Indonesia's ties with China: COVID-19 and the South China Sea
Indonesia's ties with China: COVID-19 and the South China Sea
WRITTEN BY AKASH SAHU
16 May 2020
Indonesia is increasingly struggling with a rising number of COVID-19 infections, with16,500 confirmed cases and over 1,000 deaths reported as a result of the virus, which is causing immense economic turmoil in the largest economy in ASEAN. The government in Jakarta has scrapped the limit for the country’s fiscal deficit, which will now soar to 5% of the GDP; and has issued ‘pandemic bonds’ to the amount of $27 billion to ease the increasingly dire situation in the country.
In response to this President Joko Widodo has only imposed a partial lockdown across Indonesia; citing the severe economic hardships facing everyday people, particularly to the informal sector in the country which represents 60% of Indonesia’s economy.
The health challenges facing Indonesia
The response by Indonesia to COVID-19 has been criticised for being inadequete, with the reported testing of a mere 36 persons per million, by comparison South Korea tests 2,100 person per million. Government spokespersons however have clarified that the state is testing only the symptomatic people who arrive at the health facilities, but this poses greater challenges for Indonesia. There are just four doctors and 12 beds per 10,000 people; with less than three intensive care beds per 100,000.
In the face of a major health and economic crisis, China is looking to boost ties with Indonesia. President Xi Jinping, in a recent conversation with the Indonesian president, has offered to maintain ‘close contact’ and a deepening of bilateral relations under the framework of Belt and Road Initiative.
The wider health challenges facing Indonesia makes the COVID-19 pandemic even more concerning. Around 285,000 people died in 2017 due to tuberculosis, asthma, influenza and other respiratory problems. Every year SPM in the air causes 7,400 deaths in Indonesia. Respiratory illness is rampant in 16 of Jakarta’s 44 sub-districts. The country also has one of the highest rates of tobacco consumption in the world. with an increased vulnerability to strokes. This makes the 250 million people of Indonesia particularly susceptible to COVID-19 infection, especially in a much polluted capital like Jakarta.
There is also a severe lack of personal protective equipment for medical professionals in the country. Domestic companies are preparing to produce 18.3 million pieces of equipment per month and possibly export some in order for the country to acquire ventilators in return, as informed by the Industry minister Kartasasmita.
Even though many European governments have rejected poor quality medical supplies promoted by China in recent weeks, Indonesia feels it does not don’t have the luxury to do so. The vice chairwoman of international relations of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Shinta Kamdani, revealed that Indonesia will continue to import available products from China, irrespective of the quality.
A helping hand from China?
In the face of a major health and economic crisis, China is looking to boost ties with Indonesia. President Xi Jinping, in a recent conversation with the Indonesian president, has offered to maintain ‘close contact’ and a deepening of bilateral relations under the framework of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), to aid Indonesia’s economy during the present crisis.
The push by Beijing to continue Indonesian engagement with the BRI is unsurprising, especially when the COVID-19 pandemic looks set to devastate Indonesia’s economy. The Belt and Road Initiative however has, as in many countries, its own share of critics and sceptics within Indonesian policy circles and civil society.
Critics have argued that the Chinese projects in the country are of a low-yield and high debt nature. BRI projects, combined with the COVID-19 pandemic could push country’s large external debt further, which was already exceeding $387 billion in the first quarter of 2019. A report by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), also highlights that there is a strong interdependence between stability in South China Sea and the success of BRI in Indonesia. Popular perceptions of China’s conduct in the disputed maritime spaces are increasingly framing the willingness of Indonesian’s to accept further investment and infrastructure from Beijing.
China’s moves in South China Sea
A recent sinking of a Vietnamese fishing boat by Chinese vessels claiming that it was fishing in the waters illegally has once again focused the world’s attention on the South China Sea. Vietnam has called it a violation of its sovereignty in the region, and Philippines has with its own challenges at Scarborough Shoal has voiced support for Hanoi. China in response deployed its Coast Guard ship 5302 in close vicinity, alarming the Philippines.
Indonesia has not been immune to the recent activity by the maritime militia and coast guard as China has repeatedly made incursions into Indonesia’s Natuna waters since January. In a recent statement Chinese foreign ministry spokesman, Geng Shuang, said that his country will continue to have rights over the waters irrespective of what the Indonesian side believed. Chinese vessels were again spotted fishing illegally in February in the Natuna Sea, waters that fall under Beijing’s nine-dash line claims but widely rejected by Indonesia. China seemingly remains committed to its expansionist ambitions, especially in the South China Sea.
The Indo-Pacific and the road ahead for Indonesia
China looms large on Indonesia’s immediate horizon, offering both opportunities and challenges. Jakarta, owing to its proximity to both the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, has high ambitions in Southeast Asia to become the Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF), President Joko Widodo’s signitature policy. Beijing has offered repeatedly to assist the GMF as part of the BRI. However the ‘Indonesian Ocean Policy’ passed in 2014 emphasizes that Indonesia must remain independent of the influence of any major power. Indonesia likewise has also struggled hard to assert sovereignty over its maritime resources through UNCLOS, which China challenges through its territorial claims.
The answer for Indonesia’s questions for both COVID-19 and China lie potentially in the concept of the Indo-Pacific. The ASEAN outlook, which was adopted in 2019, advocates an ‘inclusive Indo-Pacific’ and saw Indonesia play a significant role in drafting the document. The Indo-Pacific as an inclusive geopolitical construct matters greatly to Indonesia, and it has endorsed the idea repeatedly on multiple platforms, notably within ASEAN.
On COVID-19, Indonesia must look at working multiple partners across the Indo-Pacific in acquiring medical supplies to fight the virus. Via the Indo-Pacific framework, ASEAN will be Jakarta’s primary forum for engaging in multilateral means to face the crisis; but countries like India, Australia, South Korea and Japan must come to Jakarta’s aid in order for the country to have the adequate institutional, financial and human resources to face down its current health crisis.
In the South China Sea, Indonesia must recognise China’s ambitions in the Indo-Pacific. Beijing’s policy of registering an obtrusive presence in disputed maritime borders has been consistent with all claiment states; characterized by a show of military and economic superiority. China strongly distrusts the concept of the Indo-Pacific and seeks influence within the maritime spaces near Indonesia. Whilst the Indo-Pacific is interpretated differently by several powers, homogeneity is found in the concepts of freedom and security in the maritime spaces. If Indonesia, ASEAN’s largest country, yields to Chinese claims on the South China Sea, it will weaken the Indo-Pacific concept and open the possibility of a collapse of the construct entirely.
The Communist Party of China is known for its ‘Real Politik’. Indonesia should be aware that engagement and economic assistance from China will have implications, both financially and also strategically.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Akash Sahu is a Research Intern with Centre for Southeast Asia and Oceania in Manohar Parrikar- Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) and Research Assistant at Centre for Southeast Asian Studies (CSEAS), Jindal Global University. Image credit: Wikipedia Commons