In Conversation with Dr Elvin Ong
10 February 2023
9DASHLINE recently sat down with Dr Elvin Ong to discuss his new book Opposing Power: Building Opposition Alliances in Electoral Autocracies.
This insightful study of East and Southeast Asian electoral autocracies from 1965 to 2020 illustrates why and how opposition parties build alliances to fight autocratic incumbents, and under which conditions they don’t.
In your book, you argue that there are two key variables that most decisively sway the efforts and actions of opposition parties in electoral autocracies vis-à-vis jointly campaigning in opposition alliances: their perceptions of regime vulnerability and perceptions of mutual dependency for opposition victory. Could you briefly explain what you mean by this?
EO: The main idea that I want to propose is that opposition party leaders in electoral autocracies are strategic actors who have to make decisions based on very limited and unreliable information within a very uncertain and repressive environment. Therefore, the electoral decisions that they make are often contingent on their perceptions of this environment.
I argue that before every election they try very hard to assess whether the autocrat has become more vulnerable (i.e., has either become more unpopular or has internal regime splits), and whether they need the help of fellow opposition leaders to win (or if they can win on their own).
If opposition party leaders obtain clear information suggesting that the autocrat’s popularity is in rapid decline, or that there are severe splits within the autocrat’s regime, they are more likely to believe that they themselves have a chance of defeating the autocrat. This motivates them to want to make difficult compromises to forge alliances in order to maximise their chances of victory.
Similarly, if opposition party leaders obtain clear information suggesting that they really need the help of fellow opposition leaders, they are also less likely to be belligerent during alliance negotiations. This can help to make alliance building easier, as party leaders recognise that they need each other to mitigate their strengths and weaknesses. Less time is spent fighting each other and more fighting against the dictator.
Do you think the Philippines’ Salvador Laurel and Corazon Aquino recognised that they couldn’t win the 1986 elections without the other because of their similarities (for example, in terms of ideology and religion)? In other words, do you think that a lack of personal differences significantly improves the chances for opposition candidates to cooperate or are extrinsic factors (e.g., weak government) just as important?
EO: It would be inaccurate to say that they did not have personal differences. Based on my research, Salvador Laurel and Corazon Aquino had very different personalities and backgrounds. The former was a seasoned politician, well-versed in negotiations and making deals. The latter was charismatic but politically inexperienced. Both approached politics differently and they had tremendous differences reconciling their styles and ideas.
It is true that both were Catholics and fairly moderate in their general ideological outlook. But those were not common factors that generated their mutual recognition for each other. In fact, the vast majority of Filipino elites at that time were also Catholics and ideologically moderate. Still, that did not stop them from bickering with each other.
Mutual recognition of forming an alliance between them was simply based on the clear expectation by everyone around them — join and you both might win, split and you will definitely lose. This clear expectation was driven by numerous factors, such as growing public protests against the Marcos regime, Marcos’ own health problems and growing unpopularity, as well as the assurances of support from the United States if they both actually won. Neither of them wanted to lose, so they made the last-minute wrenching decision to join together.
You describe in detail how the vote share among South Korean opposition parties got split, leading to Roh Tae Woo’s victory in the 1987 election. What lessons from this vote split can be drawn for future opposition parties?
EO: The split in vote share in 1987 between the South Korean opposition leaders is a painful lesson for opposition party leaders and parties in general. Instead of potentially celebrating the electoral victory of a progressive opposition leader, the country was stuck with a military-aligned conservative party president. A progressive leader, like Kim Dae Jung, would not be elected until more than ten years later in 1998.
The main takeaway from the entire episode is that it is not wise for opposition party leaders to be belligerent and to bicker among themselves in order to stand out more than the others. Time, effort, and resources spent on infighting are wasted time, effort, and resources that are lost in the fight against the dictator. Forging mutual confidence and unity amongst their supporters to in order to deliver a joint democratic victory is more important than which opposition leader benefits more or less.
You explain that the Singaporean opposition strategy has revolved around reducing the number of opposition candidates in each electoral district in order to maximise their vote shares within those districts. Can this lead to eventual regime change in the country?
EO: Yes, such a strategy can increase the chances of regime change. With only one or a group of opposition candidates in each district, opposition supporters can simply throw their support behind that one party. No votes will be split and the opposition’s chances of winning in each district are maximised.
However, not all opposition parties and candidates are equal. Some opposition parties are seen as more credible than others. For example, we know from public surveys that the Workers’ Party is perceived to be the most credible opposition party by the public. It is perceived to be well organised and has good candidates. Therefore, the districts where only its candidates run stand a reasonable chance of winning.
In contrast, other less credible opposition parties are perceived as less well-organised with less desirable candidates. In the districts where these opposition parties run, such a strategy may only help them to a limited extent. Their support is likely to be mediocre anyway.
One of the cases you explore in detail concerns Malaysian politics from 1965-2018. Politics in the country have been in a state of crisis since 2020, and for the first time in the country’s history, federal elections in late 2022 resulted in a hung parliament. Can you help us understand the current state of affairs in Malaysia?
EO: As my book reveals, the historic 2018 Malaysian general elections saw the opposition Pakatan Harapan (PH) alliance defeat the dominant ruling party Barisan Nasional (BN) for the first time. Yet, splits within the newly victorious PH government from 2020 onwards led to several government changes. Malaysia saw three different prime ministers between 2018 and 2022.
For the latest general election in 2022, the PH alliance once again emerged as the overall winner with the most seats — 82 in total. But this was not enough to command a majority in the 222-seat legislature. Hence, the PH leader, Datuk Sri Anwar Ibrahim, was tasked with cobbling together a governing coalition with smaller parties in order to command a majority in the legislature.
While this post-election jostling to form a government coalition may be highly unusual in Malaysia, it is not too surprising in more mature democracies, such as in Europe. In those countries, post-election coalition building is par for the course.
Currently, Anwar’s unity government has successfully mustered the confidence of the parliament and is preparing to table a brand new budget for 2023 this month. His government seems stable, for now. Much will depend on whether the unity government can work together to compete in several state-level elections in the middle of the year.
If the unity government emerges victorious in the majority of those state-level elections, the stability of the central government will be assured. However, if the opposition wins the majority of those state-level elections, they might hobble together whatever policy initiatives Anwar’s unity government tries to implement at the central level. This may include economic policies, as well as socio-cultural policies surrounding contentious issues of race and religion.
A number of national elections are coming up in South and Southeast Asia this year. Do you expect any opposition alliances to form in any of these countries and, if so, how would you rate their potential success?
EO: The election in Thailand will be most interesting because the electoral landscape is fragmented amongst various political parties. Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha has announced that he will join the newly created United Thai Nation Party to contest the upcoming elections. His deputy prime minister continues to helm the Palang Pracharath Party, even as a significant number of MPs have defected to the Bhumjaithai Party. The Pheu Thai Party, headed by the youngest daughter of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, is the vanguard of the opposition and is leading in opinion polls.
Given this fragmented landscape, as well as new electoral rules and boundaries, there is great uncertainty over the potential outcome of the election. While there may be some moves to form pre-electoral alliances between like-minded parties, I believe the chances to be quite low. The uncertainty of the relative strengths and weaknesses of each party is too high for party leaders to have a clear sense of each other. Any pre-electoral alliance is likely to be half-baked.
What is more likely to emerge is a Malaysia-style scenario, whereby post-election negotiations over a coalition government are likely to be very intense. In a bid for power, expect no-holds-barred negotiations and eyebrow-raising compromises. After all, as some would say, there are no permanent enemies and no permanent friends in politics. Only permanent interests.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Dr Elvin Ong is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the National University of Singapore. He studies democratisation in East and Southeast Asia, particularly focusing on the role of opposition parties. He has published in major disciplinary and regional journals such as the American Journal of Political Science, Party Politics, Government and Opposition, Contemporary Southeast Asia, the Journal of East Asian Studies, and Asian Survey.