In Brief with Michael Reiterer, former EU Ambassador to the Republic of Korea
In Brief with
Michael Reiterer, former EU Ambassador to the Republic of Korea
IN BRIEF WITH MICHAEL REITERER
6 July 2021
We are delighted to bring you our recent interview with one of Europe’s most distinguished diplomats — Michael Reiterer. While our discussion focused largely on the Korean Peninsula we also touched on a number of critical issues including Europe’s role in the Indo-Pacific, US strategy toward North Korea, and the Quad. We started this discussion by looking at South Korea and its role in the region.
9DL: South Korea’s status as a robust democracy and key middle power has perhaps never been more important for the defence of liberal values both in Northeast Asia and across the wider Indo-Pacific. What do you view as its key soft-power levers and where should these be focused to best enhance Seoul's influence?
MR: Unfortunately, we are facing a worldwide recession of democracy. Therefore, like-minded partners need to engage more vigorously, take countermeasures and work to strengthen international governance. The Sino-US power competition is also framed in terms of democracy vs. autocracy with a growing ideological touch. It is important to not exclusively work with democracies but for democracy. There is a need for open processes to convince people, to attract followers, not to isolate them.
South Korea offers a model of successful development policy and transition from dictatorship to democracy, which is evident in widening political participation and more recently the successful management of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the strength of Korean democracy will be further tested in how the country finds answers to pressing societal challenges ranging from the need to adapt the structure of the economy to a rapidly shrinking population and the position of women in society, to the need to develop a new lifestyle to cope with climate change and master new technologies. The Korean cultural sector, especially movies and literature already draws attention to these pressing challenges.
South Korea’s invitation as a guest to the G7 was not only a recognition of the country as an advanced, successful democracy but also a call for it to use its leverage in solving global problems. Korea’s diplomacy now reaches well beyond the Peninsula. In contrast to the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 when Korean independence activists waited outside the room, the Korean President is now at the table, participating in discussions that affect the region and the world. Korea must take advantage of this opportunity to diversify its relations and in turn gain more autonomy. Building cooperation with Japan, as the two advanced democracies in Northeast Asia and strengthening trilateral cooperation with the United States would contribute towards common goals in the region and globally. Likewise, re-invigorating the China-Korea-Japan trilateral cooperation forum would contribute to common goals.
The 4th Industrial Revolution poses challenges and high-tech plays an important role at the intersection of the public and private sectors. Joining hands would allow Korea and the EU to play a larger role in the digital competition which has become a driving force in the Sino-US rivalry.
9DL: There is much speculation that a future Quad might develop along more explicitly 'anti-China' lines. In light of Seoul's longstanding need for an agile foreign policy, how realistic do you view any potential South Korean involvement as part of a wider 'Quad-plus' format?
MR: Minilateral cooperation should be a steppingstone to multilateral cooperation, not an exclusive club or a sort of directorate managing a region. It can be useful for various forms of functional cooperation like in the management of overcoming the present and preparing for the next pandemic — the Quad originated in rescue operations at the time of the catastrophic Indian Ocean tsunami. In that sense South Korea or any other interested partner should be able to associate themselves; contributing to solving problems is a positive, not an “anti” concept.
When it comes to tackling global challenges, there is a need to ensure the larger picture, while supportive actions are welcome. Global challenges like maritime governance, climate change, and technological innovation and supply-chain resilience, require an open approach because of their very nature.
These challenges are also part of a comprehensive understanding of security to which the EU adheres. The ASEAN Regional Forum provides a platform for discussion and cooperation. Quad participants acknowledge ASEAN centrality. The EU has confirmed its long-standing relationship in upgrading it to a strategic partnership in 2020. Therefore, an enabling partnership with ASEAN to empower the organisation to take on these tasks would be in line with multilateralism which provides a more stable environment than confrontational alliances. ASEAN’s handling of the severe crisis in Myanmar will be crucial for its credibility and influence.
9DL: As the EU shapes its Indo-Pacific strategy, in what ways can Brussels expand the scope of these mutual security and defence agreements with the ROK? Is there an opportunity for cooperation with Japan and the United States on shared security concerns?
MR: The EU has stated clearly that security between Europe and Asia is indivisible and has launched a program to enhance security cooperation in and with Asia. The pandemic, natural disasters like the mentioned tsunami, supply chains interruptions, cybersecurity, nuclear proliferation, erosion of the rule of law, threats associated with geo-economics are an incomplete list of areas where cooperation is necessary.
As part of the Indo-Pacific strategy, the EU can bring its experience in organising connectivity in Europe to the table (Trans-European Networks). Creating synergies, building forward (not back!) better while fighting climate change, avoiding national silos in working for mutually supportive and sustainable solutions based on agreed rules and standards could be a major contribution of the EU in working for open and sustainable Indo-Pacific partnerships. In addition, keeping lanes of communication safe, secure and open could be a common task. Korea´s New Southern Policy Plus, as well as the Northern Policy, provide the country with a basis for coordinating its activities and working with the EU, a partner which is not directly involved in the Sino-US competition. This is the perfect opportunity for diversifying its foreign policy and developing a truly strategic partnership with the EU.
9DL: How do you see the EU expanding its trade with the ROK? Are there ways to improve the current Free Trade Agreement (FTA) to enhance trade and diversify the supply chain?
MR: I am aware of several commemorative conferences because of the tenth anniversary of the EU-Korea FTA. Ten years ago, this FTA used to be the most advanced agreement concluded by the EU. This label has moved first to Canada and now to Japan. Thus, it would be helpful to update this agreement by including e-commerce as well as an investment chapter. Stable economic relations and supply chain security would also be part of comprehensive security. Developing new technologies and setting norms and standards is part of the worldwide competition and like-minded partners like the EU and Korea should strive to excel in these areas.
The recognition of Korea’s adequacy in terms of personal data protection (GDPR) is an important step in the digital competition and should be extended to industry in cooperation with the private sector. With nearly 30 per cent dependency on trade with China and being mindful of the vulnerability, this creates (THAAD) investing political capital in further enlarging trade and economic cooperation with the EU would be a rational foreign policy decision fitting with the strategic partnership.
9DL: Former US President Donald Trump’s unpredictability provided an opportunity for the EU and South Korea to strengthen ties. How do you feel the Biden administration may affect these bilateral relations, and more importantly, apart from trade and security, what are some other areas where the EU and ROK should consider cooperating more closely?
MR: Stability, reliability, predictability, rule of law, a focus on diplomacy and cooperation, which characterises the EU approach have been appreciated as they could no longer be taken for granted. This has increased interest in the EU as was recently shown by a Survey on the State of Southeast Asia. Building on these assets cooperatively to enhance autonomy in areas like technological development, high-tech, digital, cyber and space should move up the agenda.
The new US administration has a more familiar approach to diplomacy; it is more cooperative and friendly in tone. However, it will put US interests first (US-middle class) and allies will have to struggle to get their voices heard in time. Their China policy looks like a continuum. The big question, however, is whether President Biden will be followed by a second Trump or Trump-like administration. This issue of continuity and reliability will impact the relationship.
I advocate also enhancing cooperation in the academic sector — Erasmus is one of the most successful EU programs — bringing students, teachers but also apprentices together to contribute to open societies which are by definition more innovative. This adds the important people-to-people element and helps to understand and tackle societal problems. We are living in times where future generations cannot automatically count on progress and a better life; climate change will have strong repercussions on lifestyles. Each society has to find its solution but open exchanges shorten the learning curve and help appreciate the commonality of tasks.
9DL: The situation on the Korean peninsula remains fraught as Pyongyang continues to pursue its nuclear programme. How do you assess the EU’s efforts in dealing with this problem and looking ahead what role do you think the EU can and should play?
MR: The EU is South Korea’s most like-minded partner in terms of the commitment to solve the North Korean nuclear issue through diplomacy and peaceful means. EU policy on North Korea must balance the commitment to strictly uphold the international rules-based system with the need to adopt flexible diplomacy that will convince Kim Jong-un to move in a positive direction. For that reason, you see the strong insistence by the EU in implementing the sanctions decided by the UN Security Council. The EU leads initiatives at the UN Human Rights Council and General Assembly that call on North Korea to respect human rights. To do otherwise, would risk unravelling the international rules-based system that we depend on.
At the same time, the EU by its nature is a body that is dedicated to building sustainable peace through dialogue, cooperation and exchange between opposing sides. While direct diplomacy between the EU and DPRK has been limited in recent years, the EU keeps the door to dialogue open; if not prevented by COVID-19 measures the Member States are present in Pyongyang. The EU is making known its readiness to lend support to new diplomatic processes by bringing its experience of managing multi-level, complex negotiation processes. A multilateral approach based on lessons learned in reaching the Iran Agreement and the Dayton Agreement could facilitate talks.
However, diplomacy must become more innovative, overcoming old patterns which obviously have not produced sustainable results for decades. Revisiting the policy of critical engagement which was developed under different circumstances would allow recalibrating goals and tools and clarify positions also within the EU.
As a result of its North Korea policy review, the Biden administration seems set to pursue diplomacy towards North Korea. While the initial focus will be on bilateral dialogue, it is likely that at some stage, especially given Pyongyang’s way of approaching negotiations, there will be starts and stops and a need to bring in multilateral support mechanisms. At that point, the EU could have much to offer in terms of building the resilience of negotiations. South Korea, the United States, Japan and China are yet to fully recognise this and need to look to the EU as a partner with interests and much to contribute towards the common goal of moving towards denuclearisation and building peace.
I understand the recent statements by the North Korean leader that a “crucial case” has happened as an overdue admission that the pandemic has not spared the country and that economic and food-related problems risk getting out of control. While this can endanger the regime, it might also necessitate humanitarian relief actions by the international community, spearheaded by the experienced World Food Program.
The deeper the EU´s involvement in promoting peace, security and denuclearisation on the Korean Peninsula, the more leverage it will have in inviting South Korea to pull its weight on its interests in strengthening the multilateral system. A special EU envoy would signal this interest and would also be necessary as the HRVP would not be able to spend the time necessary on this issue.
The Indo-Pacific strategy which is under construction with a focus on forging cooperative networks of partnerships could offer the EU the chance to leverage its experience in connecting the European continent. Promoting open functional cooperation to connect people could turn into a crystallisation point to link up the core of various Indo-Pacific strategies.
In short, while the EU is not the game-changer in Northeast Asia, as a would-like-to-be global player it cannot be absent from one of the world´s major security hot spots and future theatres of world politics — like the Indo-Pacific. The EU will have to make sure to sit at the table when decisions are taken and not only when the hat is going round the table for collections.
Biography
Dr Michael Reiterer is a Distinguished Professor at Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS) of the Brussels School of Governance (BSoG), editor of the CSDS policy brief series Adjunct Professor Webster University, Vienna; Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali "Guido Carli" (LUISS), Rome; Associate Fellow, Global Fellowship Initiative at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP). He is also a retired Ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the European Union to the Republic of Korea (2017-2020), to Switzerland and the Principality of Liechtenstein (2007-2011), Minister/Deputy Head of Mission at EU Delegation to Japan (2002-2006), ASEM Counsellor (1998-2002). Image credit: European External Action Service.