korea’s nuclear forces. As vehicles to deliver nuclear warheads to the intended targets, Pyongyang’s missile engineering determines the threats posed by its nuclear capabilities. While analysts and officials presume the regime’s seventh nuclear test to be impending, North Korea has conducted 18 test events of close-range to long-range missile systems between January and June 2022. Considering Kim Jong Un’s list of capabilities to be developed, more test events are likely.

Not only is Pyongyang disinterested in negotiations but the conservative administration in Seoul also appears set to boost its military might.

Such test events can serve signalling purposes, clarifying at the very least that North Korea’s nuclear modernisation poses a serious threat to the US and its allies. Pyongyang’s media reporting of its “hypersonic missile” tests in January 2022 suggests such external purposes, aiming to posture and increase bargaining leverage vis-à-vis South Korea and the US. In addition, missile tests can signal to domestic audiences that the regime is successful in ensuring national security and building modern weapon systems. Media reporting of the 24 March test event, including the ‘Top Gun-style’ video footage of Kim Jong Un, exemplifies such internal purposes, telling success stories instead of explaining the missile test failures on 16 March that Pyongyang residents likely witnessed. Test events can also complement limited mass mobilisation and military drills that aim to maintain national cohesion.

Since North Korea has reported only some of its test events, knowledge about its recent missile test campaign is particularly limited, with open-source analysts having to make inferences from publicly shared information by Japanese, South Korean or US military sources as well as satellite imagery. While the North Korean state media celebrated the majority of missile test events in the past — particularly extensively in 2016 and 2017 — the current lack of reporting suggests that its missile test events indeed serve primarily technical purposes, as in pursuing new capabilities and improving the operability of its nuclear forces.

Eyes set on missile defence

North Korea has tested some missile technologies to pursue a new capability of defeating missile defence systems. Manoeuvrable systems present one way of doing so; conducting lateral and terminal manoeuvres can allow the circumventing of radar systems and complicate detection and tracking. Pyongyang tested manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles, acclaimed as “hypersonic missiles”, twice in early January 2022. In September 2021, North Korea tested a hypersonic glide vehicle. Presumably, Pyongyang can launch such manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles and hypersonic glide vehicles from short to medium-range ballistic missiles, targeting Japanese, South Korean and US military bases in the region. North Korea also possesses cruise missile systems which can challenge missile defence systems; whether these can carry nuclear warheads remains unclear. In January 2022, September 2021, and presumably twice prior, the regime in Pyongyang tested cruise missiles that bring Japan and South Korea into range.

Theoretically, launching missiles from submarines can also challenge missile defence systems by complicating initial detection. North Korea tested four variants of sea-launched ballistic missile systems, the latest two models in May 2022 and October 2021. Pyongyang possesses at least one submarine that is capable of launching ballistic missiles and presumably facilitates testing and training. The regime’s development of a new submarine remains underway since at least 2017.

Employing multiple warheads presents another way of defeating missile defence systems, quantitatively overwhelming and outnumbering interceptor missiles. North Korea showcased its newest intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) first in October 2020. Inferring from its size, this Hwasong-17 ICBM could deliver multiple (nuclear) warheads to the continental US. The developmental status of this ICBM remains ambiguous, however; open-source analysts infer from satellite imagery that the Hwasong-17 failed its initial test launch on 17 March and that the Hwasong-15 — first flight-tested in November 2017 — was successfully launched on 24 March. The US publicised its assessment that the t est events on 27 February and 5 March included technologies relevant to ICBM development.

Preparing for war

A significant portion of North Korea’s test events between January and June 2022 were not developmental but operational. They involved missile systems that were tested multiple times previously and appeared to operationalise different launch platforms or multiple launch activities. The regime in Pyongyang possesses several operational short-range ballistic missile systems. Since 2019, it has conducted a series of test events, including multiple launches with these solid-fueled and road-mobile systems. The regime also possesses a rail-mobile variant of the short-range ballistic missile KN-23 as tested in January 2022 and September 2021. On 25 May 2022, North Korea launched three ballistic missiles, presumably two short-range and one longer-range, from the same location. On 5 June 2022, the regime conducted eight missile launches across the country, involving two different ballistic missile systems and four different launch sites.

Although less attention-grabbing than (looming) nuclear tests, North Korea’s missile tests in 2022 are significant. They illustrate two tactics of how the regime might employ its nuclear weapons in a conflict. One is challenging, if not defeating, early warning and missile defence systems that the US and its allies maintain in the region. The second refers to challenging the US and its allies by launching multiple and different missile systems, potentially from different launch sites. Recently, the regime’s missile tests were met not only with condemnation but with military exercises by South Korea and the US.

Generally, the new administration in Seoul is investing less in rhetorical appeasement or diplomatic engagement towards the North and more in preparing for military confrontation, such as strengthening allies’ joint deterrence posture. While trying to walk the tightrope in its relations with China, South Korea seems willing to work with Japan and promote the US’s strategy in the Indo-Pacific, including increased intelligence sharing and military exercises in the region. Not only is Pyongyang disinterested in negotiations but the conservative administration in Seoul also appears set to boost its military might. While arms developments and tensions are thus likely to spiral on the Korean peninsula, diplomacy continues to lack new approaches to initiate and conduct negotiations with the regime in Pyongyang.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Elisabeth I-Mi Suh is a PhD fellow at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH) and a research fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). Her dissertation discusses North Korea’s nuclear signalling. Issues of nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and security in the Asia-Pacific are part of her work. Previously, Betty held positions of visiting fellow and research assistant at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) and student assistant at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF). Image credit: Flickr/Ryan Chan.