Moving forward while moving backwards: More of the same in Thai politics
Moving forward while moving backwards: More of the same in Thai politics
WRITTEN BY WILLIAM J. JONES
6 March 2024
In May 2023, the Thai general election saw a political ‘bomb’ drop on Thailand. The progressive reformist Move Forward Party (MFP) placed first, taking 151 seats in the 500-member parliament, setting the stage for a head-on collision with Thailand’s conservative establishment. Despite leading in terms of votes in the 2023 elections, the MFP was unable to form a government. The reasons for this inability to form a government are lengthy but the primary reason was their reform platform (most importantly, the party’s call to reform Article 112, the lese-majeste law) and unwillingness to compromise.
Move Forward’s touching of the ‘third rail’ provoked a reaction from its adversaries who resorted to the ‘old playbook’ of lawfare, filing two complaints with Thailand’s Constitutional Court. It is important to consider the impact of the recent Constitutional Court verdicts and Thaksin Shinawatra’s return to Thailand. Having lost influence to Move Forward, the country’s conservative elite is resorting to lawfare, as well as making a Faustian bargain with their previous enemy, Thaksin Shinawatra.
The Constitutional Court and Move Forward
The first complaint was filed by the election commission on the grounds that the MFP leader, Pita Limjaroenrat, held shares in a media company in violation of constitutional provisions. The second complaint was filed by ‘activist’ Theerayut Suwannakaysorn on the grounds that Move Forward’s policy platform of reforming Article 112, Thailand’s lese-majeste law, was an “attempt to overthrow the democratic system with the King as Head of State”.
On 24 January 2024, Pita was cleared of the media shares charge by the Constitutional Court and returned to his duties as an MP. However, the far more serious second charge saw a unanimous verdict that the party’s platform of reforming Article 112 did indeed represent an ongoing attempt to overthrow the country’s democratic system. The court issued a cease and desist order to the party to stop, delete, and do away with any-and-all reference to the policy.
In May 2023, the Thai general election saw a political ‘bomb’ drop on Thailand. The progressive reformist Move Forward Party placed first, taking 151 seats in the 500-member parliament, setting the stage for a head-on collision with Thailand’s conservative establishment.
The court ruling has far-ranging implications for Thailand’s opposition party. In response to the Constitutional Court ruling, various ‘activists’ filed complaints with the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC). These complaints centre on 44 Move Forward Party MPs who signed a petition supporting the party’s policy of reforming Article 112. The NACC will take up the complaint and, if political winds continue to blow in the same direction, it will forward the complaint to the Supreme Court’s Division for Political Office Holders. If found guilty, the 44 MFP MPs could face a lifetime ban from politics and have their political rights stripped for 10 years.
This indeed feels like a repeat of the political process that befell Pannika Wanich, a banned MP from the Future Forward Party (the predecessor to Move Forward, which was dissolved in the aftermath of its success in the 2019 general election). Pannika was banned for life late last year for ‘serious ethical breaches’ by the same court for Facebook posts that allegedly defamed the monarchy.
Move Forward’s future
The immediate future for Thailand’s progressive party does not look good. The speed with which this court case proceeded and the unanimous decision reached by all justices reflects the fears of Thailand’s reactionary elite. The unanimity of the court verdict bears signs of political interference and a predetermined outcome. The only open question is: why did the conservative establishment move so quickly to push the legal cases so far away from the next election? Dissolving the MFP now gives the party time to re-establish and regroup before the next election, expected to be held in 2027. The most plausible answer is that the Thai elite has not learned from the past and are reacting in the only way they know how: the tried-and-true method of lawfare and banning the opposition. Essentially, an ‘ostrich strategy’ by the Thai political elite.
The fact that the conservative establishment has no answer to Thailand’s electorate, which wishes for some change in direction via socio-political reform in the country, is underscored by the reversion to cooperation with their ‘hated enemy’ for the last 15 years — former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. The conservative establishment political parties, United Thai Nation, Palang Pracharat, and Democrat Party, were roundly rejected in the 2023 general election. The conservative response was to allow a Puea Thai government formation, the return of Thaksin Shinawatra, and a move to ban Move Forward.
Thaksin Shinawatra’s return from exile
On 22 August 2023, Thaksin Shinawatra returned triumphantly to Thailand after a decade and a half in self-imposed exile. His return signalled a new chapter in Thailand’s tumultuous politics. Thaksin’s reconciliation with his adversaries resulted in two military coups, one judicial coup, and a lost decade for the Kingdom.
The reconciliation is premised on the conservative Thai elite having a new and more ‘dangerous’ enemy in the ideologically informed Future Forward, now Move Forward, Party. The party is popular, has strong support among the youth and, most threateningly, is not influenced by traditional Thai money politics, patron-client relationships, clientelism, and cronyism. In fact, it stands in direct opposition to all of the aforementioned and is unwilling to compromise its principled positions.
Thaksin’s return to Thailand and the deal that was cut with his adversaries was instrumental in forestalling the MFP from power. The ‘backroom deal’ for Thaksin was evidenced by his receiving of a royal pardon on 2 September, which reduced his prison sentence from eight years to only one year. This culminated in him being released on parole on 18 February after serving 6 months in police general hospital. The royal pardon was a double-edged sword, as Thaksin was not released ‘scot-free’. By admitting his guilt, he in effect legitimised the establishment’s actions against him, subsequent coups, and the political upheaval of the last two decades.
The impact of Thaksin’s return
Thaksin’s Puea Thai Party will take up the mantle of Thailand’s conservative party as General Prayut and Prawit fade into history. The Democrat Party is no longer a viable political party with its vote share collapsing from 156 seats in 2011 to 25 seats in 2023.
However, the electoral landscape is not rosy for Puea Thai in the least. Thailand’s once-dominant party has lost its ‘mojo’. The 2023 general election saw the worst-ever performance and outcome for a Thaksin-led/backed party. Previous incarnations of Puea Thai, the original Thai Rak Thai (TRT), stormed to power in 2001 with 248 MP seats. This increased in 2005 to 377 seats and increased again in 2006 to 461 seats in an election that was invalided by the Constitutional Court and boycotted by the opposition, triggering the 2007 coup.
After the TRT’s dissolution, its reincarnation, the People’s Power Party, won 233 seats in the 2007 elections and the Puea Thai Party won 265 seats in 2011, with Yingluck Shinawatra elected as Prime Minister. The 2019 elections saw Puea Thai take 136 seats, but this was due to the single-ballot voting system. The free and fair elections using the two-ballot voting system produced only 141 seats for Puea Thai.
Looking forward
Some key takeaways from Puea Thai’s electoral performance and Thailand’s changing landscape are that while Thaksin’s return is a stabilising force, the country’s politics will continue to be tumultuous. An entire generation of voters only know Thaksin as a historical figure. This generation is now largely supportive of Move Forward, made up of a large base of middle-class urban voters, whose votes gave the MFP almost all the parliamentary seats in the capital, Bangkok, in 2023.
Puea Thai will continue to struggle electorally as its traditional identity as a populist people’s party has been taken wholesale by the MFP. This is evidenced by its inability to generate energetic reformist economic or social policies in the face of a country deeply in need of reform. Thaksin still has enormous influence among elite circles and a sizable backing in the Thai electorate. He had been away from the country for over a decade and that degree of space has undoubtedly kept his finger off the pulse of Thai society. Whether he can reconnect to Thailand’s needs by finally being in the country remains to be seen.
Given the lack of central or strong leadership from the former military junta, Thaksin will play a central role in the current government. Prime Minister Srettha will likely last a year in office before being replaced. Rumours are that Paetongtarn Shinawatra, Thaksin’s daughter, will take the mantle of political leadership. Whether Thaksin chooses or is forced to put his daughter in ‘the line of fire’, as he and his sister did previously, is an open question.
Lastly, what can we expect in the near future? Move Forward will likely be disbanded by the courts and its executives banned as well. However, this will not stop the forces that Move Forward represent. The sizeable party will be reincarnated as a new party that will continue calling for deep reform into and beyond the next general election. Whether Thailand’s elites heed the necessary calls for change is a cause for deeper concern.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
William J. Jones is an Assistant Professor who has taught international relations for 16 years at Mahidol University International College, Thailand. He has publications covering European Union diplomacy, ASEAN regionalism, human rights in Southeast Asia, Thai higher education, and contemporary Thai politics. He has published widely in academic journals and provided commentary in the Diplomat, East Asia Forum, and other prominent news outlets. He is currently completing his PhD on the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights. Image credit: Wikimedia (cropped).