Will friction over Taiwan spark a US-China war?

5 August 2022

US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s recent trip to Taiwan has exacerbated long-standing tensions in US-PRC-Taiwan relations. The trip served as a test of resolve for all three sides — any changes in Speaker Pelosi’s plans, once announced, would be judged as Washington or Taipei caving to Beijing’s threats; China’s response, once delivered, would be weighed internally and externally as a measure of determination to the ultimate goal of unification. For such a high-stakes ‘game of chicken’, it may seem surprising that no one blinked and no high-impact collision occurred. But although there is an optimistic case to make that Taiwan is not the kindling for a great power ‘bonfire’, the tenuous bargain that has protected cross-Taiwan Strait peace and stability for 40 years is under intensified threat and requires mindful attention to preserve the peace in US-China and cross-Strait relations.

The case for optimism

The core of the bargain that has kept the peace in the Taiwan Strait since the US and China normalised relations is a set of tacit commitments to a status quo that acknowledges that the PRC claims sovereignty over Taiwan without forcing Washington, Taipei, or Beijing to immediately prove that claim right or wrong. The US has committed to a One China policy that does not take a position on the sovereignty of Taiwan, but demands that the issue be resolved without the use of force or coercion (and, as of late, in accordance with the wishes of the people of Taiwan). The PRC’s Taiwan policy remains to pursue peaceful unification with the use of force reserved only in extremis — to prevent Taiwan from declaring independence. Taiwan’s leaders have skirted the need for a formal declaration of independence in various creative ways while continuing to govern the island autonomously. This is the status quo — no independence, no use of force, and therefore, no conflict stemming from a resolution of the sovereignty issue — that the majority of the Taiwan electorate wants to continue.

Although there is an optimistic case to make that Taiwan is not the kindling for a great power ‘bonfire’, the tenuous bargain that has protected cross-Taiwan Strait peace and stability for 40 years is under intensified threat and requires mindful attention to preserve the peace in US-China and cross-Strait relations.

In fact, the US and China have seemingly little appetite for a large-scale conflict over Taiwan either. Xi Jinping is preparing for a very important Party Congress this fall, in which he will almost assuredly secure an unprecedented third leadership term. He is bargaining for this position with political constituencies amid a series of economic crises at home, a still raging global pandemic that has caused periodic lockdowns and social discontent, and a war in Europe that China is implicated in supporting, by way of the “no limits” partnership Xi announced with Putin shortly before the invasion. The US is likewise mired in continued domestic political and economic drama, attentive to its alliance commitments in Europe, and navigating its own way through COVID resurgences.

However, the most important point offering reassurance that we are not on the brink of a great power war is that the usual pattern of responses to a Taiwan crisis has not changed. When the US, or the US and a partner, do something that incenses Beijing, China concentrates its major punishments on the weaker party — and often does so in indirect or symbolic ways, more to make its displeasure felt after the fact than to achieve an immediate resolution. The current punitive campaign on Taiwan has already started. China’s Air Force jets have crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait; it has conducted live-fire military drills that disrupted commercial access to Taiwan; it has suspended some key food imports from Taiwan, has sanctioned some of Taiwan’s companies and foundations, and, in the days to come, it may poach yet more of Taiwan’s dwindling diplomatic allies.

Not to let the US off the hook, China has also announced the suspension of bilateral dialogues on key US priorities, including military-to-military talks, cooperation on global crime and drug trafficking, and climate change. China has often cycled through the suspension of military-to-military talks after important US arms sales to Taiwan; it is now expanding this response to send a pointed message about the importance of the Taiwan issue on all aspects of the bilateral relationship. This is undoubtedly an escalation from prior cycles of high tension, both in scale and scope. But thus far, Taiwan’s people remain relatively undaunted by the price of the Pelosi visit. Yes, China’s expression of anger is formidable and worrisome, but, so far, it is also more of the same.

A sustainable Cold Peace?

The strategic question moving forward is whether the fragile cross-Strait Cold Peace can survive under the rising pressure of trilateral dynamics. Taiwan has come to symbolise more than the island and its people; it is the mantle on which differing perceptions of legitimacy are displayed, and neither side sees what is obvious to the other. For China, actions taken by the US to bolster Taiwan’s defences and to provide rhetorical and symbolic support for Taiwan’s democratic political system — such as Congressional delegation visits — are a direct affront to Beijing’s legitimacy for a sovereign claim on Taiwan. For the US, China’s overt and asymmetric concentration and application of military and political power against Taiwan reveals how little Beijing regards the legitimacy of Taiwan’s democratic political system and by extension, US legitimacy to shore up ties with like-minded governments.

Competing statements from the US and China over the onus of responsibility for the current cross-Strait crisis speak to this perception gap. China’s officials have warned the US not to “play with fire”. US officials have accused China of manufacturing a crisis. What the Pelosi visit has done is to force both sides to prove that their legitimacy argument is correct. The challenge ahead is how to grapple with rising ire from each side in defending the rightfulness of their logic with calls for more action and less dialogue. These disputes are now going global. Joint statements between the US and its allies are suddenly raising the issue of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The G7 has put out a statement condemning China’s economic response to the Pelosi visit. Unlike in previous cross-Strait crises, it is difficult for China to identify any partners in Taipei or Washington who can acknowledge and respect its position on Taiwan. It is increasingly finding abroad less respect for that position and less tolerance for its tactical moves to box in Taiwan.

None of these issues are new and neither side has ever accepted the other’s viewpoints as defensible. What has changed is that acknowledgements of the other’s position are no longer sufficiently reassuring in the face of China’s growing military power and the US bipartisan consensus to take on more risk in defending Taiwan — both sides see what the other does as a major shift in policy, no matter what is said. The crisis today — especially the signalling of the PRC’s capacity and intent for a Taiwan blockade — is an example of deterrence run amok. The more pressure the PRC puts on Taiwan, the more the Taiwan electorate gravitates toward politicians who staunchly support Taiwan’s democracy and oppose any path to unification.

Turning down the dial requires ‘kicking the can down the road’

It is not too late to blunt the edges of these dynamics and return to a stable, if delicate, status quo. But it requires leadership in all three capitals to recommit to managing cross-Strait and trilateral relations, rather than seeking their place in an ultimate resolution that would surely lead to outright war. Part of that recommitment is to reassure each other that the core bargain stands: that US support of Taiwan’s democracy is not a red herring for support of Taiwan’s independence; that Beijing has no plans short of an independence declaration to use force; and that Taiwan itself will follow the majority’s will to stay autonomous (de facto independence) rather than formally separate (de jure independence).

The US and China could also both recognise the shortcomings they bring to the table. The US has to concede that an increased appetite for foreign policy risk tolerance within and between ruling administrations is a major driver of friction. China should likewise understand that the opaqueness of its intentions amid a rapid military build-up has led to leaps of logic on if and when it might attempt to take Taiwan by force. The two sides owe each other and the world more self-reflection and self-discipline on these sensitive and irreconcilable positions. The path to conflict is not inevitable, but it is paved with poor communication, misperceptions, and disregard for the lives it holds in the balance.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Rorry Daniels is the Managing Director of the Asia Society Policy Institute, where she leads strategy and operations for the Institute’s projects on security, climate change, and trade throughout Asia. She was previously with the National Committee on American Foreign Policy where she managed the organisation's Track II and research portfolio on Asia security issues, with a particular focus on cross-Taiwan Strait relations, US-China relations, and the North Korean nuclear programme. She is a 2022 Mansfield-Luce scholar focusing on how upgraded US alliance arrangements affect cross-Taiwan Strait relations. Image credit: Wikimedia.