In Forum: 2024 — US Strategy and the Indo-Pacific

31 January 2024

The Biden administration has reinvigorated the Quad, launched AUKUS, and proposed the Partners in the Blue Pacific (PBP) group to enhance its partnerships, alliances, and security cooperation across the Indo-Pacific. However, one of the key criticisms of the Biden administration's Indo-Pacific policy has been its conservative stance on trade. Recent news that the Biden administration would be pulling back from concluding the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) agreement indicates that this continues to be a structural feature of US politics.

To what extent can the US compete with China if it does not offer more economic opportunities to Indo-Pacific countries, especially due to mounting doubts about its reliability as a security guarantor in the region? We invite several experts to assess this state of affairs.

TO COMPETE WITH CHINA, THE UNITED STATES NEEDS TO GET BACK IN THE FREE TRADE GAME

DR KELLY A. GRIECO — SENIOR FELLOW, REIMAGINING US GRAND STRATEGY, STIMSON CENTER

President Joe Biden’s administration has a simple mantra: Indo-Pacific countries do not have to choose between the United States and China. It is usually said magnanimously, but the reality is that Washington probably would not like the decisions of some Indo-Pacific countries if they were forced to take sides in the US-China rivalry. And it has only itself to blame: the United States has provided no credible economic and trade alternative to what China has on offer.

After his predecessor withdrew the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership — a large regional free trade agreement, which later became the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) — President Biden came into office promising to bolster economic engagement with the region. But his administration’s chief initiative, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) — a 14-country partnership built around cooperation on trade, supply chains, clean energy and infrastructure, and tax and anti-corruption measures — was always a paltry substitute for the CPTPP. Indo-Pacific countries were unenthusiastic, given it offered few economic benefits for them in the way of tariff reductions or improved market access. Still, it was better than nothing.

Now even this ersatz trade deal — a modest set of digital trade rules — is on hold. In November 2023, bowing to pressure from Congressional Democrats, the Biden team suspended talks on the IPEF’s trade pillar. While China races ahead in building trade ties with its neighbours, the Biden administration slow-walks its own trade negotiations. Much of the region has grown wary of Beijing’s bullying behaviour, but these countries are unlikely to stand up to China — and put their trade and investment relations at risk — unless they have better alternatives. Washington moving off the free-trade sidelines would do far more to prevent China from dominating the region than additional missiles or submarines ever could. But in rejecting a robust free trade policy, the Biden administration is effectively giving China a free pass.

US STRATEGY COULD FORCE FRIENDS TO HEDGE AGAINST AMERICA

DR ZACK COOPER — SENIOR FELLOW, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

The Biden administration has demonstrated two things this year in Asia: (1) it can deliver remarkable progress on defence cooperation with key allies and partners, and (2) it cannot — or will not — present a similarly appealing trade agenda to the region. This policy position is not new. In fact, it is very much in line with over a decade of American engagement in which defence progress has outpaced economic initiatives. Combined with a growing sentiment of restraint and isolationism (including among potential future presidents), US allies are increasingly having to question their reliance on America to provide regional security and prosperity.

The result, I fear, is that the United States will find even its closest allies asking more from Washington than it can consistently deliver. Those allies, as well as other partners, will look to each other (and sometimes to China) to make up for what US leaders are unable or unwilling to provide. In short, Washington is forcing its friends to hedge against American protectionism today and potential isolationism tomorrow.

TIME FOR THE US TO BE MORE REALISTIC ABOUT ITS DIPLOMACY TOWARDS THE INDO-PACIFIC

DR KEI KOGA — ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, PUBLIC POLICY AND GLOBAL AFFAIRS PROGRAMME, SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY (NTU)

Throughout 2023, the US Indo-Pacific strategy, which was centred on China, was not as effective as anticipated. To be sure, the United States has further institutionalised multilateral and minilateral frameworks, such as the Quad, AUKUS, and the IPEF, to lock in its commitment to the region, aiming to shape the regional strategic environment and constrain China as advocated by the 2022 US Indo-Pacific Strategy. Nevertheless, the prolonged Russia-Ukraine war from February 2022 and the break-out of the Israel-Hamas conflict from October 2023 have kept distracting US strategic attention away from China and East Asia.

In particular, the Biden administration has struggled to effectively engage with Southeast Asia — the most critical region in the Indo-Pacific given its strategically important location, where the vital sea lines of communications for US allies and partners and where China’s economic and diplomatic influence is strong. To date, Southeast Asian states are not bandwagoning with China, trying to continue various hedging strategies to maintain good relations with both the United States and China. Yet, if the United States is perceived as an unreliable partner, it is entirely possible that they could not help but develop closer relations with China. This is because Southeast Asia is sensing the unreliability of US diplomatic rhetoric such as “respecting ASEAN unity and centrality”. Another case in point is that President Biden skipped the East Asia Summit in Jakarta in September, which disappointed Southeast Asian states despite its promises to maintain strong diplomatic commitments.

In this context, it is time for the United States to take a more realistic diplomatic approach towards the Indo-Pacific region. While the United States has demonstrated its continuous economic and military commitment to specific Southeast Asian states (such as the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam), it has not seriously engaged with all Southeast Asian states or the regional institution, ASEAN. Though this posture is somewhat understandable given its limited resources and the slow progress of ASEAN, it would potentially exacerbate economic and development gaps among Southeast Asian states, leaving the region more vulnerable to the great powers’ wedge strategy. Looking ahead, the United States should coordinate its Southeast Asian policy with its allies and partners, such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia, so that they can engage in a diplomatic division of labour that collectively enhances regional engagement.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform. Image credit: Flickr/The White House (cropped).