Is China's Western Theatre Command confident enough to challenge India?
Is China's Western Theatre Command confident enough to challenge India?
WRITTEN BY SUYASH DESAI
30 June 2020
In 2013, during the Third Plenum of the18th Central Committee, it was announced by Xi Jinping that China would introduce widespread military reforms. This shift in policy came a year after Xi Jinping had succeeded Hu Jintao as General Secretary and at the beginning of his program of consolidating his faction’s hold over the Chinese Communist Party. Amid other reforms, including announcements on the economy, the Third Plenum specifically identified the People’s Liberation Army leadership, command and force structures, institutions and civil-military integration as key areas for major reforms.
Xi initiated the reform process two years later in 2015 with the ambitious goal to make the PLA a fully mechanised force by 2020, informatised by 2035 with the key aim of turning it into a world-class army by 2050. These reforms included changes to the Central Military Commission’s bureaucratic structure, the creation of newer forces like the PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) and the PLA Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF) and the formation of theatre commands for improving effectiveness between the various branches. Alongside these institutional reforms, Xi Jinping also prioritised weapons modernisation with the deployment of newer weapon systems.
The formation of the PLA’s Western Theatre Command (WTC) in 2016 saw the replacement of the old Chengdu and Lanzhou Military Regions and established a single unified command structure across Xinjiang, Tibet and along the border of key states from Afghanistan and India. The impetus to modernise the PLA was accelerated after the 2017 Doklam stand-off which saw Indian and Chinese troops face-off in Bhutan. This along with amplified military training has helped the People’s Liberation Army to improve its firepower and develop its combat readiness, making it now more confident to challenge India along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
Reforms and the Western Theatre Command
Under theaterisation, the former Chengdu and Lanzhou Military Regions, which were responsible for operational jurisdiction during the Sino-Indian border, were merged. However, under this new theatre structure, the Tibet Military District, which overlooks the eastern and possibly the central sector on the Sino-Indian border, was elevated one level compared to other military districts. Unlike other military districts which are placed under CMC’s National Defence Mobilisation Department, the Tibet and Xinjiang Military Districts (MDs) are placed under the jurisdiction of the PLA Army (PLA Ground Forces). The latter overlooks the western sector on the LAC, which includes the Ladakh-Aksai Chin border.
Since 2013, the tempo of the People’s Liberation Army’s single service and joint services exercises in Tibet has increased. The PLA has also started performing high altitude night-time military exercises and focused war-gaming in the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau region.
Due to the elevation of the Tibet and Xinjiang MDs, the PLA GF now has more command and control authority over these regions when compared to others placed directly under the CMC’s authority. This increases the possibility for opportunism by a local commander, which could account for the 15 June incident which saw 20 Indian army soldiers dead and an unspecified number of PLA casualties.
The WTC has benefited immensely from ground force modernisation since Xi’s reforms. Our research shows that since 2015, more emphasis has been given to capital over revenue and training-sustainment expenditures in the PRC’s overall defence spending. Taking a directive from China’s 2015 defence white paper, the document commanded the PLA to look outward and protect Beijing’s overseas interests with the result being that the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) were given priority in Xi’s ongoing military modernisation drive.
Only the WTC has benefited from China’s limited ground forces modernisation, as newer weaponry has been deployed to the Tibetan and Xinjiang MDs. After the 2017 stand-off between India and China over the Chinese construction of a road near the Doklam tri-junction, commissioning became notably focused. For instance, the latest weaponry deployed with WTC includes the advanced T-15 tanks, which the PLA claims to be the lightest in the world and designed for mountainous terrain, extreme conditions and harsh topographies. It also includes the PCL-181 laser-guided vehicle-mounted howitzers, Z-20 medium utility rotary-wing aircraft and GJ-2 attack drones.
Following the 2017 stand-off, The Tibet Military District reportedly witnessed an increased deployment in the permanent presence of KJ-500 Airborne Early Warning Aircraft along with advanced fighter jets like the J-11s and J-10s. A recent addition has been the J -16s, which are domestically produced variants of the Russian Sukhoi 27. There had been no instances, at least till now, of the deployment of the PLAAF’s latest J-20 stealth aircraft, Y-20 strategic air lifter or Sukhoi 35 Flanker E in Tibet. Though the J-20s, as reported by some, were seen performing training operations in Tibet, Tibet has also seen the upgrading of its four airbases and the construction of seven new helipads after the Doklam stand-off.
High altitude military drills
Xi Jinping’s military reforms have also prioritised intensive military drills in harsh climate conditions. Since 2013, the tempo of the PLA’s single service and joint services exercises in Tibet has increased. The PLA has also started performing high altitude night-time military exercises and focused wargaming in the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau region. The PLA SSF has been exercising extensively under WTC since 2018.
A series of force-on-force exercises by the SSF with other services will most likely see the improvement of the Army and Air Force’s joint operations capabilities in advanced electromagnetic environments. We have also witnessed regular training and live-fire exercises by the Rocket Forces in Tibet. Exercises that have not gone unnoticed in India.
Since 2015, Rajeshwari Rajgopalan’s research has highlighted that simulations have been more realistic in producing war-like conditions and environments aimed at better understanding problems associated with mechanical failures and battle damage repair. This, she argues, helps to strengthen the PLA’s command and control function while also providing the opportunity to use equipment in war-like conditions. More importantly, these exercises have been useful in testing the efficiency and functioning of the newly formed combined arms brigade after Xi’s completed the final phase of military reforms in 2017.
The PLA’s primary strategic direction, as outlined by M Taylor Fravel, has been Taiwan and the Western Pacific Region. This also explains Beijing’s prioritisation of the East and Southern Theatre Commands in seeking to modernise China’s military. However, limited modernisation, improved connectivity and increased military drills and training by WTC, especially since the Doklam stand-off has now made China increasingly confident to challenge India across the LAC.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Suyash Desai is a Research Analyst for the China Studies Programme at The Takshashila Institution, Bangalore, India. He works on China's defence and foreign policies and writes a weekly newsletter on the People’s Liberation Army called The Takshashila PLA Insight. Image credit: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff/Flickr.