In Forum: 2024 — The future of ASEAN
In Forum: 2024 — The future of ASEAN
16 February 2024
Great power politics in the Indo-Pacific has put the future and centrality of ASEAN under some doubt. Apart from the proliferation of minilaterals in the region, which could challenge ASEAN’s role, internal divisions in the regional body are also a matter of concern. These fault lines have become more prominent over issues like the military coup in Myanmar, contestation in the South China Sea, the transfer of power from Hun Sen to Hun Manet in Cambodia, China’s ‘salami slicing’ tactics, and rising organised crime among other issues.
Here, 9DASHLINE asks a select group of experts whether ASEAN can withstand these internal and external pressures. What are the different visions amongst its members regarding the future of ASEAN? How can ASEAN negotiate greater space for itself amid the intensifying great power rivalry?
ASEAN’S CHALLENGES ARE IMMENSE BUT NOT INSURMOUNTABLE
DR. PRASHANTH PARAMESWARAN — FELLOW AT THE WILSON CENTER, FOUNDER OF THE ASEAN WONK NEWSLETTER AND SENIOR COLUMNIST FOR THE DIPLOMAT
The challenge for ASEAN is how to confront overlapping crises abroad while also driving post-pandemic growth at home within the limits of a grouping of diverse countries that operates by consensus. This challenge is immense but not insurmountable. Born as a small non-communist bloc amid the Cold War, ASEAN is no stranger to geopolitical competition. Despite the predictions of naysayers, it has since expanded to become an indispensable institution across Southeast Asia, the convenor of Indo-Pacific diplomacy, and the source of about a tenth of total global economic output.
ASEAN began to address this challenge in 2023 under Indonesia’s chairmanship. The grouping connected its own ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific with tangible economic outcomes and the visions of its dialogue partners, including the United States and China despite their ongoing competition. It deepened the diversification of its power mix beyond Washington and Beijing through various initiatives, including upgrading its ties with Japan and Canada and pledging to do so with South Korea. It did not shy away from addressing major challenges, as evidenced by its adoption of new guidelines to accelerate a South China Sea code of conduct and suspending Myanmar from chairing ASEAN in 2026. It also intensified the focus on major sectoral areas such as electric vehicles and cross-border payment systems. This is a pragmatic recognition that member states are competing in the search for growth sources amid an uncertain global economic outlook and shifting supply chains.
Yet overcoming the challenge in 2024 and beyond will require not only sustaining these various lines of work but also more far-reaching efforts. Overlapping crises reinforce the need for all member states to adopt a more expansive notion of their national interests. This would recognise the immense regional stakes in issues like China’s provocations against the Philippines or sprawling Mekong scam networks. Crafting the ASEAN Community’s post-2025 vision also affords an opportunity to examine institutional mechanisms that could make ASEAN more responsive and flexible. Member countries must also continue undertaking measures to not only better insulate themselves from intensifying major power competition, but also shape the wider environment and even transcend it through adroit balancing and engagement. This will help maximise Southeast Asia’s agency and boost its growth story rather than making the region simply an object of the great powers.
ASEAN’S PRIMARY PURPOSE IS INTERNAL SOLIDARITY, NOT INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE
GORDON CONOCHIE — ADJUNCT RESEARCH FELLOW AT LATROBE UNIVERSITY
When Cambodia hosted ASEAN in 2012, it was heavily criticised for favouring China in negotiations to the detriment of its ASEAN partners, and the closeness of Cambodia’s relations with China still worries many as Cambodia’s indebtedness mounts. Concern is heightened by the uncertainty of how the Western-educated, English-speaking Hun Manet will lean as Cambodia’s new prime minister.
The challenge for ASEAN, and not just in relation to Cambodia, is that it is not a single actor and therefore finds it difficult to know what it wants, or even thinks. Without purpose, it becomes little more than a photograph with each leader holding hands in a show of solidarity. Cambodia was rightly praised for its hosting of ASEAN in 2022, which does not mean that pronouncements of consequence were made, but rather that statements, meetings, and ceremonies proceeded unduly. Delegates were happy with their hotel rooms.
China knows what it wants and pursues it diplomatically and economically. Countries like Cambodia know what China wants of them and what the benefits and costs may be of behaving accordingly. The choice becomes clear, whereas ASEAN remains a muddle. China will remain a much larger influence than ASEAN on the foreign policy of individual members.
It is, however, unfair on ASEAN to pit it against China in terms of international influence. Like the EU, ASEAN’s primary reason for being is not to influence international affairs but to promote solidarity among its members. It is internal facing. If internal solidarity is its primary purpose, then this could be measured by the absence of conflict between ASEAN members.
We may not see it, but the constant dialogue and pretensions of unity within ASEAN could be permeating the fabric of Southeast Asia, growing peacefulness, which will be able to withstand any divisions in regard to China.
ASEAN NEEDS A FRESH NARRATIVE
NAZIA HUSSAIN — ASSOCIATE RESEARCH FELLOW, CENTRE FOR MULTILATERALISM STUDIES (CMS), THE S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (RSIS), NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY (NTU)
ASEAN had a successful year under Indonesia’s chairmanship in 2023, having launched the ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA) — the first major region-wide digital economy agreement in the world. However, challenges such as the Myanmar crisis, contestation in the South China Sea, as well as intensifying great power rivalry and the subsequent proliferation of minilaterals bring into question the ASEAN’s relevance and its centrality in the region. Deteriorating US-China relations particularly have complicated traditional ASEAN diplomacy, threatening to split the regional organisation along the fault lines created by its member states’ external relations.
ASEAN needs a fresh narrative to remain in the centre of the fluid situation and sustain its role as a valuable partner and interlocutor for major powers. The group’s focus on maintaining a robust digital economy and acknowledging the shift in nomenclature from Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific helps reinforce its strategic relevance and balance the interests of major powers in the region. ASEAN must refurbish its existing mechanisms to stay relevant in an increasingly uncertain world, which cannot be done without unity of purpose and a common vision in strengthening its collective value.
The key approach going forward is to reassert ASEAN centrality in Southeast Asian development and progress, in tandem with the commitment of respective member states to avoid being swayed by the strategic ambitions of external powers.
EVALUATING ASEAN BEYOND COMMON REFRAINS
HUNTER MARSTON — ASSOCIATE WITH 9DASHLINE, PHD CANDIDATE AT THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, AND ADJUNCT RESEARCH FELLOW AT LA TROBE ASIA
Despite increasingly common refrains that ASEAN has become irrelevant or comparatively ineffective in an age of minilaterals, I wouldn’t bet on the organisation disappearing any time soon. Great power politics have introduced certain structural challenges, but they are neither insurmountable nor new in ASEAN’s history.
ASEAN has weathered various coups or coup attempts (including among its founding members, such as the Philippines and Thailand) before, so it has some institutional memory to respond to extreme political violence in Myanmar today. That said, the list of members has expanded significantly, which has made it more difficult to achieve consensus and act collectively.
Rather than viewing the South China Sea disputes strictly as an example of ASEAN’s failure to deter China, the issue must be seen through ASEAN’s unique cultural and relational perspective. Given the obvious asymmetry between individual claimants and China as well as the strong preference to avoid confrontation, ASEAN has been moderately successful in preventing interstate conflict and binding China through a dialogue process (even if it has failed to produce a meaningful Code of Conduct).
Certain members seem more willing to pursue minilateralism to manage specific issues of interest such as the South China Sea dispute and the ongoing conflict in Myanmar. For example, Vietnam and the Philippines have discussed an agreement on maritime cooperation, while some democracies in ASEAN have expressed a stronger interest in pushing the Myanmar military to adhere to the Five Point Consensus agreed to in 2022.
If ASEAN is unable to address the Myanmar crisis it will represent a serious threat to intraregional stability as well as the organisation’s credibility. Success on just one of these pressing issues — whether minilateral or from a majority of members mobilising consensus — would go a long way toward demonstrating ASEAN’s continuing influence and relevance in an era of great power competition.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform. Image credit: Flickr/UK Government.