North Korea: successful satellite launch coming soon
North Korea: successful satellite launch coming soon
WRITTEN BY JOE VARNER
29 June 2023
On 30 May, the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff said it had detected the launch of Pyongyang’s new reconnaissance satellite from Tongchang-ri on North Korea's west coast at 6:29 am. The projectile flew over the waters west of the South's border island of Baengnyeong before falling into the sea some 200 kilometres west of Eocheong island. The flight was the nuclear-armed North’s sixth satellite launch attempt and the first since 2016. Even though this satellite launch failed, it suggests that Pyongyang is following the model of other nuclear weapons states to develop and refine its nuclear deterrence capabilities by developing a warhead, a missile for delivery, and reconnaissance assets to support its nuclear strike force. If these efforts go unchecked, we may very well be facing a successful North Korean space programme in the future.
Based on open sources, here is what we know so far about the latest launch: in a very rare admission of failure for the Hermit Kingdom, North Korea acknowledged that an “accident” occurred of a “new type” of Satellite Launch Vehicle (SLV) "Chollima-1" carrying the "Malligyong-1" military reconnaissance satellite from Sohae after launch. The "Malligyong-1" is a 1.3 metre-long small low-orbit satellite weighing 300 kilogrammes that can only conduct basic reconnaissance activities. This North Korean satellite is believed to be capable of basic reconnaissance duty with a resolution of a maximum of one metre. The "Chollima-1" rocket is assessed to be a new type of projectile using an engine for Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM).
Some experts believe that the first stage and engines were taken or derived from the Hwasong (HS)-17 ICBM as Pyongyang described it as “new”. The dual nozzle RD-250 derived liquid fuel engine is also used in the HS-12 Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) and HS-15 ICBM, meaning that it is a tried, tested, and true engine. The HS-17 has the best booster rocket we have seen to date from Pyongyang and likely could easily accommodate a payload of 400 kilogrammes into the 500-kilometre orbit [probably planned for 30 May]. The upper stages are less certain, but from photo images, they are smaller in diameter than the first stage and are likely somewhere in between the diameter of the HS-12 IRBM and HS-15 ICBM and with a “new-type engine system” geared to long-burning, low-thrust flight to safely deploy a satellite into orbit. It is possible that North Korea developed a restartable second-stage engine based on the RD861 that Pyongyang has been working on for some time. It is currently unclear if the SLV’s third stage was to put the satellite into orbit or if the payload also included an apogee motor (used for putting a satellite into its final orbit) and what exactly that motor would be if an apogee or ‘kick motor’ is in play.
Scramble for debris
North Korea claimed that the Chollima-1 SLV fell into the sea “after losing thrust due to the abnormal starting of the second-stage engine after the separation of the first stage during the normal flight”. This is a common failure issue, and Pyongyang already lost an Unha-3 due to this in the 2012 launch attempt. Furthermore, the North said that the new "Chollima-1" satellite launch rocket failed because of instability in the new engine and fuel system, and it is very likely that neither the second nor third stage fired at all. South Korean intelligence suggested a technical glitch may have occurred because the projectile was set up to fly a route leaning toward the west but “had to make an excessive change of route toward the east through lateral motion”.
One thing is certain: we are going to have to live with a dangerously effective and growing North Korean nuclear deterrent, and we must be prepared for an equally successful space programme to follow with a satellite launch coming very soon.
Historically, North Korean space launches have consistently failed, indicating that whereas its military ballistic capabilities are being forcefully developed, its space launch capabilities are not proceeding at the same pace of development. That is curious because space launch capabilities and ballistic missile systems are essentially similar technologies in many respects, and North Korean testing of ballistic missile systems has been much more successful. In fact, they have been so successful with their ICBM programmes that the North has been introducing new types of missiles every other year.
Recovery of the first stage of the North Korean SLV by South Korea has likely taken place and the recovery of the second stage and third stage is ongoing as they are buried in the seabed and likely still full of propellant. There are indications that China is now also trying to recover the North Korean SLV and its payload as Beijing, like Seoul, wants to determine the sophistication of Pyongyang’s missile and satellite technology. It will take weeks for the North to fix the engine problems before it could conduct a second launch but the possibility of an early launch cannot be ruled out unless the defects are major. If a second launch were to take place, the North may change the launch site to a previously trusted location. Both launch pads at its Sohae Satellite Launch Station showed signs of launch readiness.
North Korea’s satellite programme matters
Failed attempt or not, North Korea’s satellite programme is significant and needs to be monitored very closely for a variety of reasons. First and foremost, the low-orbit satellite would give North Korea greater real-time domain awareness over military targets and their movements in the southern half of its territory. Second, it would increase the range of North Korea’s long-range drones to about 500 kilometres. Third, the technology involved in the satellite programme aids the ICBM programme, particularly in producing re-entry technology key for the effective deployment of nuclear weapons. Four, the satellite would aid North Korea in targeting tactical nuclear weapons in the South and completing a damage assessment after attacks.
Finally, pride is involved. The satellite programme was on Kim Jong-un’s want list at the 8th North Korean Communist Party Congress and Pyongyang’s leadership wants to be a member of the elite club that operates military reconnaissance satellites. We all know that pride comes before a fall. In this case, the real cause of the Hermit Kingdom’s SLV failure may have been the pride to match South Korea’s KSLV-II Nuri satellite launch that placed several satellites into orbit days before what appears to be a rushed launch by the North. Not surprisingly to answer the North’s critics, Kim Yo-jong — Kim Jong-un’s little sister, who tends to deliver toughly worded messages her brother is better off not uttering for political and deterrence reasons — warned that Pyongyang would follow up soon with another reconnaissance satellite launch and will increase surveillance capabilities.
The final takeaway may just be that North Korea is following the same path to a nuclear deterrent as the other major nuclear weapon states in that it has tested several nuclear devices, developed land-based ballistic missile delivery systems, and moved on to sea-, and likely other air-delivery weapons. Now it needs to develop space-based assets to support its nuclear ambitions. As always, when it comes to regime survival, nuclear ambition and Pyongyang’s nuclear program come first, and the space program ‘plays second fiddle’ to the pre-eminently important nuclear deterrent. North Korea has likely assembled 20 to 30 nuclear warheads to date and may have enough fissile material to build as many as 45 to 55 nuclear weapons, other estimates are even larger. It has tested 100 ballistic missiles with eight of them being ICBMs since 2022. This year alone, Pyongyang has tested canisterised solid fuel ICBMs in the HS-18, land-launched guidable cruise missiles, submarine-launched cruise missiles, long-range drones, unmanned underwater drones, and tactical or theatre-level ballistic missiles all geared to carry nuclear weapons to their target whether it be Seoul, Tokyo, Guam, or Washington, DC. One thing is certain: we are going to have to live with a dangerously effective and growing North Korean nuclear deterrent, and we must be prepared for an equally successful space programme to follow with a satellite launch coming very soon.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Joe Varner is the Deputy Director of the Conference of Defence Associations, Canada. He is also a former Adjunct Scholar at West Point’s Modern War Institute and is the author of “Canada’s Asia-Pacific Security Dilemma.” Image credit: Wikimedia Commons/Gilad Rom.