Indonesia, France, and the logic of strategic autonomy
Indonesia, France, and the Logic of Strategic Autonomy
WRITTEN BY ANIELLO IANNONE
11 July 2025
When French President Emmanuel Macron visited Jakarta in late May 2025, much of the coverage focused on the dramatic scope of the agreements signed, including multi-billion-euro deals for Rafale fighter jets, Scorpène-class submarines, and radar systems, as well as promises of joint production and technology transfer. However, those headlines missed the bigger picture. Macron’s visit was not just about weapons. It was a strategic moment in which a major European state and a rising regional middle power found common ground in their shared search for autonomy in a world increasingly shaped by systemic uncertainty and hardening geopolitical divides.
For Indonesia, the visit offered more than military hardware. It was a calculated step toward diversifying its strategic options, reducing dependency on traditional powers like the US and China, and building long-term capacity. For France, it was about reasserting itself in the Indo-Pacific after the AUKUS shock and strengthening ties with a rising Southeast Asian partner whose foreign policy defies easy categorisation.
What emerged was not just a flurry of deals but the signing of a long-term political framework: the Horizon 2050 Joint Declaration. This document outlines a comprehensive vision for cooperation across defence, energy, education, technology, maritime security, and even cultural diplomacy. It is, in many ways, a blueprint for what middle power partnerships can look like in the 21st century: pragmatic, interest-driven, and built on mutual respect rather than ideological alignment.
Strategic flexibility over strategic alignment
Indonesia’s strategic doctrine has long been characterised by the bebas-aktif principle, i.e., “independent and active” foreign policy. While often read as a form of non-alignment, the doctrine in practice is less about neutrality and more about flexibility. In the current Indo-Pacific context, where the rivalry between the United States and China is reshaping regional dynamics, Jakarta is not sitting still. Instead, it is quietly executing a policy of hedging by forming ties with multiple partners to avoid falling into the orbit of superpowers.
This shows that both Jakarta and Paris are playing the long game. They are not interested in a transactional relationship limited to hardware but are building a layered partnership that spans sectors and timelines. Unlike a typical great-power alignment, this middle-power synergy is grounded in mutual constraints and ambitions.
France now joins a growing list of Indonesia’s strategic partners that includes South Korea, with its joint KF-21 fighter jet project; Turkey, an important supplier of drones and missiles; and India, a key maritime partner. Crucially, the Macron visit not only underscored Jakarta’s emphasis on defence procurement but also on industrial partnerships. The Rafale and Scorpène deals are structured to include co-production, training, and technology transfer, aligning neatly with Indonesia’s 2019 Presidential Regulation on the development of the national defence industry.
Indeed, for Jakarta, the defence relationship with France is about safeguarding sovereignty as much as security. It reflects a broader ambition: to modernise Indonesia’s military while laying the foundation for long-term autonomy from external dependencies rather than from any single actor. This thinking is especially important for a country that still remembers a punitive measure in response to Indonesia’s involvement in violent reprisals following East Timor’s independence referendum. Since then, Indonesian defence planners have sought to avoid putting all their strategic eggs in one basket. Macron’s pitch was enticing precisely because it offered high-tech systems without political trade-offs. France does not demand ideological loyalty or regional posturing in exchange for cooperation. It proposes a deal while respecting national independence. That is a rare and valuable combination for a country like Indonesia.
At the same time, Macron’s visit served the French national interests well. The Horizon 2050 framework allows France to project itself as a relevant Indo-Pacific actor by pursuing alternative partnerships beyond the AUKUS deal. While alliances like the Quad and AUKUS are reshaping the region’s strategic architecture, France is seeking alternative paths by building deep bilateral ties with strategically independent countries. Other examples of this French strategy include its enhanced defence and energy cooperation with India, support for Vietnam’s maritime capacity-building, and strategic dialogues with countries such as Japan. These partnerships reflect Paris’s intent to diversify beyond traditional Atlantic ties and engage with pivotal actors in a multipolar Indo-Pacific. Indonesia, with its demographic weight, maritime reach, and diplomatic credibility, is a perfect fit .
The Horizon 2050 declaration is more than a diplomatic flourish. It outlines a detailed, ten-pillar plan for cooperation over the next 25 years. While defence understandably took centre stage during Macron’s visit, the document points to an even broader convergence. From maritime cooperation and cybersecurity to clean energy and educational exchange, the declaration reflects a strategic complementarity rooted in long-term needs, not just short-term optics.
Among the most notable elements are France’s commitments to support Indonesia’s energy transition, with over EUR 450 million in financing pledged through the French Development Agency, as well as enhanced cooperation on nuclear technology, artificial intelligence, and critical minerals. In education and culture, the two countries agreed to expand academic scholarships, increase university partnerships, and deepen collaboration in heritage restoration, including joint work on Borobudur Temple. On maritime issues, France and Indonesia pledged joint efforts in ocean governance, combating illegal fishing, and protecting marine biodiversity, with an eye toward cooperation at the 2025 UN Ocean Conference.
Minilateralism as a Pathway to Autonomy
Indonesia’s growing preference for bilateral and minilateral formats reflects a deeper trend among middle powers as they navigate today’s complex security environment. As ASEAN struggles to generate consensus on critical issues, from the South China Sea tensions to the Myanmar crisis, Jakarta is supplementing regional engagement with flexible, issue-specific coalitions. France’s entry into Indonesia’s expanding web of security partnerships adds another layer to this approach.
In recent years, Indonesia has strengthened trilateral maritime patrols with Malaysia and the Philippines in the Sulu Sea, increased joint exercises with India and Australia, and deepened intelligence exchanges with Japan and South Korea. These formats enable practical cooperation without the burden of formal alliances or the need for a shared ideology. The France–Indonesia partnership fits this mould: focused, functional, and forward-looking.
Minilateralism offers what ASEAN increasingly cannot: speed, focus, and political room to act. At the same time, Indonesia remains careful not to abandon ASEAN’s diplomatic platform, recognising that it still provides regional legitimacy and a convening space. The result is a layered foreign policy: ASEAN at the centre, but surrounded by multiple reinforcing partnerships, each serving a different function.
France’s willingness to engage Indonesia bilaterally while supporting ASEAN multilateralism shows an appreciation for this strategic nuance. It’s not about choosing one model over another but building resilience through many juxtaposed ones. For Jakarta, this is how strategic autonomy is exercised — not through grand declarations but through careful, calibrated alignments that expand national agency in a fragmented world.
This shows that both Jakarta and Paris are playing the long game. They are not interested in a transactional relationship limited to hardware but are building a layered partnership that spans sectors and timelines. Unlike a typical great-power alignment, this middle-power synergy is grounded in mutual constraints and ambitions.
France-Indonesia: navigating global uncertainty
The geopolitical logic is clear. France, facing a more unstable Europe and a fractured Atlantic alliance, is seeking to extend its influence through sovereign, non-Western partnerships. Indonesia, meanwhile, recognises the limits of ASEAN-led multilateralism and is increasingly complementing it with bilateral and minilateral formats to advance its security and economic interests. Horizon 2050 does not replace ASEAN; it supplements it, offering a pragmatic model for navigating uncertainty without surrendering national autonomy.
Macron’s visit, then, should not be seen as an isolated gesture. It marks a deeper shift in the global order. Indonesia is no longer a passive recipient of external influence but an active shaper of its strategic environment. France, for its part, is recalibrating its global posture in a world of shrinking trust, contested alignments, and eroding Western leverage. What brings them together is not ideology but realism. Indonesia is not aligning with France; it is aligning with itself. In doing so, it reveals what strategic autonomy looks like in practice, not isolation, but diversification; not neutrality, but flexibility; not rhetoric, but capability. In an era of systemic rivalry, this is not just smart diplomacy; it is a survival strategy.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Aniello Iannone is a lecturer in Indonesian and Southeast Asian Politics at the Department of Political Science and Government, Diponegoro University. His research focuses on Indonesian politics, ASEAN as a regional actor, and comparative and international politics in Southeast Asia. Image credit: Google Gemini AI.