Indo–French Relations Après Macron: Policy Continuity Under a Le Pen Presidency

25 September 2026

As France heads into the next presidential election — scheduled for two rounds in April and May 2027 — recent opinion polls indicate a high chance that Marine Le Pen of the National Rally (Rassemblement National, RN) will win. Despite her recent conviction for misusing EU campaign funds, a July 2026 ruling reduced her period of ineligibility for public office enough to allow her to run. Given the RN’s associations with Eurosceptic and protectionist policies, a Le Pen presidency is not entirely inconsequential for India. However, despite her ideological differences with outgoing president Emmanuel Macron, a Le Pen presidency is unlikely to significantly alter Indo–French relations.

France’s Indo‑Pacific policy is shaped by a balancing act between the US and China, and by the need to safeguard French territorial presence. This creates a structural continuity that insulates Indo–French maritime cooperation in the Indo-Pacific from major policy change. In addition, the RN is unlikely to disrupt the expanding Indo–French and India–EU economic relationship, as the party no longer supports leaving the EU, and the India–EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA) falls under the EU’s exclusive competence.

Taken together, a le Pen presidency would therefore operate within structural geopolitical and geoeconomic realities of the Indo–French relationship that result in broad policy continuity after each election cycle.

Broad strategic continuity in the Indo-Pacific

Naval cooperation between India and France began in 1983, with the inauguration of bilateral Varuna naval exercises. Maritime security cooperation was further institutionalised after France released its Indo-Pacific strategy in 2018. That same year, Paris and New Delhi announced a joint strategic vision of cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region. The two countries have since continued to engage in the annual Varuna naval exercise and expanded cooperation with third countries, such as through minilaterals with the UAE and Australia. For France and India, deeper maritime security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific enables them to exercise their agency as middle powers seeking strategic autonomy from Washington and Beijing.

Should a future RN government end up pushing for protectionist policies, New Delhi should work towards diversifying its economic partnerships across other EU member states.

Should Le Pen get elected, France’s Indo–Pacific policy will have broad strategic continuity. France is a resident power in the Indo-Pacific through its overseas territories, such as La Réunion, which require a sustained maritime naval presence regardless of which political party is in power. Coupled with the RN’s prioritisation of French territorial sovereignty, French de-prioritisation of the Indo–Pacific in its foreign policy agenda is highly unlikely.

These structural realities also shape France’s approach to China. Even though the RN has insisted that Paris should maintain equidistance between the US and China, it nonetheless regards Beijing as a threat to French interests in the region. For example, in the RN’s 2022 policy program, it was critical of Chinese asymmetric operations in New Caledonia and French Polynesia. As territorial integrity will remain a core priority for Paris, the RN’s China policy will have minimal change from the Macron government, as it too has sought strategic autonomy vis à vis Beijing and Washington, while at the same time pushing for polices aimed at addressing China’s growing challenges to French interests, such as increasing naval presence in the region.

However, there could be further reductions in overseas development aid and climate initiatives. The RN has advocated for France to cut the budget for its overseas aid agency, the Agence Française de Développement (AFD), arguing that those funds should be spent internally. Such criticisms merely reflect prior trends in French overseas aid policies. Since 2023, Paris has successively cut the AFD’s budget, reducing it by 40 per cent between 2024 and 2026. Further cuts could impede the work of the International Solar Alliance, the French-Indian Campus for Health in the Indo-Pacific, and various other climate finance and urban development projects across India that rely on AFD funding.

However, what ultimately matters most for India is Le Pen’s policy towards China and commitment to Indo-Pacific security. Amid growing uncertainty about the future direction of US policy towards China and the Indo-Pacific, policy continuity from Paris is imperative as it drives New Delhi’s desire to deepen defence industrial ties with France, with the key reason being to strengthen India’s hard power capabilities vis à vis China.

The durability of Indo-French economic relations

The Indo–French relationship has rested on defence industrial cooperation since the 1950s, growing further in recent years as India moves away from Russian arms. India was the largest buyer of French arms exports from 2021 to 2025, most notably Rafale fighter jets and Scorpène submarines. However, in recent years, a new pillar of cooperation has emerged in the Indo–French partnership: trade and connectivity.

With the expansion of India’s defence cooperation with other EU member states such as Germany, Poland, and Italy, Paris is eager to broaden the Indo–French bilateral relationship beyond defence. For example, in June 2026, Paris and New Delhi announced plans to double bilateral trade from its current USD 16 billion within five years. France has positioned itself as India’s gateway to the India Middle East Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) through Marseille. Importantly, as part of India’s desire to diversify its trade partners, the India–EU economic partnership has gained newfound importance, illustrated by the conclusion of free trade negotiations in January 2026, in which Paris has played a key role in supporting.

Should the RN win, it is unlikely to significantly impact the burgeoning economic relationship between India and France.

The RN has moderated some of its policies toward the EU over the past decade, in large part to appeal to a wider French electorate beyond its core base. For example, the party no longer supports a “Frexit” and leaving the Eurozone. In addition, Le Pen is not entirely opposed to EU trade agreements, so long as it excludes agriculture, which is a politically sensitive sector for both India and France. However, unlike the EU–Mercosur interim trade agreement that was signed on 17 January 2026 — which opens European markets to South American agricultural exports — the India–EU FTA largely excludes agriculture. Considering the exclusion of agriculture, the India–EU FTA did not produce the domestic political backlash in France that would have necessitated an RN opposition.

In addition, the Indo–French and broader India–EU economic relationship is structured in a way that limits future RN opposition. For example, the ratification process for the FTA is an EU exclusive competence, meaning only Brussels has jurisdiction over the process. Where an RN government could have some authority is on future investment protection agreements, as these fall under mixed competence between Brussels and member states.

What should India do?

When President Macron leaves office in 2027, his successor will inherit an Indo-French relationship that was upgraded to a Special Global Strategic Partnership in February 2026. Should that successor be Le Pen, there will be broad continuity from the Macron government in the Indo-Pacific. France’s efforts to balance between the US and China and safeguard its overseas territories are shared across political parties, and a Le Pen government would merely continue the reductions to French overseas aid to developmental projects. Importantly, as India and France seek to expand their economic relationship, it is unlikely that the RN would significantly alter it.

Nonetheless, India should still be prepared for policy changes. Should a future RN government end up pushing for protectionist policies, New Delhi should work towards diversifying its economic partnerships across other EU member states. For example, regarding IMEC, India could work on strengthening trade ties with Italy, as the port city of Trieste serves as a crucial gateway to the Balkans and Eastern Europe, for the duration of the le Pen presidency to ensure the project’s continuity. In addition, New Delhi should seek alternative sources of funding from the Indian private sector for climate and developmental projects to avoid dependency on Western aid as Western governments are cutting back to spend more on defence budgets. Lastly, India should ensure that the India–EU FTA is implemented ahead of the upcoming French elections, as scheduled by the current negotiation timeline, which would avoid any future impediments post the election.

At a time when the Indo–French and the India–Europe relationship more broadly are becoming increasingly important in New Delhi’s foreign policy strategy of hedging and diversification, especially in light of Washington’s and Beijing’s coercive usage of economic interdependence, it is essential for New Delhi to minimise any disruption caused by political changes in the Élysée.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent those of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Sapna Suresh is is an early career analyst focusing on India, France, India–Europe relations, and the intersection between European and Asian security. She graduated with a BA and MA from The George Washington University and was a prior exchange student at Sciences Po Paris. Her work has been featured in 9DASHLINE, ORF America, ORF, and India’s World. Image credit: Rafael Garcin/Unsplash.