Uncharted waters: In search of Slovenia’s long-term China strategy

13 April 2022

Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Jansa’s interview for Indian television Doordarshan on 17 January 2022 sent shock waves through Slovenia, the EU, and China. Ever since China became increasingly prominent on the international stage, not many foreign policy decisions have been as divisive as Jansa’s announcement that Slovenia would boost its economic and cultural ties with Taiwan by opening trade offices in each other’s respective territories. China has long condemned Taiwan’s ‘secessionism’ and has made the eventual ‘reunification’ a major foreign policy goal with deep historical underlining. As a result, Beijing does not take lightly any third party’s attempts to deepen ties with Taiwan.

Still, it would be too easy to dismiss Jansa’s recent pro-Taiwan decision as nothing more than one of his many provocative statements. It seems that Slovenia is following other Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries such as Czechia, Lithuania, and Slovakia in their apparent disillusionment with China and their consequent political and economic reengagement with Taiwan. However, Jansa’s stance also displays a void where Slovenia’s long-term Asia-Pacific strategy should be, and a prevalent trend of a disappointing lack of continuity in Slovenia’s foreign policy, especially in relation to non-EU countries.

The reality of Slovenia-China relations

In their attempt to minimise the political damage that Jansa’s decision caused, three opposition parties submitted a request for an urgent session of the Parliamentary Foreign Policy Committee on Taiwan immediately after the interview. With their request, the parties distanced themselves from Jansa’s decision in front of their domestic constituencies and attempted to soothe Beijing’s anger. All three parties agreed that Jansa’s decision could have long-term consequences for Slovenia’s foreign policy engagement. The interview also raised a furore in the economic sector over the potentially detrimental effects such statements might have on the Slovenian economy.

As a small country without the economic or political leverage of the bigger players, openly pursuing and advocating for the formation of an EU-wide unified strategy towards China could be extremely beneficial for Slovenia to attain its own foreign-policy goals.

Looking at the realities of the last decade of Slovenia-China relations, the situation paints a more sombre picture. The two countries’ political relationship was stagnating even before Jansa’s recent announcement. Even though trade relations between Ljubljana and Beijing have increased exponentially in recent years, reaching 4.5 billion EUR in 2021, Slovenia’s trade deficit with China has nevertheless increased accordingly, hitting a whopping 3.8 billion EUR in 2021. Looking at the 17+1 initiative, Slovenia is among the countries with the most disappointing results in transforming the initiative’s proposals into reality, with Chinese companies’ public-procurement wins in Slovenia still firmly at zero.

The much-discussed dream of extended economic cooperation seems closer to wishful thinking. The overarching Slovenian foreign policy drafted in 2015 and revamped in 2021 still omits relations with China from its top strategic priorities. Slovenia’s participation in the initiative did not bring about a warmer political environment towards China, with no prominent political visits from Beijing and no high-level political strategies formed to address the new geopolitical and geoeconomic realities. Even with its few modest successes, such as China becoming Slovenia’s most important economic partner in Asia or a continuous yearly increase in the number of Chinese tourists in Slovenia, Slovenian economic diplomacy cannot bear fruit by itself as long as Ljubljana lacks political will or interest to engage with Beijing.

Against this backdrop, Jansa’s political turn towards Taiwan is not as surprising or sudden as one might think. Since the start of the pandemic, pro-China sentiment has soured in some CEE countries, including Slovenia. The country, together with Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania, Malta, and Estonia, so far is one of the few European states without a Taipei representative office. However, Jansa’s own sympathy towards Taiwan dates back to the 1990s, when he, as a Member of the Parliament, helped form the Slovenian-Taiwanese Friendship Association. The prime minister’s recent attitude towards China has been consistent with his pro-US political style. Looking at just a few of his government’s China-related decisions — signing onto the US-led joint declaration on the 5G Clean Network Security, Jansa skipping Yang Jiechi’s visit to Slovenia, and the highest Slovenian leadership opting out of attending the 2021 ‘17+1 Leaders’ Summit’ — Jansa’s decision to follow the United States’ more aggressive stance towards China is easily recognisable.

Additionally, the possibility of economic incentives and the potential access to the Taiwanese technological sector are also shaping Jansa’s position. After China initiated economic sanctions against Lithuania over its Taiwan representative office, Vilnius secured Taiwan’s sizeable USD 200 million investment in its strategic sectors, most notably in the currently hottest industry: microchip manufacturing. The announcement of a further USD 1 billion investment and the promise of continuous US trade support in light of Lithuania’s dispute with China might have prompted Jansa to expect a sizeable boost to the Slovenian trade sector and potentially high technological investments as well. It remains to be seen whether associating with Taiwan brings any tangible economic results to Slovenia.

The lack of a long-term strategy is hurting Slovenia’s foreign policy

On the other hand, Jansa’s position has predictably drawn Beijing’s ire, with the Slovenian-Chinese Business Council already reporting signs of an economic backlash from the Chinese side, mostly in terms of Chinese partners exiting previously agreed obligations. The latest Jansa interview had one of the most prominent Slovenian journalists actually lamenting that Jansa’s stance on China has transformed Slovenia into one of the most anti-Chinese countries in Europe. And truly enough, one might be inclined to believe so, considering Jansa openly stated that the Slovenian people firmly support any sovereign decisions of the Taiwanese people, including their potential quest for independence. Nevertheless, Jansa’s position, no matter how consistent with his personal ideology and the politics of his tenure, demonstrates a more worrying anomaly inside Slovenia’s foreign policymaking, which is an unparalleled lack of long-term planning in its foreign policy engagement in the Asia-Pacific.

Slovenian foreign policy priorities shift with every new government. With the upcoming elections in April and the possibility of a government change, we may soon experience another change in the discourse regarding China. The lack of consistent long-term foreign policy goals is hurting Slovenia, as it makes the country appear unreliable on the international stage. In an era of the growing significance of the Asia-Pacific on the global political and economic stage, making regional enemies displays a worrying lack of regional expertise. Gaining sufficient expertise to make informed foreign-policy decisions is only possible by promoting regional studies at universities and think tanks, encompassing not only traditional subjects, such as language, culture, philosophy, and history, but also recent geopolitical and geoeconomic developments. Slovenian public debate is severely lacking an understanding and knowledge of the Asia-Pacific, with its traditional scholarly focus firmly based on transatlantic relations. Without the country consciously investing in honing a pool of Asia-Pacific expertise, no possibility of constructive collaboration between economics, politics, and academia will exist to tackle Slovenia’s long-term strategic challenges.

Moreover, as Slovenia is currently a candidate for the non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council for 2024–2025, even the prime minister’s promise that the representative offices will not be on the embassy level and that Slovenia will not depart from the ‘One-China’ policy might not suffice to gain China’s support for Slovenia’s candidature. Alienating an undisputedly important player on the global stage usually does not bode well for a small country such as Slovenia. It is nevertheless important to note that Slovenia’s current plight reflects the broader dilemma of current EU-China relations.

There has been a detectable shift in some of the CEE countries’ engagement with China. The current realities of EU-Taiwan-China relations are predominantly focused on the EU struggling to find a balance between normative re-engagement with a fellow democracy, Taiwan, and enjoying the economic benefits from engagement with China. However, Slovenia’s current vulnerability also lies elsewhere. Ljubljana’s foreign policy lacks Asia-Pacific expertise and consistency, as well as long-term plans for dealing with the rising possibility of a bipolar world order. Making an efficient long-term decision regarding relations with China and Taiwan would be a first step in the right direction.

For Slovenia to rise above the current slump in its relations with China, it must produce more skilled China-expertise that will be able to formulate and assess the attainability of Slovenia’s long-term political and normative goals in lieu of considering business’ attempts at deepening economic cooperation between the countries. As a small country without the economic or political leverage of the bigger players, openly pursuing and advocating for the formation of an EU-wide unified strategy towards China could be extremely beneficial for Slovenia to attain its own foreign-policy goals. While Slovenia could eventually contribute to the formation of such policy suggestions, it must first deal with its domestic deficiencies to earn credibility abroad.

Slovenian policymakers need to ask themselves how the country can exercise its right to form productive relations with Taipei without breaking the established pattern of cooperation between China and the EU, what we really want from China, and what we can do to form a meaningful bilateral relationship without diplomatic hiccups. Without the formation of a China-experts cadre and vibrant public debate, these basic questions might remain unanswered.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Valentina Vengust is an assistant at the Embassy of the Republic of Slovenia in Berlin. She was also an intern at MERICS from October 2020 - April 2021. She holds an MA in International Political Economy from the London School of Economics and Political Science, BA in International Economics and Trade from the University of International Business and Economics in Beijing, as well as a BA in Sinology from the University of Ljubljana. Image credit: Flickr/European Committee of the Regions.