Navigating the tides: Reassessing the EU's Indo-Pacific strategy
Navigating the tides: reassessing the EU's Indo-Pacific strategy
WRITTEN BY DR GORANA GRGIC
16 January 2024
As the leaders of the European Union and China convened for an overdue in-person summit, many drew comparisons with the last time the two sides had a meeting in such a format in April 2019. Compared to then, the EU finds itself deep in the throes of a significant transformation, striving to establish credibility as a geopolitical player on the global stage while dealing with crises on multiple fronts.
There is no doubt that how the EU approaches China these days is informed by its foray into the Indo-Pacific and that, indeed, its approach to the region is shaped by its relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The 2021 publication of the EU’s “Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific” marked a pivotal chapter in its global engagement, and set the context for the most important bilateral relationship in the region.
Amid a surge in European interest in the Indo-Pacific, the EU occupies a distinct role as the core of its strategy remains rooted in its traditional roles as a force in trade and a champion of liberal-democratic norms. While some corners of this expansive region greet its involvement with open arms, lingering doubts persist about its capabilities and the extent of its influence.
Drawing upon member states’ existing strategies in the region, the EU's strategy tactfully treads a fine line — seeking greater assertiveness while preserving space for cooperation, even in its dealings with China.
The initial ambition driving the EU's Indo-Pacific engagement contrasts sharply with the current landscape marred by pressing challenges and emergencies closer to its borders. As the Union's leadership embarks on its final lap, culminating in the 2024 European Parliament elections, it is imperative to consider the complexities that have grounded the original promises of greater engagement with the region against the reality of the multiple internal and foreign policy crises that the EU is facing.
Moving forward, policymaking bandwidth and resource allocation will remain significant hurdles, especially considering the ongoing war in Ukraine and, more recently, the escalating violence in the Middle East. Moreover, in implementing its Indo-Pacific strategy, the EU will have to find a way to coordinate its approach with that of the United States, as well as recalibrate relations with China.
Crises of today limiting the aspirations from 2021
In the 2021 State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen defined the EU Indo-Pacific Strategy as a “milestone that reflects the growing importance of the region to our prosperity and security”. There is no doubt that following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the ensuing full-scale war, the EU's engagement in the Indo-Pacific has been affected by the acuteness of crisis response and policymaking closer to home.
To remain upbeat about the prospects of the EU's active involvement in the Indo-Pacific, it is sufficient to consider its economic potential. The region promises substantial returns on investments from connectivity to infrastructure, as well as opportunities for gains from trade liberalisation. Moreover, in governance of global commons, addressing climate change and global health issues offers arenas where the EU possesses significant stakes and valuable experience.
The reverberations of the war in Ukraine have also reshaped threat perceptions among some parts of the region and deepened the sense of interconnectedness between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific spaces. This shift might usher increased resource allocation toward the region, leveraging the EU's growing capabilities in defence and security cooperation.
Conversely, a more cautious perspective warns that the ongoing war in Ukraine might siphon crucial resources — be they financial, bureaucratic, or even attentional — leaving scant means for a robust and sustained EU engagement. Furthermore, reconstruction aid for Ukraine will undoubtedly divert some of the funding that would have been otherwise allocated for overseas development assistance or connectivity projects. This line of reasoning suggests that selective rather than deep and comprehensive engagement in the vast Indo-Pacific region may be more likely, particularly while high-intensity warfare persists in Europe.
Furthermore, the EU’s perceivably inconsistent approach to human rights poses a risk of eroding its credibility, especially among nations in the Global South — many of which find themselves in the middle of Indo-Pacific contestations. There are concerns that the EU is seen as applying different standards based on geographic proximity, potentially undermining its legitimacy. Discrepancies between the EU's responses to crises, such as the differing reactions to Russia's invasion of Ukraine compared to other humanitarian emergencies like the Israel-Hamas conflict, have been highlighted as particularly worrisome in the region.
Managing great power relations
Another factor to consider is the extent to which the EU’s role as a growing security actor impacts its actions in the region. Thus far, it has aspired to further cooperative security and expand its operational portfolio to address new security challenges, while relying on bilateral and minilateral cooperation led by member states due to the dependence on individual defence capabilities. However, it appears that seeing the Strategy merely as a “third way”, emphasising engagement and partnerships without taking overt sides is being significantly tested.
For one, there has been a significant shift in transatlantic relations over the last three years and the extent to which the EU-US coordination on the approach to the Indo-Pacific has become part of the vernacular. Collaborative efforts in functional domains — connectivity, climate change action, human security, and defence technology — have emerged as potential areas for transatlantic cooperation in a range of policy statements. Yet, while the EU and the United States might share similarities in diagnosing the regional challenges, there remains a considerable contrast in their approach. This is the result of power asymmetry and difference in the position the two partners occupy in the hierarchy of power in the international system.
Moreover, China's expanding influence in the Indo-Pacific continues to present challenges to the EU's approach, triggering concerns about security, economic interests, and adherence to international norms. As a result, the EU's response has sharpened over the past couple of years as it seeks to rethink its China strategy, particularly in the economic realm. In navigating its evolving stance vis-à-vis China, the EU confronts the imperative of strategic recalibration. A comprehensive approach incorporating economic and security concerns, as well as a steadfast commitment to human rights is pivotal for the EU to safeguard its interests, assert influence, and maintain credibility in engaging with China.
Where to from here?
Drawing upon member states’ existing strategies in the region, the EU's strategy tactfully treads a fine line — seeking greater assertiveness while preserving space for cooperation, even in its dealings with China. However, this balancing act is becoming increasingly precarious. While the region welcomes the presence of extra-regional powers for economic and political exchange, escalating security concerns hinder the EU's ability to compete fully. Thus, the EU can only defer to its most capable member states on matters of hard security in the Indo-Pacific, while spearheading collaborative efforts in trade, development, and capacity-building.
The EU's adoption of the term 'Indo-Pacific', coupled with the resonance of its "de-risking" discourse in the United States, signals a growing strategic alignment between the two sides of the Atlantic. Initial engagements with the Biden administration underscored aspirations to infuse a transatlantic dimension into regional cooperation. However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing security turmoil in the most proximate neighbourhood have redirected focus back to the Old Continent. Consequently, legitimate concerns have arisen regarding the EU's ability to sustain its Indo-Pacific endeavours amidst the resource strains.
To avoid the risk of the EU's Indo-Pacific Strategy becoming a mere catalogue of aspirations, leveraging existing resources and partnerships is imperative. Focusing on its fortes in trade, infrastructure development, investments in connectivity, and boosting its partnerships with select regional partners such as Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, and India, as well as multilateral groupings such as ASEAN will anchor its future role in the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, a critical re-evaluation of the EU's approach towards China looms large, necessitating a possibly overdue recalibration for the new Commission.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Dr Gorana Grgic is a Senior Scientist in Transatlantic Security at the ETH Zürich’s Center for Security Studies and Senior Lecturer at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. She is also an Expert Associate with the National Security College at the Australian National University. Previously, Gorana was a Research Fellow in Grand Strategy at the Hertie School’s Centre for International Security (2022-2023), Partners Across the Globe Research Fellow at the NATO Defense College (2021) and Visiting Fellow at the Harvard Center for European Studies (2018-2019). Gorana’s research interests include US foreign policy, transatlantic relations, conflict resolution, and democratisation. Image credit: © Council of the European Union, 2023.