India, the EU, and the next green wall
India, the EU, and the Next Green Wall
WRITTEN BY DEBOMITA DASGUPTA
18 November 2026
Beneath the ocean floor and beyond any country’s borders sit vast deposits of the metals that power the green transition: nickel, cobalt and copper. India and the EU have a lot riding on how these metals get mined, and they are familiar partners in this area. European states hold their own International Seabed Authority (ISA) exploration contracts, and India and the EU cooperate within the Minerals Security Partnership as well as on a jointly funded EUR 15.2 million electric vehicle (EV) battery recycling initiative. This cooperation is driven by a shared need for secure, low-carbon access to the essential transition minerals, which India needs to scale up clean energy and EVs, and the EU needs to hit its 2050 climate-neutrality target.
What India and the EU lack is a mutual verification framework to assess the sustainability of seabed extraction. That shortcoming threatens to leave substantial revenue on the table. India is racing towards extraction. A coalition of states — including EU members — wary of moving too fast, want to apply the brakes. Within this divergence lies a broader dispute: the question of who gets to define, measure, and verify responsible extraction, and who pays when that definition is in question.
The EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) shows how this dispute could unfold. Without an independent means of verifying claims of responsible production, whoever defines ‘responsibility’ determines the outcome, and the other side bears the cost. But India-EU cooperation on seabed mining is not doomed. The India-EU free trade agreement (FTA), concluded in January 2026, provides a blueprint for mutual recognition of carbon pricing systems and CBAM verifiers. That template now needs to be brought to the deep sea.
Seabed mining, the ISA, and why it’s inadequate
The race for seabed resources is reshaping the EU’s and India’s mineral strategies. India’s contract area in the Central Indian Ocean Basin may hold nearly 5 million tonnes of nickel and over 4 million tonnes of copper. These deep-sea deposits are governed by the ISA, established under to authorise and regulate seabed mining beyond national jurisdiction. In September 2025, India became the first country to hold two ISA contracts for polymetallic sulphides. These binding 15-year agreements grant it the right to survey the largest area allocated to any country. The award extends India’s reach across the Indian Ocean and advances its ambition to “strengthen its blue economy initiatives”. That ambition is fuelled by a desire to reduce reliance on China and secure an early foothold in an area where Beijing’s presence is growing.
The lesson of CBAM is that speed without agreed standards only shifts conflicts to a costlier stage, once investments have been made. The obstacles to agreement are lower now than they will be once commercial extraction begins and the economic stakes increase.
But the incomplete and contentious legal regime around seabed mining has hampered progress. Despite a decade of multilateral negotiations, the international community has failed to agree on a deep-sea mining code to govern contractors once they move from exploration to commercial production. Institutional gridlock at the ISA is exacerbated by a coalition of over thirty nations, including EU members such as France and Germany, that advocate for a moratorium on deep-sea mining over environmental liability and compliance concerns. Whether current contractors fulfil existing obligations is also unclear. When the ISA asked 21 contractors in March 2026 about potential non-compliance, all said there was none. The ISA’s Legal and Technical Commission nonetheless continued its inquiry into potential breaches.
The ISA’s rules require that seabed mining benefit “mankind as a whole” and that environmental damage be assessed and compensated. Those rules would form the basis for any future system of standards and verification. But there is still no satisfactory mechanism to investigate compliance with ISA obligations.
Without a deep-sea mining code, an inadequate system of corporate self-reporting has persisted. Self-reported disclosures with no independent check are liable to understate damage and overstate compliance. Where scrutiny has been applied, it has run into procedural hurdles. The ISA inquiry into Nauru Ocean Resources Inc. and Tonga Offshore Mining Ltd. has stalled over due-process claims. Without an agreed independent investigation process, compliance disputes like this remain vulnerable to delays unrelated to the actual risk associated with a given project. That serves neither the EU’s and India’s demand for seabed minerals nor the EU’s environmental concerns.
A familiar pattern with a twist
The EU and India have faced this problem before. Since January, the EU’s CBAM has charged importers a fee on goods such as steel and aluminium, based on the emissions produced in their manufacturing. India pushed hard for an exemption but instead got a promise of technical dialogue, a future climate platform to address supply standards, and EUR 500 million in EU support.
The costs are real. Indian steel emits roughly 2.5 tonnes of CO2 per tonne produced, against a global average of approximately 1.9. Under CBAM, EU importers must buy certificates for those emissions. Because Indian to verifiers are not yet recognised under CBAM, Indian exporters have no independent means of proving improvements and bear these costs without recourse. CBAM thus becomes a ‘green wall’, an environmental barrier India has no independent way to overcome.
Seabed mining is heading towards the same wall, in a field where verification is even more difficult. The carbon emissions CBAM penalises can be tracked using the globally accepted metric of tonnes of CO2 equivalent. With a lack of baseline data on deep-sea ecosystems, there is no equivalent metric for environmental degradation. With CBAM, the fight was over a number everyone knew how to calculate. With no accepted metric, ISA audits face an even thornier problem.
The sustained backlash against CBAM shows the political costs of the green wall. In August 2026, BRICS environment ministers released a joint statement opposing "unilateral, punitive, discriminatory, and protectionist measures… such as the CBAM”. The EU has not officially responded to that statement, but its broader answer to CBAM complaints has been to ease compliance without conceding that the policy itself is unfair. But this compromise has a shelf life. Both sides now have a brief window to ensure seabed minerals do not become the next point of friction.
What India and the EU can do about it
India and the EU do not need to agree on whether to proceed with mining or impose a moratorium. They need a shared method to verify environmental damage, benefit sharing, and compliance. They already have a forum whose mandate touches this problem: the Trade and Technology Council (TTC), a ministerial-level body launched in 2022 and co-chaired by India’s and the EU’s top trade officials. Its Working Group on Trade, Investment, and Resilient Value Chains covers supply chain resilience, including critical minerals. In July, the TTC reaffirmed cooperation on critical minerals, including nickel, cobalt, and copper at stake in the ISA deadlock. The TTC can do what the ISA cannot — let India and the EU build and test a verification model bilaterally first, using their FTA as a testing ground.
The pressure is mounting. Exploiting the fact that the US never ratified UNCLOS, The Metals Company (TMC) has filed to mine commercially through its US subsidiary. If a lone extractor sets the terms of deep-sea mining before India and the EU agree on theirs, there will be no negotiated framework to lean on. A joint India-EU verification system must be built now so that both sides negotiate proactively, rather than reactively.
A realistic first step is fixing what the CBAM model missed, using the TTC’s working group to extend the mutual recognition mechanism for carbon pricing systems and verifiers that India and the EU committed to in their FTA. Turning it into a working mechanism would require agreed data-reporting standards and a dispute mechanism for when the numbers are contested. Applying the same architecture to environmental and social impact reporting for seabed contracts would let both sides build a shared evidence base before extraction disputes reach CBAM-level stakes.
An independent investigative body with no institutional stake in the outcome would ensure compliance cases are judged on facts, rather than stalled by questions of legitimacy. But while independence removes the conflict of interest, it cannot prevent the losing party from calling the process rigged. That requires prior agreement to accept the findings. A jointly designed India-EU verification model would therefore need both: an independent investigator and a process both sides sign up to in advance. Above all, it would be a working example of two large economies building a shared standard. An agreement would not bind the wider ISA membership, but it could serve as a template for the ISA.
Admittedly, creating such a model will be an uphill political battle in which neither party has a compelling reason to act first. A mutually recognised verification regime could slow India’s extraction timeline and commit EU member states, many of which favour a mining moratorium, to a level of engagement they might prefer to avoid. It would also mean moving more slowly than a unilateral actor operating outside the ISA. But slower and verified trumps fast and contested. The lesson of CBAM is that speed without agreed standards only shifts conflicts to a costlier stage, once investments have been made. The obstacles to agreement are lower now than they will be once commercial extraction begins and the economic stakes increase.
When the ISA Council reconvenes in March 2027, it will likely still lack a mining code. The window is narrow, but India and the EU can still choose what seabed mining becomes — a shared standard or another green wall.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent those of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Authors biography
Debomita Dasgupta is a policy researcher based in Melbourne working on critical minerals, climate, and trade governance across the Indo-Pacific and partners outside the region. Her writing has appeared in the Lowy Institute's The Interpreter, Asialinks Insights, Australian Outlook and the Devpolicy Blog. Image credit: Flickr/Steve Jurvetson.