In Brief: Gideon Rachman on the Indo-Pacific
In Brief: Gideon Rachman on the Indo-Pacific
How significant, in your view, is the challenge to Western democracies from the Chinese Communist Party?
GR: I think it’s important – partly because Western democracies have not thought hard enough about the CCP. The Australian debate is relatively well advanced and also highlights the tensions brought about by a dependence on student income and investment from China – as well as appropriate concerns with cultural sensitivity.
I think the keys are transparency and firmness and an awareness of the trade-offs. The more the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party encounters a “united front” to use their term, the more likely they are to back off. It’s not a terminal threat to Western democracies, if dealt with firmly.
Considering China’s ambitions in the South China Sea, how can the UK and France hope to challenge Beijing’s attempts to weaken the regional status quo?
GR: I think the European powers have an important symbolic role to play in the Indo-Pacific – namely to make it clear that this is not just a question of the United States trying to preserve it’s own regional hegemony.
In military terms, the European contribution to balancing China is far less significant. In fact, London and Paris need to guard against leaving themselves too exposed in areas far closer to home, specifically the threat posed to Europe by Russia’s conventional forces and disinformation campaigns.
The UK and France would also be advised against appearing to be a soft target for China on the issue of FONOPS in the South China Sea too.
Historian Niall Ferguson, suggests the US and China are now effectively in Cold War 2.0. Where will this new Cold War be fought and via what means?
GR: We are pretty close to being in a Cold War scenario now. I think the struggle for technological dominance over artificial intelligence, space and quantum computing will be central to Sino-American rivalry in the years ahead, as Ferguson himself has also suggested. I would also expect to see a further drive towards decoupling by both economies, especially in the context of COVID-19.
One outstanding question, which will be worth watching, is regarding how decoupling can be put into practice successfully – I’m thinking here in economic terms. How for example will Washington try to repatriate Apple’s extensive supply chains in China back to North America?
Also another area to watch out for, in terms of competition between Beijing and Washington, is the battle for international opinion and hearts and minds. We are seeing this already with COVID-19.
In geostrategic terms, the Indo-Pacific will be crucial to both the United States and China in the coming decade. We are seeing Taiwan move up the list of potential flashpoints in East Asia.
Concerning China, is Xi Jinping’s authoritarianism a case of learning from the mistakes of Mikhail Gorbachev, but in so doing ignoring the lessons from Mao Zedong?
GR: Yes, I think the nostalgia by Xi Jinping and elements of the Communist Party more broadly for Maoism is one of the most disquieting aspects of his time as chairman.
As history has taught us, especially very recent history, personalised strongman rule has all sorts of defects when it comes to governance – in particular an inability to report bad news. This occured in the Soviet Union, most dramatically played out in Chernobyl, and we are seeing echoes of this when it comes to COVID-19, especially in the early phase of the pandemic in Wuhan.
We’ve also seen with Xi Jinping a deliberate effort to play to the nationalist gallery in China, which is dangerous.
Which of these flash points: Hong Kong, Taiwan and Xinjiang (if any) do you think is keeping Xi Jinping awake at night?
GR: I think Xi’s primary concerns are domestic stability – and there is plenty to worry about given recent events in all three of these regions.
I can’t know his mind but Xi Jinping must be increasingly concerned and frustrated by the situation in Hong Kong. Even though the protests are currently not as fierce as in the summer of 2019, the underlying grievances have clearly not gone away. I think this would be followed in close order by Taiwan. China's paranoia about Taiwan will also have increased following Tsai Ing-Wen's clear victory in the presidential election.
He should be having second thoughts too about China’s conduct in Xinjiang, especially given the outcry over the Uiyghurs – although there is no evidence to suggest this is the case.
What is at stake in India if Modi seeks to remake India as a 'Hindu' state? How would democratic partners react to a more authoritarian India?
GR: A huge amount is at stake in India if Modi attempts this– not least the country’s internal stability. The fate of hundreds of millions of Muslims would hang in the balance, which by itself would have major implications globally.
From a strategic perspecitve as well the ability to see India as a democratic counterweight to China would be damaged also.
If Modi suceeds in this I would imagine that Donald Trump would have no real difficulty with Modi’s domestic policies. An incoming Biden administration would be much more concerned regarding the BJP’s conduct in government, however I suspect it would probably hope to be able to turn a blind eye to events within India – unless something really shocking happened such as the mass, nationwide internment of Muslims by India.
On Japan, how successful has Shinzo Abe been in reshaping Japan? Has Abe opened the door for a nationalist successor to reform Article 9?
GR: In terms of recent Japanese prime ministers Shinzo Abe has been pretty successful. The huge challenges facing Japan are intractable in many ways. The country faces both an ageing and shrinking population.
I think scrapping Article 9, the pacifist section of the constitution completely would be very a difficult ask, either by him or more likely his successor. But a lot will depend on how China behaves in the next few years. To my mind, Shinzo Abe has done well to make Japan more internationally engaged since 2012.
Finally, how would you rate China’s success in influencing the governments of Southeast Asia? Are we seeing spheres of influence develop?
GR: For China, the big success story in Southeast Asia is Cambodia, which prevents ASEAN from forming unified positions on key issues such as the South China Sea. This is pretty ironic since Hun Sen when he first came to power was originally pro-Vietnam.
Then of course, there is Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines– very significant given the South China Sea dispute; that being said Duterte has proven so flaky regarding his commitments he cannot be seen as a reliable partner by Beijing.
Thailand also looks potentially promising for Beijing – given its drift towards authoritarianism under the Thai military. All that being said, I’d say Southeast Asia remains very much a contested area when it comes Washington, Beijing and other Indo-Pacific actors, rather than a true Chinese sphere of influence.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Gideon Rachman became chief foreign affairs columnist for the Financial Times. An Orwell Prize winner his most recent book; Easternization was widely praised for examining how global power is shifting to the Asia-Pacific. He joined the FT after a 15-year career at The Economist, which included spells as a foreign correspondent in Brussels, Washington and Bangkok. Image credit: CC BY-NC 4.0/World Economic Forum/Flickr.