A domestic audience for a global spotlight: Indonesia’s G20 presidency and the Bali Summit
A domestic audience for a global spotlight: Indonesia’s G20 presidency and the Bali Summit
WRITTEN BY RADITYO DHARMAPUTRA AND DEMAS NAUVARIAN
15 November 2022
The G20 presidency has been at the forefront of Indonesia’s foreign policy this year, highlighting President Joko Widodo’s (Jokowi) mark on foreign affairs. While Indonesia will also chair ASEAN and MIKTA (a middle-power, BRICS-like organisation consisting of Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and Australia) next year, the G20 presidency carries its own prestige and has been portrayed as such. Beyond its default role as the host for a whole year of G20 processes, Indonesia aspires to become a forger of economic cooperation and a leader of post-pandemic recovery. Under the theme of “recover together, recover stronger”, Indonesia set its G20 priority issues on global health architecture, digital economy, and energy transition.
At first, the success of Indonesia’s G20 presidency was measured simply by its hosting capability. However, under the shadow of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — an unprecedented situation — expectations for Indonesia’s G20 presidency have shifted. Initially, Indonesia was only expected to become a convener for an economic cooperation forum focusing on post-pandemic recovery and sustainable development. But now, some Western countries have called for Indonesia to address the impacts of the war.
In the run-up to the summit, Jokowi held meetings with both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, and invited them to Bali. However, Indonesia has not publicly offered any concrete peace proposals to encourage both of them to attend. Jokowi’s double invitation merely signals his efforts to be a good host. Analysts have argued that Indonesia should forget its mediator role and focus only on organising the G20 summit successfully. It appears that Indonesia’s main interest right now is the symbolic nature of the G20 leaders’ attendance at the summit, rather than any actual substantive outcomes.
Jokowi’s domestic legacy is the main priority
To understand Indonesia’s perception of the G20, we have to look at the tradition of Indonesian foreign policy, which stresses the importance of domestic issues in determining foreign policy priorities.
The Global South can play an essential role as the host of a peace forum after the G20 summit, and Indonesia — following its historical role in the Bandung Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement — can be the initiator of such a forum.
A 2021 survey by the Lowy Institute found that most Indonesians are still primarily unaware of foreign affairs and less analytical in their perspectives on them. They consider foreign policy nothing more than an extension of the means to achieve domestic interests. Therefore, it makes sense for Jokowi to cater to such a paradigm to gain popularity among the Indonesian public, despite the Indonesian foreign ministry’s strategic plan for 2020-2024 that promotes strengthening the country’s leadership and positive image in the world. The Indonesian public was the main target of Jokowi’s State of the Nation address last August when he said Indonesia “is at the pinnacle of global leadership”.
The 2024 election is Jokowi’s primary concern, despite being unable to seek re-election. It will be the first election held with the outgoing president not being chairman of any political party. Jokowi will have to compete for the kingmaker role with two former presidents, Megawati Sukarnoputri (PDI-P) and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Demokrat). Based on the latest survey by Kompas, PDI-P and Demokrat are two of the biggest parties now, and Jokowi’s domestic legacy will be under question since he might not be able to nominate his preferred successor (which some have said will be the Central Java Governor Ganjar Pranowo).
A successful G20 summit, even if only showcased by the attendance of G20 leaders, will be portrayed as part of his global success in promoting himself as an internationally respected leader among the Indonesian public. For most Indonesians, foreign policy remains a theatrical and ceremonial matter. Evan Laksmana has famously called this process-oriented instead of outcome-oriented diplomacy. As an indication, his visits to Kyiv and Moscow received applause from domestic audiences, with some claiming he deserved a Nobel Peace Prize, even though the visit resulted in nothing.
Jokowi especially needs a successful G20 summit to demonstrate that he can compete with the legacy of former President Yudhoyono, who was a respected global leader. There were even talks that Yudhoyono was offered several positions in global organisations, including the UN, when he left office. Meanwhile, Jokowi has not been known for his global engagements and activities. In his eight years in office, he missed numerous UN summits and famously wanted to turn away from ASEAN and only look for benefits in befriending other countries. His latest visits to the US, East Asia, and the G7 summit in Germany can be seen as attempts to bring them all to Bali, highlighting the important symbolism of the leaders’ attendance for his image and legacy.
Russia’s war in Ukraine and Indonesia’s response
Beyond his political ambitions, Jokowi is also concentrating on building a legacy of economic growth for Indonesia. After all, he still has two more years in office. Jokowi has famously stated that Indonesia's economic problems are his priority for the rest of his term, even above political issues. The war in Ukraine has created global turmoil, and Indonesia faces three significant crises due to the war: A food crisis, an energy crisis, and an economic recession. These crises could derail Jokowi’s economic achievements should they not be mitigated well, and the G20 is at the centre of Indonesia’s mitigation plan.
The Russian war in Ukraine has threatened Indonesia’s overall vision for its G20 presidency. Instead of forging economic cooperation, Indonesia is now expected to play its emerging middle power role by mediating and acting as a bridge between Russia and Ukraine to help stabilise the situation. Unwilling to take on that role, however, Indonesia is stepping “innocently onto the global stage” without any clear strategic doctrine on the current geopolitical landscape. Jakarta is executing its G20 presidency half-heartedly and ignorantly, considering its global status.
Indonesia has been trying hard to be a fence-sitter between Russia and the West regarding the war in Ukraine. On the one hand, Indonesia has invited both Putin and Zelensky to attend the summit in November, and Jokowi visited Kyiv and Moscow, branding his country as a peace broker. On the other hand, Indonesia has refused to directly call out Russia’s invasion and annexation in its official statements, even while voting in favour of the UN General Assembly’s resolution condemning Russian actions. However, Jokowi’s visit to Kyiv and Moscow was not followed by any actions, sidelining Indonesia in peace-building efforts.
Days before the summit, Indonesia continued to insist on caution. Jokowi’s calls to Putin and Zelensky regarding the ‘grain initiative' show Indonesia’s half-hearted efforts to pursue peace and economic interests simultaneously. In responding to Zelensky’s refusal to attend the summit if Putin attended, Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi reiterated the normative position of the host’s inability to cancel invitations and to expel members. Indonesia is trying hard to build trust between parties by having them attend the G20 summit. It is consistent with the ASEAN way of diplomacy that emphasises informal meetings, meals, and golf to build trust among leaders. However, by doing so, Indonesia ignores the different historical and cultural contexts of the conflicting parties and the current development of the war.
What should Indonesia do during the summit?
The G20 summit can result in benefits for the current administration and its short-term priorities but avoiding the role of a global leader might have negative repercussions, especially for Indonesia’s global standing. Previously, Indonesia followed the tradition of being a leader of the Global South, as exemplified by hosting the Bandung Conference in 1955 and its leadership in creating the Non-Aligned Movement.
Now, Indonesia can play its emerging middle-power role as the Global South’s voice and a stabiliser of the world order. Indonesia should become a representative and a pioneer for middle-power countries to demonstrate their efforts in ending the war. These countries should be impartial yet active intermediaries between conflicting parties and other great powers, and work alongside the existing multilateral efforts such as those of the United Nations.
For example, during the summit, Indonesia can gather the representatives of the Global South in the G20 and organise informal meetings between them to propose a Russian retreat from Ukrainian territories, which would open opportunities for further negotiation. The Global South can play an essential role as the host of a peace forum after the G20 summit, and Indonesia — following its historical role in the Bandung Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement — can be the initiator of such a forum.
Executing a strategic and high-profile role with a self-centred pragmatism limited to national economic aims could be considered a moral hazard, especially when a humanity-depriving war and economic crisis loom. The high-level meeting will bring more unpredictability, as it will showcase world leaders’ ultimate stance towards the war and their views of the G20 framework. Should President Jokowi stubbornly stick to his overall business-as-usual and pragmatic approach, it will secure a heated yet redundant summit that brings nothing but some sort of passive respect to Indonesia.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biographies
Radityo Dharmaputra is currently a doctoral student at the Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies, University of Tartu, Estonia, and a lecturer in International Relations at Universitas Airlangga, Indonesia. He is also a Fellow at the Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia (FPCI).
Demas Nauvarian is a research staff at the Center for Strategic and Global Studies, Universitas Airlangga, Indonesia. Image credit: Wikimedia.