The case for a Franco-Italian spearhead in the Mediterranean-Indo-Pacific continuum
the case for a franco-italian spearhead in the mediterranean-indo-pacific continuum
WRITTEN BY MATHIEU DROIN AND EMANUELE ROSSI
23 April 2024
The European Union launched a new naval operation on 19 February, Aspides, to support freedom of navigation in the Red Sea. Two countries are leading the effort alongside Greece: Italy, which is providing the command at sea and the operation’s admiral vessel, and France, which is an Indian Ocean resident country with two bases in the Northern Indian Ocean (Djibouti and the United Arab Emirates).
This operation indicates the importance of the Red Sea as a nexus between the Mediterranean and the Indo-Pacific. It is the main sea line of communication that connects European and Asian markets, through which nearly 15 per cent of global seaborne trade passes, including 8 per cent of global grain trade, 12 per cent of seaborne-traded oil, and 8 per cent of the world’s liquefied natural gas trade.
It also indicates a convergence of interests and priorities between France and Italy, both of whom are willing to strengthen their profile and presence in the Mediterranean and the Indo-Pacific, while scratching their heads on how to avoid overstretching their scarce resources. Finally, it reminds us that France and Italy have the two most important, and the most integrated, navies of the European Union.
Despite these convergences, however, bilateral cooperation between France and Italy remains below potential, due inter alia to the fluctuating political affinities between respective governments, differing positions on key strategic issues such as Libya and migrations, and the absence of a habit of concerted action on key strategic matters.
Irrespective of the strategic framing, France and Italy are both seeking ways to prevent disruptions to freedom of navigation and political instability in this vast region given the potential ripple effects for their domestic stability, notably due to illegal migration.
France and Italy should paper over their manageable dissensions and craft a shared, ambitious agenda of partnership in the “Indo-Mediterranean”. This requires exploring how structural weaknesses and divergences could be rationalised and turned into complementarities.
An under-exploited potential
France and Italy are broadly like-minded on strategic issues such as attachment to the European project and the importance of the transatlantic bond, but their bilateral relationship ebbs and flows. This is notably due to political instability in Italy, which has resulted in very diverse degrees of proximity with successive French Presidents. The situation has been compounded by episodes of clear dissension, such as the French push for military intervention in Libya in 2011, against Italy’s will, which have left important scars. There is also a pervasive sentiment that Paris looks down upon Rome, preferring instead to consult with Berlin or London, which it considers its real equals, economically and militarily. These challenges were partly the rationale behind signing the Quirinal Treaty in 2021, to help the two parties agree on a shared agenda and a structured, institutionalised dialogue that could weather the vagaries of bilateral politics.
In fact, the two countries have a strong history of cooperation and significant shared assets. They boast the most capable blue water navies in the European Union, which operate aircraft carriers (Charles de Gaulle and Cavour) as well as a significant fleet of submarines. The two navies exchange four liaison officers and their leading companies have teamed up to jointly develop critical capabilities such as the Horizon program launched in 1992 to construct nearly identical advanced destroyers. In 2005, the two national champions Fincantieri and Naval Group (called DCNS then) agreed to develop the Multipurpose Frigates (FREMM), which has become a competitive ship for exports, and Logistics Support Ships (LSS, Vulcano type). The two firms then decided in 2019 to establish Naviris, an equally shared joint venture that led the consortium to develop a European Patrol Corvette under the EU Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) framework, and was awarded the contract for the mid-life upgrade of the Horizon-class frigates in July 2023.
France and Italy also have strong industrial cooperation on air defence, starting with the middle-range air defence systems SAMP/T used by both armies, and the associated Aster missiles, whose development started in the 1980s and is continuously enhanced by the Franco-Italian EUROSAM consortium (MBDA and Thales), with a new generation being produced since 2018. Last but not least, they both host a complete space value chain, and partner in the industrial Space Alliance between Leonardo and Thales.
The level of technical and industrial cooperation is significant and probably unparalleled at the European level. But these are mostly ongoing, relatively dated projects. The bilateral relationship lacks impetus and shared appetite to carry the partnership forward and launch new, more ambitious projects.
Comparable interests but competing approaches across the Med-Indo-Pac
Both France and Italy have major stakes in the security and stability of the sea lines of communication that bind the Indo-Pacific and the Mediterranean together.
The Italian Navy put forward the concept of an “enlarged Mediterranean” in the 1990s, which was picked up again in the national White Paper of 2015 and restated by the Ministry of Defence in 2022. It refers to an arch that spans from the Gulf of Guinea to the Northwest Indian Ocean, with the Mediterranean at its core. Although particularly relevant for France, the concept never made its way into the French strategic and defence community, especially due to Paris’ early endorsement of the “Indo-Pacific” concept that brings most of its overseas territories into one framework. Although Italy has given signs of warming up to the idea of elaborating its Indo-Pacific outlook, the country’s relevance as an Indo-Pacific player is still disputed given its scarce resources. As a result, the ‘Indo-Mediterranean’ concept has emerged and seems to better fit Italy’s strategic area of interest and action.
Irrespective of the strategic framing, France and Italy are both seeking ways to prevent disruptions to freedom of navigation and political instability in this vast region given the potential ripple effects for their domestic stability, notably due to illegal migration. They both contribute actively to collective efforts, through the United Nations (main contributors of the UNIFIL in Lebanon), NATO (Standing Maritime Groups, KFOR), and increasingly through the European Union. France and Italy are indeed regular and active contributors to Operation EUNAVFORMED Irini, whose main mandate is to enforce the UN’s arms embargo on Libya, and to EUNAVFOR Atalanta, which has played a pivotal role in combating piracy in the Indian Ocean.
In the Northwest Indian Ocean, Italy has been an early and steady supporter of the French-led European Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASoH) mission, and both countries participate in two US-led multinational taskforces: CTF 153 focusing on maritime security in the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandeb, and Gulf of Aden, and CTF 151 addressing piracy in coordination with EUNAVFOR. France and Italy’s participation in these initiatives highlights the shared importance given to a multilateral and integrated approach to maritime security.
Despite these commonalities, France and Italy regularly find themselves at loggerheads on how to secure their respective interests in the Indo-Mediterranean. Paris and Rome have repeatedly clashed on the sensitive topic of monitoring and handling illegal migration, notably over rescue operations at sea.
The issue of Libya has been a bilateral bone of contention for over a decade, beginning with French activism in favour of a military intervention in 2011. A former colony of fascist Italy, the country remains crucial for Italian interests: the energy giant Eni controls 45 per cent of Libya’s oil and gas production, and it is also a major hub for migrants seeking to reach Europe through Malta or Italy. Italy and France have been supporting opposite sides in the ensuing civil war, with Rome backing the Western Libya-based, UN-endorsed Government of National Accord, while Paris has been discretely supporting the Eastern Libya-based Army of National Liberation. But bilateral rivalry seems to be attenuating with both countries evolving towards more pragmatic approaches towards an inclusive settlement of the conflict. Libya is a telling example of Italy’s proximity with Turkey on several strategic issues, a factor that further complicates the Franco-Italian relationship due to the tense relations between Paris and Ankara.
The Indo-Pacific offers more prospects for consensus between France and Italy. As showcased by the smooth establishment of Operation Aspides, both Paris and Rome recognise that stability in the Red Sea is essential for preserving the routes that connect Europe and Asia. In this regard, they are both staunch supporters of the IMEC — India Middle East Europe Corridor — as signatories of the MoU proposed on the sidelines of the 2023 G20 Summit in New Delhi. Despite the project being challenged by the war in Gaza, France and Italy appear to remain committed to the strategic objective, as shown by France’s recent appointment of Gerard Mestrallet, former head of gas utility Engie, as the country’s Envoy for the project. Italy, for its part, appears keen on definitively turning the page of its previous agreement to participate in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, to which IMEC is set to be a direct competitor.
France and Italy’s approaches to the Indo-Pacific could nevertheless be more concerted given their strong strategic like-mindedness. In the greater scheme of things, they both have a vested interest in the stability of the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, where they regularly deploy naval assets — notably, in the coming months, an Italian mission led by the carrier strike group of the Nave Cavour. France and Italy are also keen to proceed with de-risking from China in line with EU positions, deepen partnerships with regional organisations such as the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), and strengthen relations with regional powers such as Japan, South Korea, India, and Australia.
Efforts could also be further coordinated in terms of partnerships. Meloni’s government is actively reaching out to both the UAE and India, who are two of France’s main partners in the region (they launched a trilateral initiative in 2022), and Indonesia, another of Paris’ strategic partners. Italy also seems to be a step ahead of France in its relations with Japan, anchored around the Global Combat Air Program (GCAP) to develop a sixth-generation air program by 2035, along with the UK.
The way ahead
If there is political will, France and Italy have the potential to considerably enhance their cooperation and build a meaningful joint agenda for the Med-Indo-Pac.
First, they should aim to become significant providers of stability and 'de-escalators' in the Mediterranean, especially in a scenario of greater US disengagement, which could result in increased assertiveness of hostile actors, such as Russia or Iran, and a resurgence of more pronounced ambitions (currently subdued) by Turkey. This objective could be tackled in the joint Defense/Foreign Affairs ministerial meetings that are provided for by the Quirinal Treaty but have not been convened so far.
Second, they should jointly seek to rationalise, support, and encourage their respective efforts in the Indo-Pacific. France could help Italy join some of its initiatives, for instance with India and UAE. It could welcome more Italian officers in its permanent bases across the Indo-Pacific, especially in the South Pacific, an area with which Italy is less acquainted. They should also reflect the significance of the bilateral relationship in strategic documents related to the Med-Indo-Pac continuum: France could rectify Italy’s absence in previous versions of its Indo-Pacific strategies when it updates them, while Italy could emphasise the potential of the bilateral partnership if and when it decides to draft its first Indo-Pacific strategy. They could also consider jointly establishing an Indo-Mediterranean high-level working forum with a core focus on connectivity between Europe and Asia.
Third, they could also move towards ‘trilateralising’ their respective partnerships with the UK. It is telling that despite their geographical proximity, both Paris and Rome seem to look to London first when it comes to naval and/or industrial cooperation. Building on their trilateral cooperation on renovating the stocks of missiles, and given that France has committed to coordinate deployments in the Indo-Pacific with both the UK and Italy, a trilateral effort could be envisaged, including between the three carriers.
Finally, France and Italy could explore replicating the Combined Joined Expeditionary Force (CJEF) model bilaterally. They could also benchmark the Joint Expeditionary Force model of a multi-national military partnership led by the UK with Nordic countries, Baltic States and the Netherlands, to explore the relevance of a similar setting with fellow Mediterranean partners.
There is much untapped potential for a more fruitful Franco-Italian partnership, and benefits to be gained from breaking the geographical silos in which bilateral cooperations are usually tackled. Italian concepts such as “enlarged Mediterranean” or “Indo-Med” clearly indicate that Rome sees its interests increasingly tied to the Indian Ocean, while remaining hesitant to fully embrace the “Indo-Pacific” given its limited resources. While France likes to brag about being an Indo-Pacific power it also faces similar resources shortages. By combining their assets, making the most of their interoperability, and implementing the Quirinale Treaty seriously, France and Italy could jointly bolster their presence, influence, and credibility across the Mediterranean-Indo-Pacific continuum.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biographies
Mathieu Droin is a visiting fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he focuses on European security and defence issues.
Emanuele Rossi is a journalist and analyst specialising in the Indo-Mediterranean region and the interconnections between the Enlarged Mediterranean and the Indo-Pacific. Image credit: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Theoplis Stewart/Wikimedia Commons.