Blurred lines at 22: Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence
Blurred lines at 22: Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence
WRITTEN BY ANKIT K
4 June 2020
This year marks 22 years of Pakistan’s overt nuclearisation. Since its first weapon tests in May 1998, Pakistan’s nuclear programme is ever-growing, both in numbers and in variety. With an average of about 140-150 warheads, it is the fastest growing nuclear weapons state today.
This rapid growth has several reasons for it. More than the strategic value, nuclear weapons are strongly linked to its national identity and hold immense value within its civil society. Perhaps for this very reason, despite its struggling economy, Pakistan’s nuclear programme continues to be the core element of its national security. In the past couple of decades, the military in Pakistan has struggled to strengthen itself conventionally. Military expenditure in terms of its national GDP has slipped steadily by 25 per cent since 1998.
Budgetary constraints has consequently led to the dependence on asymmetric nuclear means to match any new military developments undertaken by India. This desperate strive for development and deployment of nuclear weapons has resulted in asymmetric means of deterrence which has eventually blurred the crucial distinction between conventional deterrence and nuclear deterrence. Hasty integration of conventional and nuclear capabilities has become the new normal. Case in point is the establishment of its Naval Strategic Force Command (NSFC) for sea-based deterrence and subsequent reports of cruise missiles being mounted on conventional (Electric-Diesel powered) submarines.
While India has continued to strengthen its conventional and nuclear capabilities in order to address Chinese aggression, Pakistan has put its faith on nuclear asymmetry
However, the intermingling of means of deterrence is not new to Pakistan. Pakistan’s understanding of nuclear deterrence has been asymmetric and mostly overlapping with conventional deterrence since its evolution. This overlapping has blurred the two distinct kinds of deterrence, thus destabilising the region. Whether it is ‘Cold Start Doctrine’ or Ballistic Missiles or the issue of Kashmir, nuclear weapon is the key to any major conventional or nuclear military development in India.
Most nuclear weapons states today link the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances or when they face an existential threat. Especially in the case of use of nuclear weapons against a Nuclear Weapons State (NWS), mutual vulnerability becomes a binding factor. Therefore, NWS carefully craft their declaratory policy on nuclear use and its signalling. Countries such as the US, UK and France in their respective nuclear policies consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances or when there is an extreme threat to national security. It is important to mention that these policies are often affixed with a bit of ambiguity meant for deterrence purposes.
When it comes to Pakistan, there exists no declared nuclear use policy. The only other country to have no official declared nuclear use policy is Israel, which is not overtly a NWS. What is known about Pakistan’s nuclear policy is from statements, speeches or papers by its serving and retired-officials. The famous four points made by Lt Gen (Retd) Khalid Kidwai elaborates the nuclear threshold of Pakistan into four broad spectrums which are: spatial, military, economic, and political. These four broad categories carry plenty of ambiguities on nuclear use by Pakistan. More so, when Pakistan categorically denies No First Use Policy.
Pakistan’s understanding of nuclear strategy is largely driven by western concepts, especially the idea of flexible response of NATO. NATO’s idea for a flexible nuclear response stemmed from the idea that its conventional forces in Europe were too little to deter the USSR. As Vipin Narang of MIT argues, “the Pakistani nuclear posture is explicitly modeled on NATO’s flexible response posture, which threatened the first use of nuclear weapons in theater should conventional deterrence fail”. Flexible response option for Pakistan has resulted in lowering the threshold of nuclear use by introduction of miniaturised nuclear weapons in tactical battlefield. As Bharat Karnad argues, no nuclear weapons can be tactical. It is bound to have a strategic implication rightly so, as use of a single TNW will put India in compulsion to retaliate as per its clearly stated doctrine. The possibility of such a misadventure should not be ruled out given Pakistan’s repeated nuclear overtones by political and military leadership.
‘Credible Minimum Deterrence’ which guided the initial years of nuclearisation, is abandoned and replaced with Full Spectrum Deterrence. Pakistan’s former foreign secretary argues that, “ Our conduct continues to be guided strictly by the principle of credible minimum deterrence.” Full spectrum deterrence is by no means a quantitative change in our credible minimum deterrence; it is rather a qualitative response to the emerging challenges posed in South Asia”. Use of “no quantitative change” is confusing and problematic when several estimates indicate an increasing number of warheads every year.
In purview of current geopolitics in the region, nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan cannot be looked alone and without considering China into play. A deterrence gap (both conventional & nuclear) exists between India-China and India-Pakistan. India seeks to balance China and Pakistan seeks to balance India. Consequently, this has led to two different contrasting outcomes. While India has continued to strengthen its conventional and nuclear capabilities in order to address Chinese aggression, Pakistan has put its faith on nuclear asymmetry. Perhaps for Pakistan, every military development in India looks Pakistan centric. However, it is not so difficult for Pakistan to understand that India’s need to address a superpower to its north. Perhaps it is intentional. This might be due to the ongoing bonhomie with its brethren China, with massive geostrategic investment into a shrinking economy and a hope for security against India. Nuclear development in Pakistan does not seem to bother China. Counterintuitively, Chinese assistance plays a bigger role in developing asymmetric means of deterrence. Plus it is in China’s interest to keep India at bay by keeping India engaged both on land and naval fronts.
A strong robust deterrence based on proper nuclear signaling is crucial for deterrence to come into play. Nuclear development in Pakistan is undergoing asymmetrical shifts, coupled with ambiguity. Full Spectrum Deterrence is relatively new and suits well to Pakistan. It opens up all possible ways to expand its nuclear arsenal and reduce dependency on its conventional forces. Strengthening of conventional forces in Pakistan is less talked about, thus reliance on nuclear weapons is likely to increase. FSD is unlikely to change in this decade.This is bound to have strategic implications targeted solely at India.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Ankit K is Delhi based researcher who is associated with the Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi as Research Assistant. Prior to that he has worked with the Ministry of External Affairs and the Observer Research Foundation. He is currently an associate member at the Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis (IDSA). Image credit: Wikipedia Commons.