The Kim-Putin summit: thrusting Russia-US tensions into Northeast Asia

26 September 2023

Ahead of the recent summit between Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin at the Vostochny Cosmodrome in Russia’s Amur Province, US State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller described the fact that Russia is turning to North Korea for weapons as a sign that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been a “strategic mistake”. This is likely true to a point, but beyond this assessment lies another potential long-term development that could stem from the recent DPRK-Russia rapprochement. Whereas the sharpening of Russia-US tensions has primarily occurred due to realities in Eastern Europe, the development of North Korea-Russia relations to their current state may constitute a veritable opening of a second front, namely in Northeast Asia, in the current Russia-US great power standoff.

Russia-US tensions into Northeast Asia

The nature of Kim’s most recent summit with Putin contrasts significantly with the context of his prior visit to Russia in 2019. Everything from the lapse of nearly a year between when Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov invited Kim to Russia in May 2018 and Kim’s actual visit in April 2019 to the fact that the North Korean leader did not meet Putin until he had met with the leaders of China, South Korea and the US on multiple occasions is emblematic of the difficulties the Kremlin has faced in getting Pyongyang to view Moscow as an essential player in Northeast Asian geopolitics. By making his first post-pandemic trip abroad to Russia, however, Kim Jong Un has shown that Putin has something profound to offer him in return for much-needed weapons. To the Kim regime’s benefit, the outcome of the 2023 DPRK-Russia summit indicates that North Korea and Russia are prepared to essentially upend the multilateral sanctions regime against Pyongyang in ways that go well beyond any potential arms transfer between North Korea and Russia.

The implications of the Kim-Putin summit, however, go far beyond the issues of Russia’s war in Ukraine or North Korea’s financial stranglehold. This summit has all but thrust the spectre of Russia-US great power competition, long centred on Eurasia, into Northeast Asia. For the Kremlin to pursue strategic cooperation with the DPRK in ways that pose challenges to the interests of the US and its allies in Northeast Asia, including potentially in the fields of aerospace and defence, demonstrates that the Russia-US relationship in Northeast Asia has changed fundamentally.

From a longer-term perspective, the summit between Kim and Putin could also thrust Moscow-Washington tensions into the Asia-Pacific in ways not seen since the Cold War.

For all of the outstanding issues in Moscow-Washington ties, Russia and the US had long continued to cooperate over the security of the Korean Peninsula. As late as the early stages of the Biden administration, Washington appeared to hold out hope that cooperation with Russia over Korean denuclearisation remained a possibility. Of course, during one of the tensest periods in Korean security in recent years, namely the period around the DPRK’s sixth nuclear test, Moscow and Washington had difficulties reaching an agreement at the UN regarding how best to respond to North Korea’s provocations. Nevertheless, the Kremlin ultimately agreed to lay a new round of punitive economic measures against North Korea in late 2017. In subsequent years, however, Moscow has blocked other US-led multilateral actions aimed at bringing North Korea to heel.

Indeed, Russia’s policies toward the Korean Peninsula are increasingly driven by anti-Americanism. Washington, of course, largely approaches Russia primarily as a player in post-Soviet Eurasia and considers China to be its primary challenger in the so-called Indo-Pacific. Many in Moscow, however, believe that the Russia-US animosity that has emerged from geopolitical contention in Eurasia also shapes US attempts to undermine Russian interests in the Asia-Pacific. This reality serves the DPRK’s interests, with the recent Kim-Putin summit laying the groundwork for a more substantive relationship based on a desire to confront their “common enemy”, the United States. For the Kremlin, a nuclear-armed North Korea, while still not the best case for Moscow, now appears to be the lesser of two evils compared to a Northeast Asia in which the balance of power favours the US.

Shifting attitudes toward Russia among US allies

The uptick in Moscow-Pyongyang relations has thus understandably caused concern in Washington and allied capitals. Whether the DPRK-Russia rapprochement is a cause or an effect of renewed Cold War-style confrontation is a matter of perspective. But one immutable fact is that the US, as well as its Northeast Asian allies Japan and South Korea, are on course to reshape how they approach their relations with Russia. Specifically, the war that has prompted Russia to seek military assistance from the DPRK has already begun to influence the United States’ Northeast Asian allies’ respective relationships with Russia. Both Seoul and Tokyo are moving away from longstanding attempts at preserving decent ties with Moscow.

In turn, an enhanced relationship with North Korea could mean for Russia that the DPRK becomes a strategic asset, whereby pressure and provocations from North Korea against US allies, as well as the United States’ forces in the region, could benefit the Kremlin. Such a possibility is particularly salient in light of the recent summit between the leaders of Japan, South Korea and the US at Camp David, a development that Moscow slammed, as Russia considers it to be a step toward the formation of a “mini-NATO” in Northeast Asia.

Relations between Japan and the Russian Federation reached a new low at the outset of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Prior to that, Tokyo had spent years attempting to resolve its World War II-era bilateral territorial dispute with Russia over the Kuril Islands/Northern Territories. Yet Japan’s position has fundamentally shifted, especially after Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida declared that “Ukraine today could be East Asia tomorrow”. That position not only undermined Tokyo’s longstanding efforts at preserving ties with Russia but also helped foster closer cooperation between Japan and NATO. Indeed, focusing less on resolving the Japan-Russia bilateral quarrel has arguably freed Japan up to take a closer stand with the West as an industrialised democracy.

In much the same way as Japan’s cautious approach to Russia for its own national interest, South Korea has also generally taken a measured stance toward its relations with Moscow. In contrast to how the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) damaged China-South Korea ties, the deployment had a minimal effect on ROK-Russia relations. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, furthermore, did not shake ROK-Russia relations in the same way they did Tokyo’s relationship with Moscow. Although the ROK has condemned Russia’s invasion while providing non-lethal military and humanitarian support to Ukraine, Seoul has thus far refused to sell lethal weapons to Ukraine despite exhortations from both Kyiv and Washington. Nevertheless, the prospect of military or technical cooperation between the DPRK and Russia appears to be a red line for Seoul. Ahead of the Kim-Putin summit, the South Korean government warned that Russia may transfer military technology to the DPRK. Following the summit, the ROK’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs cautioned that any North Korea-Russia military collaboration could be detrimental to Moscow’s relationship with Seoul.

A need for policy coordination on Russia

Of course, there is little that the US and its allies can do to undermine the burgeoning DPRK-Russia axis, aside from potentially employing increased secondary sanctions on individuals and entities involved in fostering DPRK-Russia cooperation in sensitive fields. Nevertheless, the rapprochement between Moscow and Pyongyang has helped lend momentum to the strengthening of trilateral relations between Japan, the ROK and the United States, as evidenced by the additional trilateral cooperation between Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington that the Kim-Putin summit itself prompted.

The effects that a North Korean arms deal with Russia will have on the war in Ukraine, as well as the implications DPRK-Russia cooperation will have on the rule of international law, are issues of immediate concern. Yet, from a longer-term perspective, the summit between Kim and Putin could also thrust Moscow-Washington tensions into the Asia-Pacific in ways not seen since the Cold War. In particular, Russia may encourage, or at least turn a blind eye to North Korean provocations against US allies in Northeast Asia, not unlike how Russia itself attempted to stoke divisions between Japan and South Korea in 2019, particularly if provocation from the DPRK distracts the US from developments in Ukraine. As such, the US and its Northeast Asian allies will need to develop plans on how to coordinate policies related to any implications the North Korea-Russia relationship may yield for the sub-region’s alliances.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Anthony V. Rinna is a Senior Editor with the scholarly research group Sino-NK. His views on Korea-Russia relations have appeared in outlets including CNN and the Wall Street Journal. He has lived in South Korea since 2014. Image credit: Wikipedia Commons/Kim Jong-un and Vladimir Putin (2023)