Australia and New Zealand in the era of US-China rivalry
Australia and New Zealand in the era of US-China rivalry
WRITTEN BY ALAN TIDWELL
11 May 2020
Great power rivalry, in the guise of strategic competition between the US and China, requires revised thinking about the relationships between the US, Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS). Today Australia and New Zealand find themselves on the emerging southern flank of an unfolding rivalry between Washington and Beijing.
This rivalry will upend many of the assumptions and practices that have informed the tripartite ANZUS relationship. Three challenges needing resolution present themselves. The ways in which the ANZUS countries have worked together will not be the way in which they work together in the future. Over the past two and a half years, the ANZUS countries have collaborated in increasing their development assistance to the Pacific in an effort to deny access by China, yet there are internal contradictions in that collaboration. Finally, the US-China rivalry places added pressure on the ANZUS countries efforts to coordinate their response, yet nobody exists to manage that coordination.
The southern flank is set to play an important part in the competition for influence between the US and China. Washington needs safe havens in maritime spaces that both Australia and New Zealand provide. Just as the US relied upon Australia and to a lesser extent New Zealand during World War Two as places from which to launch the campaign to defeat Imperial Japan, so too must the US now look again at their antipodean allies.
Maintaining sea lanes and access to Australia and New Zealand requires that the archipelago that includes Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands is free from foreign actors.
Today is not tomorrow
Strategic rivalry has altered the way relationships are managed. Australia, New Zealand and the US find themselves in very different places today. Australia's main concern with the US has been to ensure Washington stayed engaged in the region.
The establishment of the joint intelligence facility at Pine Gap and the creation of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum are both examples of Canberra’s securing American presence. Since the passage in 1987 of New Zealand's New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act and the consequent suspension of formal ANZUS treaty commitments by the US, consecutive governments in Wellington have struggled to manage relations with Washington. And the US has had to contend with advocates in both Australia and New Zealand promoting an ‘independent’ foreign policy. The independent foreign policy advocates are often wrongly labelled ‘anti-American’ in Washington.
The rivalry between Washington and Beijing means that Australia must no longer worry about the US decamping from the region. The conclusion of the Washington Declaration in 2012 normalised relations between the US and New Zealand. While voices advocating an ‘independent foreign policy’ remain, Beijing’s interference in the domestic affairs of Australia have dampened their ardour. The result is that today, the three are close allies collaborating in the Pacific, working to promote the resilience of Pacific Island Countries (PICs), and denying easy access to Beijing.
It would be satisfying to think that the future will be a continuation of this seemingly smooth sailing. Of course, nothing could be further from the truth.
Development vs. defence in the Pacific
Australian, New Zealand and US collaboration in the Pacific has seen a marked increase since March 2018. In that month New Zealand announced its Pacific Reset, expanding development funding for infrastructure projects. Then, in November 2018, Australia followed up with its Step-up. Later, the US announced its Pacific Pledge. Each has deep connections with different parts of the Pacific – Australia in Melanesia and parts of Polynesia, New Zealand throughout Polynesia, and the US in Micronesia and the northern tip of Polynesia. Australia and New Zealand engage in the Pacific primarily through a development lens, whereas in budgetary terms defence interests dominate the US engagement.
Planners in the Pentagon view the world through a different set of assumptions than those in ministries of foreign affairs and development offices. For example, when it comes to strategic competition in the Pacific the Pentagon worries about ships and places from which to operate and denying their opponents' similar opportunities.
Already, Australia, the US and Papua New Guinea are upgrading Lombrum Naval base in Manus Island, PNG. Lombrum, originally built by the US Navy in 1944, may not be enough for US defence planners. Beijing has tipped its hand already, showing an interest in securing Tulagi harbour in the Solomon Islands. The US Navy describes it has having a depth sufficient for vessels of any draft.
As strategic rivalry sharpens moves by the Pentagon may overshadow and overwhelm development activities at the expense of Australia and New Zealand regional sensitivities.
Changing organisational needs
Sino-American strategic rivalry has created new requirements in managing the relationships between Canberra, Washington and Wellington. It may well be time to rethink the ways in which these three interact. There has never been a strong desire to create formal institutional organisational capacity to manage relationships, but this time has passed.
The dominant view seems to be one of “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” Of course, this view presumes knowing exactly what ‘broke’ looks like. It also assumes that the ways things are managed today are sufficient. Whereas, an alternative view might conclude that better relationship management would yield even great benefits. Looking to the future, coordinating, collaborating and planning on the southern flank of US-China competition will require more than ad hoc arrangements. AUSMIN meetings, in which the US and Australian defence and foreign affairs leaders meet annually, can no longer suffice. Clear budgets and institutional capacity will go a long way to helping protect the southern flank.
Conclusion
Great Power rivalry will force changes on the way in which Australia, New Zealand and the US interact. The question is to what extent will these three collaborate to shape that alliance, and to what extent will external factors force changes upon them?
Recognising some of the changes already underway is an important first step. Clarifying conflicting institutional interests will help improve relationship management, as will the development of institutional resources. Clarification and development of institutional capacity takes time, and for Canberra, Wellington and Washington the time to act is now.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Alan C. Tidwell is currently the Director of the Centre for Australian, New Zealand and Pacific Studies located in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. Image credit: Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defense.