Taiwan: A partner for a resilient Indo-Pacific
Taiwan: a partner for a resilient
Indo-Pacific
WRITTEN BY DR ZSUZSA ANNA FERENCZY
9 February 2023
With the Taiwan Strait as a potential military flashpoint in the Indo-Pacific, embedding Taiwan in regional cooperation frameworks will support the efforts of like-minded democracies to deter Beijing’s destabilising actions which are affecting the entire region. Integrating Taiwan as a dialogue partner within minilateral frameworks will help Taipei in circumventing its diplomatic isolation and will address China’s revisionist posture in the region.
The Indo-Pacific, first conceptualised by Japan as early as 2007, has re-emerged in recent years as a response to US-China geostrategic rivalry and to the fears of regional states about being caught in the middle of the great power competition. While initially reluctant to adopt the term, regional states are now seeking to actively shape the Indo-Pacific debate as they navigate the political and strategic polarisation in the region.
While not a new development, interest in minilateral cooperation is on the rise, driven by perceptions that multilateralism has not been effective in delivering solutions to global challenges. The changing power balance in Asia has pulled like-minded countries closer together and has renewed their interest in upgrading existing bilateral and trilateral partnerships, as well as seeking ways to make these more robust and result-oriented.
Bringing together the US, India, Japan, and Australia, the Quadrilateral Dialogue (Quad) is one of the many minilaterals that are shaping the region. Other trilateral dialogues, such as the US-Australia-Japan, the India-Japan-Australia, and the India-Japan-US, are also contributing to the process of conceptualising new institutional frameworks.
With the Taiwan Strait as a potential military flashpoint in the Indo-Pacific, embedding Taiwan in regional cooperation frameworks will support the efforts of like-minded democracies to deter Beijing’s destabilising actions which are affecting the entire region.
In the context of mounting pressure from Beijing, like-minded democracies have started seeing Taiwan through the lens of security, both in the maritime and economic realms, showing greater readiness to engage Taiwan within the boundaries of their One China policies. There is now an opportunity to better embed Taiwan into regional frameworks and reshape global supply chains “based on trust and stability”.
The China-factor
While regional states have built relations with China first and foremost on a bilateral basis, China has become the most important trading partner for many in the Indo-Pacific. This has secured significant strategic leverage for Beijing, most often in the framework of asymmetric trade relations which work to its own benefit. With over 55 per cent of its outward direct investment going to China, Taiwan is equally highly reliant on trade with China, and therefore vulnerable to coercion.
For Chinese leader Xi Jinping, ‘taking’ Taiwan is a core national interest, indispensable for the realisation of China’s “national rejuvenation”. Beijing sees Taiwan as a threat to its legitimacy — an issue on which it would never compromise, as its heavy-handed response to US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August signalled. But such actions have amplified fears about China’s willingness to impose itself on the region at the expense of the rules-based order, endangering regional security and stability, and undermining Taiwan’s international space.
With its leading expertise in advanced semiconductors, Taiwan is crucial not just for China, but for the entire world. In fact, with its technological prowess and robust democracy, Taiwan has a valuable, indispensable, and unique input, which would contribute to securing a ‘free and open’ Indo-Pacific, free from the kind of coercion Beijing has been imposing.
Like-minded democracies jointly recognise their vulnerabilities due to excessive dependence on trade with China. They are worried about the possible impact of the intensifying US-China rivalry on their bilateral ties with both Beijing and Washington, as well as on regional security more broadly.
As Beijing’s recent posturing has made clear, China will stay the course on its global expansion with a mix of grey zone activities, including economic coercion and disinformation, with a growing military element. In regards to Taiwan, it will continue to pressure its people into submitting to Beijing’s will. Therefore, the region must urgently adjust to a new geoeconomic reality.
Changing regional perceptions?
In the words of its Digital Minister Audrey Tang, Taiwan’s “radical transparency” has ensured an effective strategy for fighting against the pandemic and the accompanying “infodemic”. In contrast, Beijing’s top-down approach to COVID-19 and its aggressive response to international demands for transparency and cooperation have downgraded perceptions of, and damaged trust in, China across the globe. If it has not already been undermined, this could complicate China’s foreign policy goals and weaken some traditional support among its trade partners. Furthermore, Beijing’s rhetorical alignment with Moscow following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has amplified concerns of overreliance on China.
COVID-19 has exposed the lack of national resilience in emergency preparedness and resource deployment capabilities across the Indo-Pacific, especially given China’s key role in the region’s economic growth. The pandemic seriously affected regional economies reliant on China-centric global supply chains, highlighting the urgency of diversifying and restructuring supply chains.
ASEAN members’ attitudes toward China have become more cautious, with most Southeast Asian elites believing that China “intends to turn Southeast Asia into its sphere of influence”. In this context, and with China’s maritime claims further antagonising many countries in the region, global supply chain reconfiguration creates opportunities for ASEAN countries to increase their market share.
When it comes to Chinese aggression in the region, Taiwan and Japan face similar strategic contexts and threats and are situationally in the same operational theatre. In 2021, Japan’s Defence Minister Nobuo Kishi said that the “peace and stability of Taiwan is directly connected to Japan”. In June 2022, Japan sent its first-ever active-duty military attaché to its representative office in Taiwan to enhance intelligence capabilities and facilitate communications with Taiwan.
“The Australia-Taiwan partnership has never been closer,” said Jenny Bloomfield, Australia’s representative to Taiwan during a celebration of their forty years of bilateral ties. Since both countries are victims of Chinese economic coercion, they consider each other “reliable and trustworthy partners in the Indo-Pacific region”. Following the Pelosi visit, for the first time, ASEAN called for maximum restraint to refrain from provocative action, while reiterating their “support for their respective one-China policy”.
Integrating Taiwan as a partner
There are ways to better integrate Taiwan into the still-emerging reconfiguration of supply chains. One useful opportunity is coordinating with Taiwan as a dialogue partner in the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI), first proposed in 2020 and officially launched in 2021 by Australia, India, and Japan. An exclusive minilateral initiative designed to encourage targeted, pragmatic, and results-oriented cooperation, including Taiwan would contribute to the SCRI’s focus on supporting the enhanced utilisation of digital technology and supporting trade and investment diversification.
Furthermore, the Quad’s Working Groups provide a valuable framework for cooperation. First, on health issues, Taiwan could join efforts in monitoring pandemics or developing early warning systems and sharing best practices, with a particular focus on medical supply chain vulnerabilities (as exposed by COVID-19). Second, Taiwan should be included in the Working Group on emerging technologies, connecting the scientific community of Quad countries and working together on Artificial Intelligence (where Taiwan’s advanced knowledge in semiconductors is indispensable).
Taiwan is a dialogue partner in the Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF). Building on this well-established communication channel between like-minded partners, Taiwan is already contributing to global problem-solving through the participation of its officials, experts, scholars, and the private sector. The GCTF has been growing both in terms of the participating countries and in its issues of focus. Its recently launched franchise model will help Taiwan to expand its footprint worldwide.
Finally, joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) would allow Taiwan to amplify its trading capacity, contribute to economic integration, and avoid being further marginalised. As Taiwan’s most vital trading partner among CPTPP members, the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association (JTEA) has signalled Japan’s willingness to prioritise helping Taiwan gain entry into the CPTPP, adding this was important for “ensuring Taiwan’s survival”. The less trade agreements that Taiwan is able to join, the greater the loss it has to face as trading partners will instead choose destinations with lower trade costs. Taiwan must therefore work hard to lock in support from key CPTPP members and demonstrate its CPTPP readiness.
Practical workarounds that bypass Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation have helped substantiate like-minded partners’ commitment to maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. Going forward, bilateral, trilateral, and minilateral avenues will remain relevant for addressing regional tensions and boosting deterrence. It is therefore important to further consolidate and expand these channels by including Taiwan, in order to strengthen resilience and facilitate diversification, as well as to deter destabilising actions in the region. Embedded into minilateral cooperation, Taiwan can contribute to consolidating regional coordination.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Dr Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy is the Head of the Associate Network at 9DASHLINE and Assistant Professor at National Dong Hwa University, Hualien, Taiwan. Image credit: Flickr/總統府.