Unending hybridity: Has Shahbaz Sharif’s arrival changed Pakistan’s politics?
Unending hybridity: Has Shahbaz Sharif’s arrival changed Pakistan’s politics?
WRITTEN BY AYESHA SIDDIQA
29 August 2022
Pakistan has just turned 75, but there is little hope in people’s hearts for a transformation from a decades-old military dominated power to a country under greater civilian control. Initially, Shahbaz Sharif taking the oath to serve as Pakistan’s new prime minister (after disposing of Imran Khan) raised hopes that a new moment had arrived, in which the political coalition would have a strong hand vis-à-vis the military and would put the economy back on track.
Soon, however, it felt like taking a cold shower on a chilly morning, as people realised that there would be no shift in their economic conditions, and the new governmental setup did not have the gumption to challenge the army’s power. Shahbaz Sharif tasked the military affiliated Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) with the role of approving all senior civilian bureaucratic assignments — a decision that his politically popular niece, vice-president of the Pakistan Muslim League (PMLN), Mariam Nawaz Sharif defended. Although Sharif’s order was later reversed, it set the tone for the type of government he was going to lead. There was to be no regime change; the same hybrid civil-military rule would continue. Only the faces changed, not the disposition.
Pakistan’s politics: A story of military power
A counterargument in support of Shahbaz Sharif is that he merely perpetuated what was already in practice. The ISI was already involved in providing security reports on individuals earmarked for senior positions. In certain areas, the organisation had a more decisive role, like providing clearance for academics appointed to numerous foreign universities, such as Columbia, Heidelberg, Ankara, and many others. Adding to the ISI’s power was a way for the new prime minister to win generals over to his side by sweetening their taste buds for more power. Shahbaz Sharif’s government embodies traditional patronage politics. According to this formula, political dispensations are used by leaders to try to entice generals to their corner by giving them positions of power and extensive perks and privileges. The previous government of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) party had already expanded the military’s intervention in state and governance affairs. Approximately, the top 26 positions in public sector organisations were allotted to serving or retired military personnel. This includes institutions like Pakistan International Airlines, the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) Authority, and many more.
Pakistan has just turned 75, but there is little hope in people’s hearts for a transformation from a decades-old military dominated power to a country under greater civilian control.
Other critical organisations, such as the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA), are headed up by public officials but are ultimately controlled by the military, as retired officers are in charge of human resource management and hold key positions in the organisations. This is not to mention the fact that Khan assigned the head of the army to the top economic body in the country, responsible for strategic economic decisions — interestingly, none of this changed with the change in government. The sad story of the military encroaching on Pakistan’s civil bureaucracy spans decades. The Musharraf regime started to build the military’s control over all departments and ministries in which the army had an interest, by appointing its personnel at the helm. As a result, armed forces personnel replaced the secretaries of successive Ministries of Defence and Defence Production. Later, the same thing was done with the department of Military Land & Cantonment (ML&C). During his third term as prime minister, Nawaz Sharif approved the military’s permanent control of ML&C, despite the protests of the Special Committee on National Security.
Civil service on the back foot
The PMLN party that runs the federal government has little capacity or even willingness to experiment with the formula of partnering the political class with civil bureaucracy, which was adopted by India’s leadership during the early years after the partition to push the military into a subservient position. Years of military dominance in Pakistan have weakened the civil bureaucracy’s ability to stand up to the military, but it is the only institutional force with the potential to challenge the army’s power. Lest we forget, in the wake of the country’s birth in 1947, civil bureaucracy was not as powerless as it is today. According to Saeed Shafqat, an eminent political scientist and expert on civil-military relations, civil bureaucracy was really in the driver’s seat during 1958’s first martial law, until the military realised its power and took direct control soon after.
A series of civil service reforms conducted by successive governments, starting with General Ayub Khan’s administration during the 1960s, resulted in politicising civil bureaucracy rather than improving its performance. The PMLN has contributed significantly to politicising the civil service, with the help of which it strengthened its patronage structure and its control of Punjab (the most significant province of Pakistan). The provincial and federal bureaucracy is well-trained but also weary of the military entering into every field of activity that belongs to them. They would keenly partner with the government but for the lack of strength demonstrated by the prime minister. Sharif seems to be surrendering space to the military in all matters. For instance, the head of the Pakistan National Shipping Corporation (PNSC), a civil servant, was dismissed to make space for a retired naval admiral. Although this replacement was made to look like an attempt to stop a flawed financial deal, sources claim that it was more about a battle between civil and military bureaucracy for control of a corporate entity. Letting military officers run large or even small public sector organisations cannot go side-by-side with expecting good outcomes.
No one to bell the cat
However, confronted with Imran Khan’s growing popularity, Shahbaz Sharif, and indeed the PMLN, is likely to be non-confrontational with the military. This attitude indicates a total reversal of the anti-army posture, which had helped to popularise Nawaz Sharif, the three-time prime minister of the country who is now in exile in London. Now, the PMLN is perceived as a party that is increasingly being manipulated by the current head of the army, General Qamar Javed Bajwa Khan, who has benefitted from being viewed as a symbol of anti-establishment politics — despite not being so in reality. This image is likely to bring him political dividends in the next elections, especially if he manages to sustain this narrative.
Although the army has become unpopular among the masses, and more and more people (especially youth) are holding it responsible for the ills faced by the nation, the General Headquarters has no plans to compromise on its dominance of power politics. Khan is the only leader who has been able to turn his followers against the army chief and the military at large, but he also proved to have little ability to cut the military down to size.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Ayesha Siddiqa has a PhD in War Studies and is a Senior Fellow at the Department of War Studies, King’s College, London. Image credit: Syed Wasiq Shah/Pixabay.