More than signalling: North Korea’s missiles and Japan’s enhanced need for deterrence
More than signalling: North Korea’s missiles and Japan’s enhanced need for deterrence
WRITTEN BY RYO HINATA-YAMAGUCHI AND CHRISTOPHER LAMONT
28 October 2022
Between 25 September and 9 October, North Korea conducted a total of seven missile launches. These launches were carried out as part of an exercise to train “tactical nuclear operation units” for the Korean People’s Army (KPA) and included the 4 October launch of an intermediate-range ballistic missile that flew over the Japanese archipelago. On the morning of 4 October, missile alerts sounded and warnings were issued telling people in Northern Japan to seek shelter. This most recent overflight of Japan by a North Korean missile, combined with combat aircraft and artillery drills near the inter-Korean border, brought the rogue nuclear nation’s threat back to the forefront of Japanese security debates, along with China, tensions over Taiwan, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
North Korea’s missile launches: Signalling or military readiness?
North Korean missile launches over Japan are not rare. The 4 October launch was the seventh incident since 1998 (when Pyongyang launched a Taepodong technological demonstrator, a prototype intercontinental ballistic missile). To date, apart from technological demonstrators and satellite launches, every North Korean launch over Japan has been carried out with a Hwasongpho-12 intermediate-range ballistic missile or its newer models. North Korea possesses a host of missiles that have the ability to strike Japan, including intermediate-range missiles, intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, as well as long-range cruise missiles. Moreover, North Korea is also developing hypersonic glide vehicles and other manoeuvrable missiles that are harder to detect, track, and intercept.
Even though Japan’s defence planning faces dilemmas and doubts going forward, there is a renewed consensus in Tokyo that more must be done to deter and defend against a diverse range of challenges posed by China, North Korea, and Russia.
All of these capabilities taken together offer a clearer picture of how and why North Korea’s recent missile launches cannot be seen as just missile tests. In the past, North Korea’s missile launches were often interpreted as strategic signalling directed at South Korea, the United States, and Japan. However, the series of launches over the past year are more than just signalling — they are efforts to enhance the KPA’s readiness to conduct strikes. Although North Korea carefully calibrates the timing of its missile launches, the purpose of such launches is to both test the technological capabilities of its arsenal and sharpen the alert and launch-readiness of the KPA. In short, while these training exercises might not portend a strike in and of themselves, the improved readiness of the KPA’s tactical nuclear operations units will increase Pyongyang’s perceived leverage in any future standoff with its adversaries.
With Pyongyang’s drive to enhance its military readiness, Tokyo can expect the pace and scope of North Korean military activity over and around Japan to continue to expand. In June, North Korea announced that it will accelerate its five-year military modernisation plan, although it had only been issued in 2021. The aim of this acceleration is to attain some level of improvement in the KPA’s readiness by 2024. Furthermore, North Korea also revised its nuclear weapons doctrine in September 2022, which not only included pre-emptive strikes but established ‘dead hand’ strike mechanisms in case Kim Jong-un was successfully targeted in a ‘decapitation’ strike.
It is also important to note that North Korea is not exclusively focused on improving the readiness of its nuclear missile force. Pyongyang is working to diversify its military readiness in a manner that is consistent with its limited capacity and in line with its style of hybrid warfare. For example, North Korea refrains from pursuing grand, high-end weapons systems like aircraft carriers, and instead focuses on artillery, anti-air and anti-ship missiles, mines, submarines, and also electronic and cyber warfare capabilities. Moreover, North Korea has historically embraced information warfare to agitate, influence, and create misinformation in adversarial states.
North Korean military readiness and enhancing Japanese deterrence
Against this backdrop, North Korea will continue to conduct further missile launches and drills to enhance its military readiness and leverage. For Japan, North Korea’s moves to improve its military readiness across a wide range of domains (not just its nuclear missile arsenal) highlight how the challenge posed by Pyongyang is one that requires vigilance. Conversely for Pyongyang, North Korea’s strike capabilities against Japan are aimed at deterring and neutralising any prospective intervention and counterattack measures on the part of Japan’s Self-Defence Forces and US military forces in Japan. If North Korea’s recent missile launches are primarily aimed at improving military readiness (and are not in themselves strategic signalling efforts), then for defence planners in Tokyo, Japan’s own drive to enhance its defence readiness must accelerate.
Indeed, although Japan has sought to improve its air and missile defences since the final years of the Cold War, it was North Korea’s missile tests in the 1990s that acted as a catalyst for Japan’s deployment of ballistic missile defence (BMD) systems. Japan’s BMD capabilities now comprise Aegis-guided SM-3 systems (and in the near future SM-6), alongside Patriot PAC-3 systems. However, in the shadow of North Korea’s recent efforts to improve the readiness of its ballistic missile forces (and taking into account concerns over China and Russia), Tokyo has sought to complement its BMD system with additional capabilities to both deter and counter a conventional strike against Japan. Most notable among these is Tokyo’s pursuit of counterattack capabilities. Such capabilities are seen in Japan as a means of imposing costs on a potential adversary, while also degrading an adversary’s capacity to carry out subsequent strikes.
Japan’s renewed security consensus
Even though Japan’s defence planning faces dilemmas and doubts going forward, there is a renewed consensus in Tokyo that more must be done to deter and defend against a diverse range of challenges posed by China, North Korea, and Russia. Indeed, in the context of these emerging challenges, the cost of inaction on deterrence is significantly higher than prudent measures aimed at increasing Japan’s military preparedness. In the coming months, this consensus will not only act to further accelerate Japan’s efforts to enhance defence readiness, but it will also drive greater attentiveness to regional developments on the part of Tokyo, from the Korean Peninsula to the South China Sea. In this context, deepening cooperation on security questions of shared concern among Japan’s partners, such as its longstanding treaty ally, the United States, as well as Australia, Canada, South Korea, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom, will be of heightened importance.
In sum, it is most certainly the case that significant disagreements over the past decade over adapting Japan’s security and defence policy to meet new challenges largely focused on the question of how Japan could act to improve its defence posture, as opposed to if Japan should do so. However, North Korea’s drive for military readiness, and ongoing military exercises, will provide further justification for policies aimed at enhancing Japan’s defence readiness in ways that would have provoked significant controversy in the past.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biographies
Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi is a Project Assistant Professor at the Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology at the University of Tokyo and also an Adjunct Fellow at the Pacific Forum. Ryo specialises in issues relating to defence, security, and transport governance in the Indo-Pacific, and is the author of the book “Defense Planning and Readiness of North Korea: Armed to Rule” (2021).
Christopher Lamont is Associate Professor and Assistant Dean at the Institute of International Strategy, Tokyo International University and is a Visiting Researcher at the Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology at the University of Tokyo. Chris’ work focuses on global governance, human rights, and international organisations. Image credit: Flickr/Ryan Chan.