Japan’s human rights foreign policy and the Olympic boycott

16 December 2021

At last week’s democracy summit, held by the United States, Prime Minister Kishida Fumio proclaimed Japan’s intention to “firmly raise its voice against serious human rights violations”. And indeed, a new push is underway in Japan to give human rights a more prominent place in foreign policy. This is most visible in the creation of the new position of special adviser on human rights issues last month and an announcement by the foreign ministry that it would create a new human rights position next year.

This push has received widespread support from Japanese politicians. Lawmakers belonging to the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) initiated a project team on human rights in February this year, which published its first recommendations in May. The elevation of human rights has received support across the political spectrum. In April, the inaugural meeting of the Nonpartisan Parliamentary Association for Reconsidering Human Rights Diplomacy was held. This association brings together more than 80 lawmakers from all the major parties.

What this concern with human rights means for Japanese foreign policy in practice is, however, contested. Nowhere is this more evident than in Japan’s relations with China, which figures prominently in the Japanese discourse on human rights violations. The current debate on a boycott of the Olympic Games to be held in Beijing in February 2022 shows this vividly, with one group of lawmakers strongly in favour of a boycott while the government seems to prefer a more balanced position.

Human rights diplomacy and calls for a boycott

In the case of China, human rights concerns are intermingled with other concerns, most importantly wariness about Chinese military activities, which together have led to widespread negative perceptions of China. One poll conducted in October, before the recent election, found that among LDP candidates 75 per cent saw China as a threat while only 2 per cent regarded it as a partner.

Whatever the Japanese government ultimately decides, it has already become evident that giving human rights a more prominent place in Japan’s foreign policy will bring significant challenges.

In general, more hawkish members of the LDP believe that Japan ought to take a firm stance in its foreign policy vis-à-vis its giant neighbour. For example, last month a group of lawmakers expressed the view that Foreign Minister Hayashi Yoshimasa should not visit China at the current time. This view, is not universal, however. Kono Taro, a former foreign and defence minister, rebuked “such irresponsible voices”.

As he noted, “If the foreign ministers can't talk, that is definitely not an ideal situation”. One major factor in this more conciliatory stance, as Kono also mentioned, is China’s vital importance as a trade partner. The diplomatic boycott of the Olympic Games, which is led by the United States and has been joined by several other governments, has crystallised the Japanese debate on human rights and foreign policy towards China.

Unsurprisingly, the position of the hawks is clear: Japan should join the boycott. Among these hawks is Takaichi Sanae, who recently argued that the Japanese government “should not send a diplomatic delegation”. She also grilled Prime Minister Kishida on his stance towards the Olympics in a parliamentary debate on 13 December. Takaichi is the current policy chief of the LDP, an important position within the party. While she lost a recent election for the party leadership in which Kishida won, she was able to gain substantial support, most notably from former prime minister Abe Shinzo. That is, she is far from an outsider voice.

The same can be said of Sato Masahisa, the director of the LDP’s Foreign Affairs Division, who also favours a diplomatic boycott. For him, all the dithering about a boycott is damaging Japan’s image; it gives the impression that “Japan puts money before human rights”. Obviously, this line of attack is directly addressed to those who stress the economic importance of China. While one should not deny the real concern with human rights among the more hawkish members of the LDP, it is also evident that arguments about human rights function in their case to bolster already established positions, rather than leading in new foreign policy directions.

A boycott of the Olympic Games is also being contemplated among members of the opposition. Ogawa Junya, policy chief of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDP), the major opposition party, lamented in a press conference “the recent suppression of human rights in China” and mentioned that “a firm response may be necessary in some cases”. Some opposition figures have gone further. Ishii Kazuo, head of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), has called outright for a diplomatic boycott, referring to human rights violations in China.

The government and the boycott

For the government, this has led to a difficult situation. On the one hand, there is little desire to antagonise China and potentially disrupt relations between the two countries. The preceding Japanese governments displayed a pragmatic stance towards China and for now, Kishida does not seem inclined to make any fundamental changes. This stance entails Japan engaging other countries to establish a balance vis-à-vis China’s rising power, while, at the same time, trying to keep relations with its neighbour stable. A diplomatic boycott would run counter to the goal of stable relations.

This would be true in general, but one more factor to consider for Japan, as Motegi Toshimitsu, the secretary-general of the LDP also pointed out, is that China sent an important official in charge of sports affairs to attend the games held in Tokyo last summer. If Japan did not reciprocate, it is difficult to see how China could regard this as anything but a diplomatic slap in the face. On the other hand, domestic voices calling for a tough stance cannot be ignored, especially since they are aligned with the government’s own aspiration of elevating human rights in Japanese foreign policy.

Moreover, the Japanese government certainly does not wish to snub the United States, the leader of the diplomatic boycott movement, not least because the US is central to Japan’s national security. Prime Minister Kishida has stressed that the decision of whether to join the Olympic boycott will be made based on Japan’s “national interest”.

In practice, the current position of the government is reportedly to try to achieve a balance: Japan will not send a cabinet official, but it will send the head of the Japan Sports Agency or Japanese Olympic officials. The head of the Japanese Olympic Committee, who is also a member of the International Olympic Committee, has already said that he would go in his capacity as a functionary. The question thus is if Japan will send the head of the Japan Sports Agency, a proper government official who would have a similar position as the Chinese delegate to the Tokyo Olympics. Whether this will be called a diplomatic boycott has not yet been decided.

While this balancing act will satisfy no one, it might be the best among several unsatisfying choices. By sending an official in charge of sports affairs, the government would emphasise that this is solely about the Olympics as a sports event, as well as about reciprocating the official Chinese visit to the Tokyo Olympics. A balance could further be achieved by avoiding the word ‘boycott’, which would certainly antagonise China. At the same time, the government could make sure that everyone is aware that Japan is not sending a cabinet-level official due to concerns over human rights.

Likely reactions to a balanced policy

This policy would not be the great fulfilment of the government’s human rights aspirations and it would probably lead to a domestic backlash. But at least it would not entirely neglect human rights concerns and, while not exactly celebrated by anyone, it might be broadly acceptable internationally. European countries have been far from enthusiastic in joining in the boycott and another important US ally in East Asia, South Korea, has already stated that it will not participate.

There is certainly room for Japan to carve out its own position without irritating the US. How China would react to this kind of balancing act is less clear. But at least it would be wise to accept it. Any overtly hostile reaction would more likely give ammunition to those who favoured a tougher stance in the first place, than lead to a more accommodating policy in the future. Whatever the Japanese government ultimately decides, it has already become evident that giving human rights a more prominent place in Japan’s foreign policy will bring significant challenges. This will not be the last time that Japan has to make a difficult choice.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Felix Kuhn is a lecturer at the Beijing Foreign Studies University-Keele University Collaborative Programme on Diplomacy in Beijing. Image credit: Unsplash/Shinnosuke Ando.