Fukushima’s waters: discharge decision, politics, and nuclear safety standards
Fukushima’s waters: discharge decision, politics, and Nuclear Safety standards
WRITTEN BY SHIVANI SINGH AND CHETAN RANA
20 October 2023
Issues associated with nuclear technology tend to be politically radioactive. The latest is Japan's plan to discharge water from its Fukushima nuclear plant. Although the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has backed the plan, overall, it has been met with regional and domestic criticism.
Therefore, to understand the criticism and the need to discharge water, it is imperative to dissect Japan's nuclear history, the operational and institutional failures that led to the Fukushima disaster in 2011, and the ambiguous realm of liability in nuclear accidents. Despite doubts over the veracity of the science behind the plan to discharge water from Fukushima, the patterns of support and criticism align with the logic of the great power politics in the Indo-Pacific.
Recap of the Fukushima disaster
Although there have been several disasters involving Japanese nuclear facilities in the past, the Fukushima accident in 2011 has been the most severe to date. The accident was the culmination of two unfortunate natural disasters — the Tōhoku earthquake, which caused an initial automatic shut-down of the reactors, and the tsunami that followed, which flooded the plant. As a result, the plant's power and cooling functions were disrupted, resulting in the meltdown of the core and the release of radioactive materials into the atmosphere.
The Fukushima disaster revealed a critical lack of preparedness, as well as deficiencies in the safety culture of Japan’s nuclear industry. One of the biggest failures was the lack of preparedness for seismic and tsunami events, which had not necessarily been incorporated into the industrial regulatory framework. In an initial round of reforms carried out in 2006, measures for earthquake preparedness (such as a review of seismic designs and the safety of nuclear facilities) were adopted. However, tsunamis — which at the time were treated only as an ‘accompanying phenomena’ — and accident management measures, in general, were mostly voluntary efforts to be undertaken by plant operators without any legal obligation to implement them.
Another major deficiency revealed in the safety culture was the lack of independence of the operator, Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), and the regulator, the Nuclear and Industry Safety Agency (NISA), from government agencies such as the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and the nuclear industry at large.
The 'regulatory capture' and bureaucratic complacency exhibited by the NISA compromised its effective functioning in maintaining nuclear safety. TEPCO was held accountable for mismanagement in terms of conducting safety inspections at the power plant. Both organisations failed to follow international standards on nuclear safety, including underestimating the possible risk of tsunami to the facility and addressing inadequate critical safety systems.
The fact that different states in the region, despite being exposed to similar risks, are not aligned in either supporting or protesting Japan’s decision is an indicator of the divisions being caused by the great power politics at play.
After the accident, various reforms were introduced to improve the safety culture, starting with stringent standards for commercial power reactors. A significant change came by way of the regulator becoming more independent, with the NISA being replaced by the Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NRA) in 2012. Functioning as an external bureau under the Ministry of the Environment, the NRA had a higher degree of autonomy than the NISA had previously had.
Yet, even with these reforms in place, doubts remain concerning Japan’s readiness for disaster management and how they will handle the release of radioactive (contaminated) water from the Fukushima reactors. The NRA has been accused of being opaque and reluctant to disclose information on the level of contamination of the water being discharged into the ocean. Early this year, the NRA secretariat conducted seven closed-door meetings with the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy under the METI regarding a possible revision of laws on nuclear safety without the disclosure of any record of these meetings to the public, thus leading many to question the credibility of the NRA and its autonomy.
It is important to note that, while the Fukushima accident is generally remembered as being a consequence of natural hazards, it was in fact a culmination of TEPCO’s operational negligence (as caused by deficiencies in the safety culture), and has also been formally recognised by the Japanese authorities as such. The review report of the reactor failure concluded that “Fukushima was a man-made accident, triggered by natural hazards, that could and should have been avoided”. ‘Lax regulatory oversight’ was largely agreed to be the root cause of the accident. This report further raised an important question about the liability arising from such an accident, which qualifies as both a natural and man-made disaster.
Reactions to Japan’s plan in the region
Japan’s decision to discharge the water from the Fukushima nuclear plant, and the IAEA’s 'green flag' to do so, have not been received well domestically or regionally. China, the largest market for Japan’s seafood exports, had already put restrictions on seafood from certain prefectures around the plant after the Fukushima disaster. However, since the announcement of water discharge, China has expanded on these restrictions by imposing a complete ban on all seafood coming from Japan. Russia is also contemplating joining China’s ban, and North Korea has gone as far as to call it an ‘unforgivable crime against humanity.’
Geopolitical calculations are at play here. As the Sino-American great power competition intensifies in the region, China and Japan are increasingly likely to find themselves at loggerheads. It has been suggested that the regional criticism, particularly that from the Pacific Islands, of Japan’s decision to discharge the water is simply following China’s cues. The Solomon Islands and Fiji have protested Japan’s discharge citing ecological and economic concerns, as these island states depend entirely upon marine resources.
However, these protests must also be seen in a historical light, as these islands have already faced the adverse consequences of American, British, and French atomic tests in the Pacific Ocean in the past. The cracking Runit Dome stands not only as a dark reminder of the US nuclear tests in the Pacific — which exposed millions of Islanders to severe radiation — but also the potential nuclear disaster if the ‘tomb’ collapses or fails.
Not all regional partners contest the plan, with South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol supporting the Japanese government in its efforts to improve bilateral ties, as well as to enhance congruence among the US’ partners in the Indo-Pacific. Yet, considering widespread protests and the decline in seafood consumption in the country, there are suggestions that the South Korean government may reconsider its stance.
Taiwan and the Philippines have also backed Japan’s plan with caution, putting faith in the IAEA’s monitoring. The Cook Islands (unlike the other Pacific Islands) have also supported Japan. The fact that different states in the region, despite being exposed to similar risks, are not aligned in either supporting or protesting Japan’s decision is an indicator of the divisions being caused by the great power politics at play.
Diving into the science behind
The IAEA’s report claims that discharges of the Advanced Liquid Processing System-treated water (ALPS) from the nuclear plant will have “negligible radiological impact” on the environment and has even assured they will provide real-time monitoring and continuous presence at the discharge site. Yet, this has done little to dispel the concerns of Japan’s neighbours, including South Korea and China. The primary worry is regarding the concentration of carbon-14 and tritium in water. As of now, the technology required to remove tritium from contaminated water does not exist. Therefore, the authorities have decided to release the water after dilution, reducing the concentration of both components to below the IAEA’s and the WHO’s recommended limits.
However, there are concerns about the lack of scientific studies about the possible consequences of low levels of carbon-14 and tritium. The National Association of Marine Laboratories (NAML) published a position paper opposing the release of contaminated water, arguing that the dilution solution ignores the “processes of organic binding, bioaccumulation, and bioconcentration” apart from the accumulation of tritium in seafloor sediments. They also called the Japanese government’s and TEPCO’s data insufficient.
Furthermore, any discharge is likely to spread across the Pacific Ocean due to oceanic currents. The potential pan-oceanic ecological damage also violates the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Therefore, there is an urgent need to address the concerns emanating from the scientific grey areas, especially to limit and avoid any long-term health and economic crises. In this respect, one must also take note of the ambiguity that exists over the issue of liability.
The issue of liability in the wake of Fukushima
The liability arising from the Fukushima accident and the release of the radioactive water also has legal implications. In any nuclear industry, the compliance and safety culture practised by the operator and the regulator is strengthened by a universally effective legal regime. However, a major shortcoming remains the absence of any universal liability regime that can hold all states accountable for mitigating the risks of nuclear disasters.
Two key international legal instruments on nuclear liability — The Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (1960) and the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (1963) — provide for strict operator liability in case of nuclear damage. These provisions are brought together in the IAEA’s Joint Protocol (1988) to avoid overlap of application. Japan is not party to either of these conventions or the Joint Protocol, thus absolving it from any formal legal and international responsibility.
Although Japan is a contracting party to the IAEA’s Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS), the treaty excludes any compensation for damage emanating from an earthquake or a tsunami. This is where a watertight distinction between natural and man-made disasters when reading international law becomes detrimental since the Fukushima accident was not solely a result of natural disaster but also human error, as admitted by Japan itself.
Under the CNS regime, special provisions for installations undergoing decommissioning — which in this case would include the water discharge from the affected reactor cores — prescribe that “any damage from such facilities would qualify for a lower damage claim/compensation of the operator”. Thus, the inconsistency of the law in treating damage under natural and man-made disasters could prove to be a major roadblock in successful liability claims by affected parties in case of adverse effects arising from the water discharge.
Beyond Fukushima
The repercussions of the Fukushima disaster highlight a labyrinth of challenges that Japan and the world at large must navigate. The issues stretch beyond the immediate consequences of the nuclear accident, penetrating the domains of international geopolitics, environmental safety, legal liability, and transparency in decision-making.
The decision to release treated water from the Fukushima plant, while endorsed by global authorities, echoes the need for a more robust, transparent, and inclusive framework for addressing nuclear safety, environmental conservation, and disaster management. Despite the improvements in Japan’s domestic regulatory structure, questions persist, underscoring the need for a global commitment to address these concerns comprehensively.
Importantly, more attention should be given to the concerns of Pacific Island states as nuclear politics, historically, tends to marginalise smaller states. The Fukushima incident and its aftermath stand as a poignant reminder of the complexities inherent in nuclear energy, compelling a re-evaluation and reinforcement of international standards, cooperation, and accountability to ensure the prevention of similar disasters in the future and the protection of the environment and communities.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biographies
Shivani Singh is a PhD candidate in the Department of International Politics at Aberystwyth University, UK. She studies the role and position of rising nuclear powers in the global nuclear order, focusing on South Asia and the Indo-Pacific region. Shivani completed her master's and MPhil degrees in international politics from Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, and worked as a researcher and consultant in the nuclear security programme at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Delhi, India.
Chetan Rana is a PhD candidate at the Centre for International Politics, Organisation, and Disarmament (CIPOD) at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and Associate Editor at 9DashLine. He also holds a master's degree in Politics with specialisation in International Studies from the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. He writes on issues concerning the Indo-Pacific, populism, Indian foreign policy, and Myanmar. Image credit: Flickr/IAEA Imagebank.