In Brief: Shada Islam on Europe in the Asian Century
In Brief: Shada Islam on Europe in the Asian Century
The European Union has faced a tumultuous decade since the 2008 financial crisis. The combination of the Eurozone crisis, the migration crisis and the Trump presidency have all tested the structures and institutions of the EU.
In 2020 the Union faces yet more challenges, the U.K.’s recent departure from the bloc was followed almost immediately by the coronavirus pandemic.
How strong is the European project a decade on? Is the European Dream still a viable one to its citizens, or has the last decade seen it discredited? How are policy makers in Brussels responding?
SHADA: These have not been Europe’s finest years. And today, amid the Covid-19 crisis, our most valued achievements like the Single Market, Schengen and the mantra of European solidarity are all being tested.
There are laudable attempts being made by Germany’s Angela Merkel and France’s Emmanuel Macron – and belatedly by the European Commission – to find common ground on a massive recovery fund but those deep divisions among the so-called “Frugal Four” and others are still on full display.
We also have creeping authoritarianism, with far-right parties in government or clamouring for influence while in opposition as well as rising anti-migrant sentiments.
It is often said that Europe grows in moments of crisis. But I am not sure that this will be the case this time. For that to happen, Europe needs good leadership and a European Commission that is respected. I am not convinced that we have that now.
Externally, we have the ABC problems for the Union. Firstly (A) America First, Europe feels very much isolated, the continent’s traditional ally and best friend is not present and is in some cases hostile. (B) for Brexit, a shock to the legitimacy of the EU system, and finally (C) for China. China is challenging Europe, challenging our values, our human rights, trade policy and technology as well.
Europe is facing these challenges with a new European Commission that is inexperienced. And no number of slogans such as “Geopolitical Commission” can make up for lack of clear-headed policy leadership.
How has the European Union responded, in your view, to the on-going coronavirus pandemic?
Has the EU response been effective or have member states taken the lead in combating the virus? What are the long-term effects of COVID-19 on the European Union as a political and economic bloc?
SHADA: COVID-19 brought out the worst of member states instincts, with hoarding, barriers, and travel bans. Health is a national competence so that wasn’t surprising but what was really alarming was the lack of solidarity and that in the early stages of the crisis, the EU was absent and Brussels lost control.
Significantly, what COVID-19 revealed was that Brussels wasn’t paying enough attention to events, not just in China, but also in Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea. There was a visible hubris and sense of invincibility that COVID-19 would never come to Europe. Europe needs to look at why we were so complacent. In Brussels I was attending conferences and speaking at events when Italy was hit. But the sense in Brussels was that even Italy was far away. We talk about globalization and interconnectedness, but our behaviour was not globally aware at all.
The Indo-Pacific is viewed as the key region to engage with China and India are rising powers with growing economies and the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement has been negotiated.
Is there still an appetite in Brussels to engage with the Indo-Pacific as a region and has the long list of crises mentioned above distracted European policy makers from engagement with Asia - also how is the Indo-Pacific region viewed in European institutions?
SHADA: The European External Action Service but also almost all European Commission departments are actively engaged with Asia, which is good news. The interest has grown. The EU can be slow to act, but when it is challenged it can move at speed.
It’s been a journey of learning and discovery – for both sides. The Asia Europe Meetings (ASEM) were set up in 1996 when Asia was rising and the EU wanted a piece of the cake. But then for a long time, the EU focused on only China as it sought new export markets and investment destinations.
But approaches changed around a decade ago, starting with US President Barack Obama’s “pivot to Asia”. This was a wakeup call to the EU which saw this as competition and slowly, also realized that in a changing world, common interests trumped geography. The EU then began its own much-less-noticed “pivot to Asia”.
Asians, meanwhile, were also looking at Europe with more interest, seeing the EU single market as a chance to do business, and invest. Asians did not want to accept a choice between solely China and the United States. Europe was viewed as a balancer, an exporter of norms and standards. Trade and economics remain the backbone of the EU’s relationship with Asia but the exchanges are growing to include climate change, immigration and security.
Also within Europe itself, China was becoming a much more visible actor. It was investing in Europe, buying European companies and setting up Confucius Centres. There was the “16+1” initiative (now 17+1 because Greece has joined) that linked China to countries in the Western Balkans and in Central and Eastern Europe, some of which are EU member states. Then the Belt and Road Initiative reached into Europe.
EU member states also played their role in this European pivot to Asia. The European External Action Service became independent from the Commission, with many diplomats from member states, from Germany, France and the UK joining the organization. These states have large networks in Asia. Member states’ civil servants brought their experience to Brussels. At the same time, the Commission’s trade division started negotiations on free trade agreements with several Asian countries. An Asia-Europe conversation started on security and counter terrorism.
Recently, President Trump has acted as a spur. Take EU-Japan relations, When the US President began retreating from America’s multilateral obligations, including withdrawing from the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), the EU and Japan quickly responded with their bilateral Economic Partnership Agreement, sending a signal of support for free trade. This was important as the EU-Japan EPA had effectively been placed on ice for years.
I’m comforted that the interest in the Asia-Pacific has grown and become more sophisticated.The old-fashioned view in Brussels was that Europe was the ‘senior partner’ and the Asia-Pacific and China were the ‘junior partners’ in this relationship. This has been replaced entirely. The narrative in the institutions has changed and it’s all down to Asia’s economic success.
How capable is the European Union, in your judgement, of influencing events in the Indo-Pacific? Specifically areas such as Myanmar, the Indian Ocean or even the South China Sea.
Who do you see as the potential partners for Europe in Asia and which nations should we be talking with to manage the increasingly discordant international system?
SHADA: On trade, Europe’s market power shouldn’t be underestimated. The EU’s norms, our consumer standards are the gold standards for consumer goods and exports. Once you reach EU trading standards and quality control, you can export anywhere. Asians complain that Europe’s tough standards are hard to meet. But they know that they benefit everyone in the long run.
I’m a firm believer in the role of medium to smaller powers. We should deal with China, but our relationship with Asia forms part of a broader stage, with Australia, Japan, ASEAN and yes Taiwan. I have been saying for years that you can’t have a meeting on the Asia-Pacific without including India and Pakistan also.
On human rights, I think the EU’s approach is the right one. It used to be megaphone diplomacy and people still hanker for it. It makes for big headlines. But it can backfire. The EU does make regular statements on human rights violations in Asia (and elsewhere) and the European Parliament is also active on this front. These declarations are important. But working behind the scenes on human rights dialogues, even with countries like China and India which are in breach of fundamental rights and minority rights in many areas, is even more crucial.
Can we influence countries like Myanmar? Yes, but only up to a point. The argument you often hear is that if you impose sanctions on Myanmar, China is next door and will move into fill the vacuum or India will. Also the EU needs to maintain the space for engagement. Blanket sanctions on regimes are not the way forward, it’s much better to target specific people or sectors.
Europe has been making statements on the South China Sea but they are about rules and principles - more about respecting international law and the importance of UNCLOS. This is a recognition of the fact that the EU is divided over China, has limited influence on China’s conduct in the South China Sea and lives in hope that China-ASEAN negotiations on a Code of Conduct for the SCS will result in a lowering of tensions. There is no appetite in Europe for engaging in aggressive “Freedom of Navigation” operations in the SCS. And frankly, many of my non-Chinese Asian sources say there are enough hard power actors in the region without France and Britain expanding their naval presence there.
This is one of the reasons why Brussels still has not started talking about the “Indo-Pacific”, preferring to stick to the Asia-Pacific terminology. Some EU states fear that referring to the Indo-Pacific is a code for a “China containment policy” which the EU does not believe in. If the European Union does adopt the term Indo-Pacific, it will follow the ASEAN approach which is an “inclusive Indo-Pacific” that includes China, not isolates it.
In February the European Commission took the decision to suspend aspects of Cambodia's trade arrangements due to concerns around human rights violations. Cambodia is of course very close to China diplomatically.
In a post COVID-19 world does Europe still have leverage in advancing key issues such as democracy and human rights inside Indo-Pacific countries with less than favourable records?
SHADA: The EU ‘s values on human rights can be projected but inevitably there is no consistency. The EU can be tough on Cambodia but is less so on Myanmar or vis a vis Thailand. None of these decisions are taken easily and as I said, each one is different, depending on local conditions, perceptions in Europe and lobbying by different groups.
There’s a dilemma, as previously mentioned. The way forward is really to encourage, support and engage with civil society in these countries, make sure that elections (when they are held) are free and fair, that working conditions are respected. It’s a critical engagement if you like, not isolation.
Europe should practice what it preaches on human rights, must speak its mind but also work behind the scenes. When sanctions are imposed they should be calibrated and targeted and not cause further harm to already-vulnerable people.
Moving to specific states in the Indo-Pacific region what are the short term and long-term challenges you see facing the EU’s relationship with China? For example - Huawei.
There are increasing tensions between the US and China to the point where comparisons are being made to the Cold War. Will Europe be forced to eventually choose between Washington and Beijing and can the EU as a bloc of 27 states maintain its cohesiveness or does the European Union risk fracture with divergent policies amongst members states towards China?
SHADA: I’ve been covering the EU-China relationship for almost 30 years and the relationship between Brussels and Beijing is always a rollercoaster. The 2018 EU paper on China says it all because it talks about Beijing as a partner, a challenge and also a systemic rival.
We need to work with China, on climate change, Agenda 2030 and COVID-19, but also compete with China on technology, investment and on trade. China is a systemic rival. Its China’s foray into Africa and more recently into the Western Balkans that has woken Europe up to the importance of these regions. If China hadn’t moved into Africa, Europeans would still be treating Africa as a secondary concern. The same thing is true for the Western Balkans.
China is making Europe more aware of its weaknesses and its strengths. Thanks to Chinese competition we are honing up our investment screening mechanisms, beginning to think about security risks of relying too heavily on one country for health protection gear or technology like 5G – or indeed of engaging on the Belt and Road Initiative without setting clear conditions. China is helping Europe to grow up and fill the gaps and loopholes in its investment, industrial, competition and trade policies. As regards technology, the China challenge has woken us up to the ethics of AI.
It’s a different way of looking at China. I don’t like talking of the “China fear or scare” – China is a challenge. The challenge is real but not to be feared. It’s forcing Europe to get its act together and develop its own capacities.
Governments in Europe are faced with a difficult dilemma of a so-called binary choice between the United States and China. That’s a false choice. We need to work with both. We need Chinese markets and investment; we need China to work with us to set new rules for a changed world. But that also means having the US on board.
I am not a Cold Warrior. Europe also must not fall into the trap of simple binaries. The world is a complex place, with many players. We must work with both countries – and many others - to get out of the lockdown and work for a quick economic recovery. That should be our number one priority, for one and all.
From a European standpoint the COVID-19 pandemic emerged against the backdrop of strained US-China relations. This has now been followed by public anger over faulty masks and calls for an international inquiry. Some in Europe (the Netherlands and Czech Republic) have recently made a point of publicly praising Taiwan.
What is the general mood in Brussels towards China’s leaders and the Communist Party and what form would an EU response to Beijing’s recent ‘Warrior Wolf’ diplomacy realistically take?
SHADA: The situation is not new regarding European perceptions of China, COVID-19 and now events in Hong Kong have added to Europe’s concerns regarding the situation in Xinjiang and on trade and the BRI.
Since the 19th Party Congress there’s an increased awareness in the European Union of Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power. Now there is irritation over so-called “mask diplomacy” undertaken by China in EU members states. But let’s be clear, China was doing – is doing – what any country would do to rebuild its reputation. Also, it’s not China’s fault that the EU was not there to provide assistance to Italy or Serbia at the start of the crisis. In fact, European Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen has apologized for that.
Beijing is desperately looking to rebuild its reputation after COVID-19, and flags and labels are always a factor in aid diplomacy. Everyone wants visibility when they are providing humanitarian assistance. The new element is just that we’re not used to being on the receiving end of aid, let alone it coming from China.
The West is not used to a China that is globally visible, assertive and more self-confident and also everywhere. Frankly speaking Western powers have not had to deal with such a rival since the rise of Japan. I am old enough to remember when Japan shook the international system as a major power in the 1970s and early 1980s, and how much of the current discourse of fear on China is similar to that used on Japan.
EU leaders have long viewed China's Belt and Road Initiative as presenting both challenges and opportunities for member states.
In the context of a global downturn resulting from COVID-19 how can Brussels best mitigate the challenges while simultaneously maximising the opportunities of the BRI?
SHADA: The Belt and Road feels like it’s from a very different era.The one before COVID-19. The question now is whether China has the money to invest in grand infrastructure projects. I think the focus is shifting to the Digital Belt and Road and the Health Silk Road, which again highlights Chinese agility and ability to adapt.
EU institutions remain skeptical of BRI. European businesses less so, they are interested in the commercial opportunities. Our banks are very interested. The EIB/EBRD are already working with the BRI, and with Chinese banks. There is some exchange of best practice between the two sides.
The focus in the European Union should be on connectivity projects. There are lots of these projects underway, but they are being duplicated by other powers such as Japan, ASEAN, India and South Korea. What’s needed is a coming together and a multilateralising of infrastructure and connectivity projects. We need multilateral norms and standards and a code of conduct which sets out basic principles such as transparency, sustainability and fiscal standards. Connectivity projects could provide a huge stimulus to the world economy.
Interestingly, China has shown a readiness to come together to support connectivity projects, at a multilateral level.
What issues do you see where cooperation is possible between India and the European Union? Climate change for example.
SHADA: India is an example of how the EU is diversifying its relationship with different Asian countries. India is part of the wider diplomatic moves to engage with Asia more broadly as region, and not simply with China.
For a long time, the EU-India relationship underwhelming and underperforming. One of the reasons is that India hasn’t been that interested in the European Union in comparison to China which, believes in Europe as an important balancer in the global, multipolar order.
There were aspirations in Brussels that Europe and India would develop closer ties, that there would be reciprocity by India of the EU’s courting and advances, but this wasn’t the case. Within India there was less time, energy and enthusiasm for the EU. India was much more engaged with Britain, France and Germany on a bilateral level and of course also with the United States. The diaspora in the US has played a huge role in developing US-India ties and it’s telling that all American presidents since Clinton have sought closer ties with India in return.
The situation has begun to change. There’s some disillusionment in India vis a vis the United States under Donald Trump. India was hoping to be America’s best friend in Asia, but Trump through his trade war has disillusioned the Indians.
India, however, is still skeptical of the EU and the hope in Brussels of a quick free trade agreement with India has faded.It’s been 12 years now and there’s no sign of movement. As a democracy, India has to respond to concerns of its farmers and manufacturers and alcohol producers and soIndia is more inward looking economically.
My personal view is that we should move away from the focus on an EU-India FTA. The EU and India are talking more about security issues, terrorism, migration, climate change, this is progress and needs to be developed.
The EIB is investing in India’s infrastructure. Both India and the European institutions are reaching beyond the capitals to engage with states and cities. This should continue.
Looking to how far EU-ASEAN relations come in the last decade. Can the two organizations find room to cooperate on issues of common concern and what are the European member states perceptions of ASEAN?
Furthermore how successful has ASEAN been in the last few years at engaging with other powers in the Indo-Pacific? For example China seems intent to use Cambodia to weaken the organization’s stance on the South China Sea.
SHADA: The relationship between the EU-ASEAN is something I feel very passionate about, because for a long time I was a journalist with the Far Eastern Economic Review, I developed a real, personal interest in ASEAN, I regularly travelled to those countries and met their policy makers.
ASEAN is such an under-reported success story in the West. For years, policy makers and journalists have looked at ASEAN as the poorer cousin of the EU. Comparisons were often made between the two and ASEAN was often dismissed as under-performing regional organization. There were repeated clashes over human rights.
The EU has also been short-sighted in upping its game with Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim-majority democracy. Indonesians are usually modest people and Indonesia’s leaders today are more focused on ASEAN than on global developments. In a world of hard power and Great Power competition, Indonesia and ASEAN are often overlooked and under-estimated.
Things are changing now. Europe, after the financial and Eurozone crisis, has shown more humility in approaching ASEAN and the conversation between the two these days focuses not just on trade and development aid but also on maritime security, climate change, women’s empowerment.
For the last 4 years, there is a dedicated EU ambassador accredited to the ASEAN Secretariat. There’s no EU strategic partnership with ASEAN because of EU plans to restrict imports of palm oil – a major export earner for Indonesia and Malaysia. Because this question is unresolved, it has become an impediment to closer EU-ASEAN relations.
The EU is working very hard to build a network of free trade agreements with ASEAN member states, with Singapore, with Vietnam. Discussions are ongoing with Thailand and Indonesia, and eventually the ambition is to have a single, EU-ASEAN region-to-region FTA. The narrative in Brussels has very much changed to one of mutual respect, with ASEAN’s unsung strengths finally being recognized by European policy makers.
ASEAN states have experience in keeping out of the US-China binary trap, so there is a lot the EU can also learn from ASEAN on that front.
How much weight do you attach to emerging issues such as Artificial Intelligence in the 21st Century’s geopolitics and could it realistically be an area of cooperation with partners and rival states in the Indo-Pacific? Or will it just become a new front in the ongoing competition between states such as the U.S. and China?
What role can the European Union play on the issue of A.I.?
SHADA: AI is a huge issue with enormous implications, especially in the post-Covid era. AI is going to drive our economies, our societies and our politics. I’m not a great expert on AI but the ethical standards, the GDPR, the data and privacy protection laws that we’ve developed at the EU level, are a model and inspiration for many. So once again norm-setting by Europe is hugely important. The GDPR has been recognized as a gold standard by experts.
After COVID-19, our notions of privacy are going to be challenged - when it comes to contact tracing, when it comes to Apps that governments are developing. This is a major test for European societies. Europeans said we said we wouldn’t follow China’s lead in areas like facial recognition technology for instance. But now we are going to have to give up very personal information to ensure our health.
I hope this is done through collaboration, because the worst thing that can happen is to have one world, two systems. No country is self-sufficient, we cannot re-shore all global supply chains. We need to work with China and others to speed up the search for a vaccine and to ensure a sustainable economic recovery. We are interdependent and we need careful, cautious, vigilant, global cooperation.
With America missing in action, there is space for Europe to build closer technology cooperation with Asian states, including China. But this cannot be on China’s terms. We will have to find common ground. The AI question will be crucial for the 21st Century.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Shada Islam is Director of Europe and Geopolitics at Friends of Europe, an influential independent think tank based in Brussels. Ms Islam has spent most of her professional life researching, writing and speaking about the European Union’s relations with Asia. She has built up a reputation in both Asia and Europe as a leading commentator, analyst and writer as well as a fresh and original thought leader on EU-Asia relations. Ms Islam was selected as one of the 20 most influential women in Brussels by the magazine Politico. She is also a Solvay Fellow at the Vrije University Brussel (VUB). She previously served as a correspondent for over 20 years for Asia’s leading news weekly The Far Eastern Economic Review. Image credit: Friends of Europe/Flickr.