In Conversation: Aparna Pande on India's future
In conversation: Aparna pande on india’s FUTURE
MAKING INDIA GREAT: THE PROMISE OF A RELUCTANT GLOBAL POWER
IN CONVERSATION WITH APARNA PANDE
4 December 2020
Our Associate Editor, Dr Manali Kumar recently sat down with Dr Aparna Pande of the Hudson Institute in Washington D.C. to discuss her latest book — Making India Great.
India seems to be on a precipice today due to a marked decline in its economic, political, and social fundamentals. The Indian economy had started slowing down by late-2019. It’s democratic procedures and institutions have been systematically undermined by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s administration (re-elected last summer). A controversial citizenship amendment enacted in December last year unleashed nationwide protests, which ended, only, due to the COVID-19 lockdown in March this year. The country’s social fabric seems to be unravelling with increasing insecurity experienced by minorities and women, driven by a government intent on persecuting critics and rights activists.
These fault lines have only been made worse by the current pandemic, which has laid bare the many inadequacies of India’s healthcare system, institutional incapacities, and incompetent policymaking. Dr Aparna Pande’s book, Making India Great, offers a harsh reality check at a time when much of the contemporary discourse in India seems unwilling to reflect on, and acknowledge the monumental challenges facing the country today.
You note that persistent policy short-sightedness, rigid bureaucracies, and conservative attitudes over decades — indeed, since India’s independence perhaps — have held the country back. Why has this been the case and how can it be changed?
Indians, both laypeople and leaders, have always believed in the seeming inevitability of India’s rise to the high table. There is a strong belief among Indians, irrespective of where they might stand on the ideological spectrum, that there is a uniquely Indian way of doing things and that their way will somehow and in some way overcome any challenges that come in India’s path.
There is an insufficient reflection on what holds the country back whether it is in the economic sphere, human capital, social issues, military, or foreign policy. While a sense of exceptionalism is predictable, for a five millennia-old civilisation, it can also impede self-awareness.
To be a global player today requires not a harkening back to past glory, but acquiring and developing contemporary instruments of national power. This requires, systematic investment in human capital, critical economic reforms, social stability, consistent military modernisation and an overarching grand strategy. None of these is impossible for any Indian government, the problem is lack of political will in some cases, diversion towards social issues in other, and lack of resources in many others.
The Indian liberal agenda of weakening orthodoxy and promoting modernisation remains unfulfilled. Meanwhile, not only have conservative ideas remained remarkably consistent over the decades but also seem to be ascendant today. To what extent does this reflect a failure of Indian liberalism? Is it perhaps impossible to manage this level of pluralism in a democracy?
The current struggle between two contending imaginings of India, one modern and secular and the other conservative and religious, is decades old and continues into the twenty-first century. We must remember that the role of the state in religious matters has always been problematic in South Asia just, as in the Middle East. India’s founding generation wrote a constitution that embraced a broadly liberal interpretation of individual rights and the state’s attitude towards religion.
However, it can be argued that India’s embrace of modernity may have been too quick and somewhat contrived. Ancient societies are resistant to change. Over the years, but more so recently, Hindu nationalism has been paving the way for a more traditional India. Hindutva sees Islam and to a lesser extent Christianity as existential threats which justify drastic state action, aimed at undoing what an earlier generation considered modernising reforms. This has mobilised many Indians around an insular and rigid form of a majoritarian identity.
I would argue that democracies are better suited to pluralism and liberalism and so are more heterogeneous societies. If homogeneity and autocratic rule ensured liberalism, then Han-majority homogenous China would be democratic.
In addition to the absence of expansionist and revisionist ambitions, India’s liberal democratic credentials have been a crucial factor in the acceptance of its rise by the international community. Do you think the recent illiberal and majoritarian turn in India’s domestic politics might affect the country’s ambitions to play a greater role in global leadership?
India’s desire for global pre-eminence and recognition by others of its great power status requires that the rest of the world be comfortable with India’s sense of self. The quest for authenticity through pre-Muslim and pre-western Hindu traditions, turning back the clock on the status of women, minorities, and ‘lower’ castes, and an excessively inward focus — though popular at home — may not sit well with India’s plans for global greatness. Hyper-nationalism is often accompanied by xenophobia, which in turn runs the risk of diminishing the quality of India’s interaction with the rest of the world.
You note the importance of South Asia for India’s national security. Every Indian government has prioritised the country’s neighbourhood as its sphere of influence. Yet, South Asia remains the least integrated region in the world and China is a much bigger trading partner for India’s neighbours. Worse, in recent months, relations with Nepal — a long time partner — have deteriorated sharply. Why has India’s engagement with its immediate neighbourhood been so unsuccessful despite rhetorical emphasis?
India’s immediate neighbourhood (South Asia) has remained at the top of the list of priorities for every government, irrespective of political party or ideology. India seeks the first circle in its immediate neighbourhood to comprise friendly states and remains averse to outside powers aligning with India’s neighbours or neighbouring states working in collusion with outside powers at India’s expense. Indian leaders may have given varying names — from Indira Doctrine and Gujral doctrine to Neighbourhood First — to their outlook on the South Asian region but all of them demonstrate this criticality of South Asia to India’s foreign policy.
India accepts the sovereignty of all its neighbours but its emphasis on ancient history creates fear that New Delhi’s goal might be to diminish the separate identities of its smaller neighbours. That fear is similar to recent reactions to a European Union that transcends borders. Smaller nations fear losing their uniqueness and India’s civilisational approach to regional relations is producing an ultra-nationalist sentiment within neighbouring countries.
With the challenge from China looming, the world’s democracies would like to see a more militarily and economically aggressive India. But New Delhi must find a way to assure its immediate neighbours in South Asia that India’s rise would not be a threat to their separate national existence.
Considering India’s grand strategy or lack of one, you argue, “India wants to get somewhere, but does not know which road to take because it has not decided where it wishes to arrive“. As the rivalry between China and the US becomes more pronounced, what destination would you recommend India select for itself?
More than any other single factor, China’s ascendancy presents problems that cannot be remedied with merely tactical fixes: banning apps, surgical strikes, purchasing new weapons or augmenting troop deployments. China demonstrates a full spectrum of threats to India: troops on the border, access to international finance, and regional instability.
The rise of China situates one of the world’s most powerful countries as a rival on India’s doorstep. China’s rise is hardly a single conflict; instead, it is a clash between two civilisations, which intersects on political, social, security and economic levels. Rather than personal diplomacy or quick fixes, what is required is a fundamental overhaul of India’s strategic outlook.
China has, over the decades, built a strong economy, modernised its military, built strategic infrastructure on land and in the sea, and fortified territory on its side of the border with India. New Delhi is still playing catch-up on many fronts, primarily economic and military. The simple reality that a massively powerful state with a penchant for aggression exists on India’s borders should serve to jumpstart economic reforms and allocation of resources towards the military. While India has built strong partnerships with South Asian countries and the United States, it has yet to fully harness those relations in a strategic sense.
You offer some much-needed policy prescriptions from investing in human capital, education, and R&D to expanding the country’s defence, military capabilities, and diplomatic corps. As the country experiences an economic slowdown, which has only been compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic, how can India chart a forward looking course?
The crisis unleashed by the coronavirus pandemic will almost definitely create a new global order, and India could emerge stronger. If India wants to be seen as a serious global actor, and not just an important one because of its large population, then the government needs to invest in building a modern military, bolster the economy, boost partnerships with allied democracies, and strengthen India’s democratic institutions.
In the short term, the pandemic will have a negative impact not just on economic growth but also income inequality. In the long run, the government has an opportunity to use the crisis to push through reforms in every arena. India’s challenge has never been lack of policy ideas; rather, it has suffered from a lack of political will and long-term strategic planning to implement those ideas even if one has to wait years for the final results. If the government decides to use the crisis to implement strategic reforms in various arenas, India will be better off and closer to her goals of high economic growth, a strong military, and a place on the global high table.
India is a country obsessed with greatness — becoming a great power in the future, but especially the greatness of its past. An important theme in your book is exploring how India’s civilisational past affects its present and future. You note that pride in its history and culture is the source of Indian exceptionalism, but also criticise the country’s obsession with its past for preventing its progress. Is it time for India to stop looking back or is there any scope to harness its heritage to move forward into the future?
A sense of exceptionalism lies at the heart of Indian civilisation. India is not alone in considering itself a civilisational state or even in viewing itself as unique. The notion that everything humans are capable of accomplishing has already been attained by ancient Indians is problematic. In addition to claiming that Indian civilisation is superior and only needs recognition by the rest of the world, this attitude makes Indians reluctant to look within. It breeds a propensity for living in denial and an unwillingness to acknowledge what may be inconvenient.
India and Indians have yet to find the balance between philosophical debates and conversation on practical matters. Getting carried away by emotions about other people’s beliefs or views on history or social or religious issues often comes in the way of determining a course of action in the present moment. On the one hand, India’s pride and its view of self come from its traditions and history. On the other, being tradition-bound holds it back from achieving global power status in the twenty-first century. Ancient India was isolationist, which modern India cannot afford to be. Ancient India was other-worldly but modern India needs to succeed and exercise power in this world. Only that would make India great in the eyes of the world.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Dr Aparna Pande is director of the Initiative on the Future of India and South Asia at the Hudson Institute, Washington, D.C. Born in India. Pande received her bachelor’s and master’s degrees in History from St. Stephen’s College, University of Delhi, before receiving an M.Phil. in International Relations from Jawaharlal Nehru University. She completed her PhD in Political Science at Boston University in the United States.
Her latest book ‘Making India Great’ is available here.